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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a consolidated statement of the facts in this case. The record contains 
voluminous chronologies of the factual events underpinning this action. Attached as 
Appendix "A" is a more comprehensive presentation of the facts pertaining to ADC's Case-in-
Chief, with corresponding citations to the record. Attached as Appendix "B" is greater detail 
as to the facts associated with Tobias/Feld's counterclaims, with corresponding citations to the 
record. 
1. This case is principally about Janalee Tobias and Judy Feld's ("Tobias/Feld") 
wrongful attempts to stop a local developer, Anderson Development Company ("ADC"), from 
purchasing and developing a parcel of property located in South Jordan, Utah, that was part 
of a larger real estate development (the "RiverPark Business Park"). See Appendix "A" at 
passim. 
2. Tobias/Feld live adjacent to the RiverPark Business Park. While Tobias/Feld 
exercised their properly protected rights in the public forum to criticize this planned 
development, they also chose to engage in other actions outside the public forum that 
intentionally and wrongfully interfered with ADC's contractual and economic relations with 
many of these landowners to further try and stop the development.] See Appendix "A" at ffl[47, 
*As discussed herein, Tobias/Feld has wrongfully and intentionally interfered with 
several of the landowners involved in the RiverPark Business Park. Only the wrongful 
interference with the Williams is the subject of this case. Tobias/Feld's action to try and stop 
the purchase by ADC of the William's Property was the most egregious, most likely because 
the William's Property was the parcel closest to Tobias' residence. 
-1 -
48,50,51(a)-51(q). 
3. This action addresses Tobias/Feld's intentional and wrongful interference with 
ADC's contractual and economic relations outside of the public forum with one of these 
landowners, the Williams. See Appendix "A" at passim. 
4. The RiverPark Business Park was the result of ADC assembling approximately 
120 acres of contiguous real property from several different landowners, obtaining 
governmental entitlements so the property could be used as a business park, and then buying 
the entitled property from the landowners. See Appendix "A" at lffl2, 3, 60. 
5. Specifically, ADC entered into an option purchase agreement (in the form of a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract or "REPC") with the Williams on or about October 28, 1996 
to purchase approximately 30 acres that comprised the southern part of the anticipated 
RiverPark Business Park (the "Williams Property") for $35,000.00 per acre (the "First 
REPC). See Appendix "A" at ffi[5, 6, 49, 61, 79, 80, 108, 109, 113. 
6. The First REPC provided that ADC had until June 30, 1997 to obtain the 
requisite zoning that would permit the Williams Property to be used as a business park. It is 
this contractual and economic relationship that Tobias/Feld wrongfully attacked. Their goal 
- to interfere with and use any means to thwart the sale of the Williams' property to ADC. See 
Appendix "A" at ^{7, 49, 83. 
7. Tobias/Feld failed to understand that this case is not about how Tobias/Feld 
impacted the Williams from performing under the First REPC or otherwise, but rather how 
Tobias/Feld wrongfully and intentionally damaged ADC in its contractual and economic 
-2-
relations with the Williams. 
A. Tobias/Feld's Intentional and Wrongful Interference with ADC's 
Contractual Relations with the Williams under the First REPC. 
8. Tobias/Feld's first improper efforts were to try and get the Williams to breach 
or otherwise refuse honor their contract to sell the Williams Property to ADC. Their efforts 
were concerted, intentional and wrongful in this regard. See Appendix "A" at ^ [9-19, 51, 84-
88,96, 110. 
9. However, when they concluded that despite these efforts, the Williams were 
going to honor the First REPC, they changed tactics and decided that to stop ADC from buying 
the Williams Property they needed to delay the zoning changes over the property until after the 
First REPC expired. See Appendix "A" at Tfl[7,12,28,29,30, 51(b), 510, 51(k), 66,67,101. 
10. Tobias/Feld contacted various key decision-makers at South Jordan City for the 
improper purpose of delaying the process for re-zoning the Williams Property until after June 
30,1997, when the Williams Option Agreement expired. See Appendix "A" at ffl[23,28,51 (j), 
51(k), 64,66. 
11. Tobias/Feld continued their pattern of misrepresentations, including, but not 
limited to, that they had raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for the protection of open 
spaces, were a tax-exempt entity and were interested in preserving open spaces throughout the 
Jordan River Valley generally, as well as their abilities to purchase the Williams Property 
bought and preserve it as open spaces to these key decision-makers. See Appendix "A" at 
ffl[20, 21, 25, 29, 32, 51(p), 51(q), 53, 67, 91, 92, 99, 111, 115. 
-3-
12. These decision-makers agreed to accommodate Tobias/Feld and delay the 
process for re-zoning the Williams Property until after June 30, 1997, so that the Williams 
Properly could be purchased by SOS or its associates. See Appendix "A" at 1fij22,24, 54, 70, 
98-100. 
13. While every other parcel comprising the RiverPark Business Park was rezoned 
and otherwise entitled to be part of a master planned business park before June 30,1997, these 
decision-makers delayed the rezoning of the Williams Property, as requested by Tobias/Feld, 
until after the expiration of the First REPC. See Appendix "A" at ffi[30, 31, 73, 101.2 
B. Tobias/Feld's Intentional and Wrongful Interference with ADC's 
Prospective Economic Relations with the Williams as Evidenced by the 
Second REPC, 
14. Concurrent with Tobias/Feld wrongful efforts to delay the zoning over the 
Williams Property, they also worked to stop ADC from purchasing by acting as a "shill" in the 
marketplace for the Williams Property. A shill is one who poses as a decoy in a con-game. 
For example, a shill is used in an auction setting by misrepresenting itself as an interested and 
financially able buyer. The shill then runs up the cost of items at the auction without any intent 
or ability to actually pay for the items. This wrongful conduct by the shill results in legitimate 
buyers being required to pay significantly more for the items at auction. !See Appendix "A" 
atffi[27, 91-100, 102, 103, 111, 112, 115, 116. 
2David Millheim, the them City Manager of South Jordan City and Thomas Christensen, 
a then member of South Jordan City Council, have provided credible and substantial testimony 
to these material facts. See Appendix "A" at fflf 45-78. 
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15. In the present case, Tobias/Feld introduced themselves to the Williams as 
willing and able buyers or facilitators for the purchase of the Williams Property. They 
misrepresented themselves as the principals of a credible and legitimate environmental 
charitable entity called "Save Open Spaces," commonly referred to by them as "SOS," and that 
they had the ability and connections to buy the property to be preserved as "open spaces."See 
Appendix "A" at ^ 2 0 , 2 1 , 25, 29, 31, 51(q), 53-55,91-100, 102, 103, 111, 112, 115, 116. 
16. These misrepresentations included that they had raised hundreds of thousands 
of dollars for the protection of open spaces, were a tax-exempt entity and were interested in 
preserving open spaces throughout the Jordan River Valley generally. Tobias/Feld further 
misrepresented to the Williams that they had buyers ready and able to buy the Williams 
Property for significantly more that the $35,000 per acre contractual amount under the First 
REPC. See Appendix "A" atffi[51(q), 74, 91-100, 102, 103. 
17. These representations were false. Tobias/Feld's sole concern and interest was 
stopping ADC from developing the RiverPark Business Park adjoining their neighborhood. 
They were not part of a tax-exempt entity, were not recognized by any governmental division 
(either state or federal) as a charity, had never raised any substantial monies, and were in 
violation of Utah law. See Appendix "A" at ffi[56-58, 106, 107. 
18. Furthermore, and significantly, Tobias/Feld never had procured any able and 
willing buyers for the Williams' Property. See Appendix "A" at 1fl[56, 76. 
19. By acting as a shill, Tobias/Feld intentionally caused the Williams to wrongfully 
believe they could obtain more money for the Williams Property than the $35,000 per acre 
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offered by ADC in the First REPC.3 See Appendix "A" at ^ [104. 
C. Tobias/Feld's Wrongful Actions Caused ADC to Sustain Significant 
Financial Damages. 
20. These intentional and wrongful actions by Tobias/Feld caused ADC to lose the 
benefits that it had under the First REPC. Once the First REPC expired, ADC was required 
to pay a significantly higher price for the Williams Property. See Appendix "A" at 1H[95, 98, 
102, 103, 111, 112, 115, 116. 
21. Based on Tobias/Feld's misrepresentations to Williams that they were or had 
procured a buyer willing to pay more money for the Williams Property than what ADC had 
offered under the First REPC, coupled with the then undiscovered con that they had played on 
South Jordan City officials, the Williams would not sell their property to ADC under the same 
terms of the First REPC. SeeAppendixuA"at^33,34(aHg),35,95,98,102-104, 111, 112, 
116. 
22. Instead, in order to complete the River Park Development, as ADC had 
committed to do to both South Jordan City and its investors, it had to pay more than $700,000 
in actual additional to expenses to obtain the Williams Property, thus the Second REPC cost 
ADC significantly more than under the First REPC. See Appendix "A" at ffi[35, 95, 98, 102-
104. 
23. This and other incidental and consequential damages to ADC were the direct and 
3Boyd Williams, Dorothy Williams and Cheri Johnson (William's Daughter) have 
provided credible and substantial testimony to these material facts. See Appendix "A" at lfi|79-
116. 
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proximate result of Tobias/Feld' s concerted, intentional and wrongful interference with ADC' s 
business and economic relations. These damages caused ADC to initiate the present suit, as 
such wrongful conduct by Tobias/Feld and resulting damages to ADC are actionable under 
Utah law. See Appendix "A" at HU34(a>(g), 35. 
24. While Tobias/Feld want to now deny that they engaged in these actions, they 
have publically admitted that they did engage in a concerted effort to damage ADC. In an 
article published by THE VOICE in September 2001, defendant Brent Foutz (who acted in 
concert with Tobias/Feld) literally gloated that he, Tobias and Feld had "cost [ADC] millions 
of dollars." See R. 3676. 
D. Tobias/FekTs Statement of Facts Contain Misstatements and Extraneous 
Facts. 
Tobias/Feld's Statement of Facts includes substantial extraneous statements of fact. 
Tobias/Feld seem more intent on arguing their position than setting forth facts (i.e. outlining 
who was not sued (Tfl[26g and h); stating what a reporter wrote (1|26k); and stating the obvious 
that an entity must be represented by counsel instead of appearing pro se (f261)), all of which 
are nothing more than an attempt to influence this Court based upon extraneous and immaterial 
factors. In particular, referring to numbered paragraphs of Tobias/Feld's Statement of Facts: 
1. Paragraph 17 attempts to create inferences from settlement discussions held in 
an attempt to settle the matter. Settlement discussions are privileged, confidential and 
inadmissable. The trial court found such efforts to bring settlement discussions into the 
resolution of the matter on the merits to be improper and struck the allegations that the 
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settlement negotiations were evidence of wrongdoing. See Order dated October 22,2002; R. 
1836. Tobias/Feld cannot seem to abide by the decision of the Court and continue to claim that 
the settlement negotiations are evidence of wrongdoing. 
2. Paragraphs 22 through 23 and 38 through 40 merely state procedural history 
of the case that has no bearing on the underlying merits of the case. 
3. Paragraph 26 makes an unfounded claim that the facts recited thereafter 
"clearly and convincingly show the Developer's lawsuit was 'commenced and continued for 
the purpose of harassing, intimidating, [or] punishing'" TobiasVFeld for participation in the 
process of government. The facts show nothing of the case. ADC carefully only brought its 
claims against Tobias\Feld for actions that were clearly outside of the process of government. 
TobiasVFeld acted to damage ADC outside of the public process. Yet TobiasVFeld have 
consistently and arrogantly claimed that their activity in the process of government (for which 
no complaint has ever been made) gives them a "free pass" for their wrongful and damaging 
activities outside of the process of government. Such a premise is clearly objectionable to both 
the SLAPP legislation and the United States Constitution. No one gets any such "free pass." 
4. Paragraphs 29 through 32 attempts to state as facts the appellants' arguments 
and the appellants' characterization of the trial court rulings (i.e. "tortured reasoning," 
"erroneous legal conclusions," "ignored the factual allegations"). Tobias/Feld may disagree 
with the rulings below but stating that as the facts of this case is totally inappropriate. 
5. Paragraph 36 misstates the facts. The ADC complains because TobiasVFeld 
misrepresented that they had funding when they had none in order to delay the zoning change. 
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6. Paragraph 37 attempts to make a statement of law (misstated) as fact. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDING 
The following is a chronological listing of the major and pertinent procedural events 
that have occurred in this action. ADC has not attempted to present a comprehensive 
itemization of all the filings in this action and refers this Court to the trial court's docketing 
listing for further detail as to any specific filing in this action. 
1. This action was filed by ADC on March 17,1998 against Tobias/Feld asserting, 
in pertinent part, claims for relief for intentional interference with existing contractual relations 
and for intentional interference with prospective economic relations. See R. 1-22. 
2. On or about April 21, 1998, Tobias/Feld filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure claiming that ADC's Complaint failed "to state 
a claim for intentional interference with existing contractual relations or intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations". . . [and that Tobias/Feld had been] "subjected to the 
oppression of this lawsuit for no reason other than that [ADC] ha[d] the resources to misuse 
the judicial system in order to harass and retaliate against [Tobias/Feld] who have exercised 
their rights " See Tobias/Feld's Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss at pp. 
6-7; R. 23-33, 48-53. 
3. On or about December 8, 1998, the trial court denied Tobias/Feld's Motion to 
Dismiss ruling that "[t]he Plaintiff [ADC] has stated a cause of action in its complaint of 
intentional interference with existing economic relations or prospective economic relations." 
See Disposition Summary dated December 8, 1998; R. 68. 
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4. On or about November 9, 2001, Tobias/Feld filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment claiming again that ADC had failed to state a cause of action against them for 
interference with either existing contractual relations or prospective economic relations. See 
Tobias/Feld's Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 9; R. 
337-370. 
5. On or about May 21, 2002, the trial court denied Tobias/Feld's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. See Ruling on Motions dated May 21, 2002 at p. 1; R. 927-930. 
6. On or about July 2, 2002, Tobias/Feld filed their counterclaim (the 
"Counterclaim") asserting claims against ADC under the Utah Citizen Participation in 
Government Act, UCA §§78-58-101, et seq. (the "SLAPP Act") and corresponding common 
law claims of unlawful civil proceedings, abuse of process, intentional and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, punitive damages and attorney's fees. See Tobias/Feld's Counterclaim 
dated July 2, 2002; R. 988-1437. 
7. On or about November 26, 2002, ADC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
over Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaims. See ADC's Motion and supporting Memorandum 
for Summary Judgment dated November 20, 2002; R. 1905-1940, 3051-3108. 
8. On or about December 16, 2002, ADC filed a Motion to Dismiss over 
Tobias/Feld's common law counterclaim. See ADC's Motion and supporting Memorandum 
to Dismiss dated December 12, 2002; R. 1967-1993, 3027-3050. 
9. On or about January 31,2003, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of ADC over Tobias/Feld's SLAPP counterclaims and granted ADC's Motion to Dismiss over 
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Tobias/Feld's common law counterclaims including 1) wrongful use of civil proceedings, 2) 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 3) negligent infliction of emotional distress and 4) 
punitive damages. See R. 3139, 3885-3888. 
10. After the trial court dismissed the SLAPP Counterclaim and all but one of the 
Common Law Counterclaims, Tobias/Feld requested that the trial judge certify these rulings 
as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to facilitate a right to 
interlocutory appeal. The trial judge refused this request by Tobias/Feld, noting it was time 
for this case to go to trial. See R. 4405 at pp. 80-82. 
11 On or about February 10, 2003, ADC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
over Tobias/Feld's Abuse of Process Counterclaim (their only remaining counterclaim). See 
ADC's Motion and supporting Memorandum for Summary Judgment over Tobias/Feld's 
Abuse of Process Counterclaim. This motion was granted on July 25,2003. Tobias/Feld have 
not sought interlocutory appeal over this ruling. See R. 3540-3562, 3983-4035, 4376-4380. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from "if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or 
theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this 
is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was 
not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." Dipoma 
v.McPhie.2001 UT61.P 18,29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 
23 Utah 2d 222,225-26 n.2,461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969); see also Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 
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1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (applying Limb); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 714 (1993) ("Generally, 
the appellate court may affirm the judgment where it is correct on any legal ground or theory 
disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason, or theory adopted by the trial 
court."). 
Moreover, "[a] party to an appeal does not have a constitutional right to have a cause 
of action decided on a particular ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995); see 
also State of Utah v. Topanotes, 76 P.3d 1159, 1160 (Utah 2003); Bailev v. Bavles, 2002 UT 
58, *7-9; 52 P.3d 1158 (Utah 2002); Davis County v. Jensen, 83 P.3d 405,406, n3 (Utah App. 
2003). This standard of review is applicable to the present appeal, as this Court may affirm the 
rulings of the trial court either by applying again the analysis the trial court adopted or any of 
the alternative analyzes presented by ADC to the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Properly Granted ADC's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Over Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaim, 
The SLAPP Act should not be applied to this case. It does not contain any language 
for retroactive application and Tobias/Feld's efforts to create a claim against ADC in this 
pending action by way of the SLAPP Act would result in serious and multiple constitutional 
consequences. 
However, if applied, the SLAPP Act by its very terms and procedures requires 
sustaining the trial court's dismissal of Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaims, as a matter of 
law. The SLAPP Act requires a finding that the action was commenced or continued without 
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a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. This Tobias/Feld have also failed to prove. 
The statutory scheme under which the SLAPP Act exists requires a finding by clear and 
convincing evidence that the primary reason for the filing of the complaint was to interfere 
with the First Amendment right of the defendant. This Tobias/Feld have failed to prove. 
ADC's claims do not arise within the governmental process, but rather arise from a private 
sales transaction to which Tobias/Feld have interfered. These failures and deficiencies are fatal 
to Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaims. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted ADC's Motion to Dismiss Over 
Tobias/Feld's Common Law Counterclaims. 
The Trial court properly dismissed the following common law counterclaims brought 
by Tobias/Feld: 
• Wrongful use of civil proceedings 
• Abuse of civil process 
• Intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress 
• Punitive damages and attorney's fees 
Tobias/Feld have not sought an appeal over the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful 
use of civil proceedings. The Utah courts have established that the tort of abuse of civil 
process is predicated on having the underlying action terminate in favor of the person or party 
asserting the claim for abuse of civil process. This is the same requirement as the Utah courts 
have applied to its counterpart tort of abuse of civil proceedings. It is undisputed that the 
present litigation has not yet terminated. As a result, Tobias/Feld's counterclaim for abuse of 
civil process, like its counterclaim for wrongful use of civil proceeding was premature and 
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therefore properly dismissed. 
Furthermore, even when reviewed by the trial court, the only "abuse" raised by 
Tobias/Feld was that ADC abused the civil process when it took Ms. Tobias' deposition. Yet, 
applicable law indisputably required the trial court to find that ADC had sufficient probable 
cause, as well as the actual right, to take Ms. Tobias' deposition and discover the basis and 
circumstances surrounding her emotional state. Therefore, taking her deposition cannot form 
the basis for an abuse of civil process claim. 
The counterclaim asserted by Tobias\Feld for emotional distress and punitive damages 
were also properly dismissed by the trial court, as a consequence of Tobias\Feld having failed 
to meet crucial elements — intentional and negligent emotional distress claims cannot be based 
upon the filing of a complaint and there is no recognized independent tort justifying punitive 
damage or attorney's fees. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Denied Tobias/Feld's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Over ADC's Claims for Intentional Interference with Existing 
Contractual Relations and Prospective Economic Relations Claims. 
This case is not about a developer attempting to punish concerned citizens for voicing 
their honest objections to a development. This case is about lawless extremists who actively 
and intentionally, over the course of months wrongfully interfered with ADC's contractual 
rights to purchase the Williams Property - a critical part of the RiverPark Business Park. This 
interference impaired ADC's contractual right by wrongfully delaying the requisite zoning 
changes over the Williams Property until the first contract expired. And at the same time, 
acting as a shill in the market for the Williams Property, Tobias/Feld created the mis-
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impression, through false representations, that Tobias/Feld or others were willing and able to 
purchase the Williams Property for more than what ADC had offered, evidenced by the terms 
of the second contract. 
These intentional and wrongful actions resulted in the first contract expiring before the 
Williams Property was rezoned (even though every other parcel in the RiverPark Business Park 
had been rezoned before that time) and the Williams demanding that ADC pay more for the 
Williams Property under the second contract based critically on assurances and representations 
by Tobias/ Feld that they had the money or procured others willing and able to purchase the 
Williams Property at a higher price. 
This lawless approach to opposing the RiverPark Business Park is actionable under 
Utah law by asserting the torts of intentional interference with existing contractual or 
prospective economic relations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TOBIAS/FELD's COUNTERCLAIM BROUGHT UNDER THE CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ACT (Utah Code Ann. §§78-58-101 et 
sea.) WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. The Enactment of The Citizen Participation in Government Act: Its 
Purpose and Scope. 
Three years after this the Utah legislature enacted during its 2001 legislative session 
House Bill 112 entitled, "Prevention of Retaliatory Lawsuits." 2001 Utah Laws 163,2001 Ut. 
Ch. 163, 2001 Ut. HB 112. This bill was signed into law by Governor Leavitt on March 15, 
2001, became effective on April 30,2001, and was codified as Utah Code Ann. §§78-58-101, 
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et seq., as the "Citizen Participation in Government Act" (the "SLAPP Act"). 
The SLAPP Act was enacted for two primary purposes: First, to modify the judicial 
code by creating a summary procedure for courts to determine whether a suit filed is in 
retaliation against citizens as a consequence of their participation in the governmental process. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§78-58-103 and 104(2001). Second, to provide citizens with a statutory 
counterclaim against a party who files suit against citizens arising from their participation in 
the governmental process. These suits are often referred to as "slappback" suits. See Utah 
Code Ann. §78-58-105 (2001). 
It is under this SLAPP Act that Tobias/Feld specifically pleaded their First Claim for 
Relief, captioned as, "SLAPP Suit Counterclaim - Utah Code Ann.§§78-58-101,etseq." (The 
"SLAPP Counterclaim). 
Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaim was brought under the statutory framework of the 
second purpose and provisions of the SLAPP Act that creates a new cause of action. See Utah 
Code Ann.§78-58-105 (2001). Tobias/Feld attempted to use this statutory created claim 
against ADC, citing to the specific provisions within the SLAPP Act that created an 
independent cause of action and thereby seeking affirmative relief as follows: 
"196. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a), Tobias/Feld are entitled 
to recover against Anderson Development their costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred in defending this action. 
"197. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(b), Tobias/Feld are entitled 
to recover against Anderson Development compensatory damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial." 
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See Counterclaim at f|fl96 and 197; R. 1030; see also Utah Code Ann. §§78-58-105(l)(a) and 
105(l)(b) (2001). 
However, as discussed herein, because all of the underlying interactions between 
Tobias/Feld and ADC occurred prior to the enactment of the SLAPP Act, the counter-claim 
does not state a viable cause of action for recovery under the SLAPP Act. Accordingly, as a 
matter of law, this cause of action was properly dismissed by the trial court. 
B. Interpreting the SLAPP Act 
1. Utah law provides the framework for interpreting statutes like the 
SLAPP Act 
Under applicable Utah law, when interpreting and applying a statutory scheme, two 
critical objectives must be achieved. First, courts must "presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly" and must "give effect to the terms according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning. State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75,f13, 52 P.3d 1257; see 
also Olsen v. Samuel Mclntvre Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257,259 (Utah 1998) ("Because we 
assume that the legislature used each term in the statute advisedly, we read the statute's words 
literally unless such a reading is unreasonably confusing or inoperable"). Second, courts have 
a "duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate legislative intent and avoid 
and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities." State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 397 
(Utah 1989); see also State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982)("We construe statutes, if 
possible, to avoid the risk of running afoul of constitutional prohibitions"). It is within this 
interpretive framework that the SLAPP Act must be analyzed. 
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2. Section 105 of the SLAPP Act provides for two cumulative remedies. 
As noted above, Tobias/Feld involved Section 105 of the SLAPP Act that provides, in 
pertinent part, for a statutory counterclaim. The operative language of this section provides 
as follows: 
(1) A defendant in an action involving public participation in the process of government 
may maintain an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim to recover: 
(a) costs and reasonable attorney's fees, upon a demonstration that the action 
involving public participation in the process of government was commenced or 
continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported 
by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; and 
(b) other compensatory damages upon an additional demonstration that the action 
involving public participation in the process of government was commenced or 
continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise 
maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted under the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
UCA §§78-58-105(l)(a) and (l)(b) (emphasis added).4 
A plain reading of this statutory scheme evidences that there are two kinds of 
cumulative remedial actions under the SLAPP Act: (i) the recovery of "costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees" (See UCA §78-58-105(l)(a) (2001)) (the "Fee Claim"); and (ii) the recovery 
of "other compensatory damages" (See UCA §78-58-105(l)(b) (2001)) (the "Damage 
4Section 105 of Utah's SLAPP Act was taken from New York State's statute at Section 
70-a, entitled, ACTIONS INVOLVING PUBLIC PETITION AND PARTICIPATION: 
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES. 
-18-
or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a 
substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law Sec T T A 
§ 78 58 105(l)(a) (2001.) (emphasis added) If either of tl le se t < v o c: leme i m J is n ; n • 
reco\ eiy of costs and reasonable attorney 's fees is not a\ ailable. 
If the defendant qualifies fbr the Fee Claim, then, and only then, upon an "additional" 
showing that the action of the plaintiff was "commenced or continued for the purpose of 
h;MM Mi-... imidating, pi inish I lei j * > ise n lalicioi lsb ' inhibit • xercise of 
right j;ranted under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution" can a Damage Claim be 
sought. See UCA §78-58-105(l)(b) (2001) In this manner the Fee Claim and the Damage 
Claim are cumulative. 
3. Sections 103 and 104 of the SLAPP Act provide the procedural 
framework to access the fee and damage claims under section 105 of 
the SLAPP Act 
Section 103 of the SI,APP Act further prov ides a Munmary procedural process to make 
a detei mination as to vvl lethei the i emedies under Section 105 ai ::' a;v ailable. Section 103 
specifically states that this process is to be governed by "R i lie 12(c) of the I JtahR i lies of Civ il 
Procedure for a "h lotion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Furthermore, to curtail the possible 
Interestingly, the New Y ork version provides for three cumuhnivc remedies first, 
recovery of attorney's foes and costs under ( l ) (a) ; second, recoveiy of other compensatory 
damages under (1 )(b); and third, recovery of punitive damages under ( l ) (c) . The Utah SLAPP 
A H nnK ;wloptivl the ilixt iwn n imi llative remedies om.itting a possible pi initive recm-^rx 
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increase of costs, once a party seeks a motion under Section 103, Section 104 of the SLAPP 
Act stays all pending discovery,6 provides for an expeditious hearing on the motion, and 
provides the right to an interlocutory appeal. 
Section 104 further sets the evidentiary standard which the moving party must meet, 
specifically noting that the moving party must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that 
"the primary purpose of the action is to prevent, interfere with, or chill the moving party's 
proper participation in the process of government." See UCA §78-58-104(l)(b)and(2)(2001) 
(emphasis added). The SLAPP Act contemplates that only if the moving party proves its case 
and is successful under its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, then the remedies under 
Section 105 become available. 
It is interesting and important to note that under this statutory procedure to determine 
the viability of a Fee Claim, as well as the cumulative Damage Claim, there is no "continuing" 
language as relied upon so heavily by Tobias/Feld to justify their misplaced claim. The reason 
for this difference appears clear. At the time this procedure was intended to be used the action 
would have just been filed and no "continuing" issue would exist. It is only once the moving 
party is able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the primary purpose of the 
action was to prevent, interfere with, or chill the moving party's proper participation in the 
6This option to stay all discovery until the motion has been determined may be one of 
the central issues in determining whether attorney's fees that could become available under 
Section 105 were "reasonable." Should counsel, like Tobias/Feld's counsel have done in this 
case, not seek a stay during a determination as to whether a Fee Claim is available, then the 
subsequent attorney's fees that are spent in discovery may in and of themselves be determined 
"unreasonable." 
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process of government (thereby justifying an award of costs and attorney's fees damages) that 
one can then seek at the second remedy of other compensatory damages under Section 105. 
D. Applying the SLAPP Act, 
1. The SLAPP Act does not provide for any applicable retroactive 
application. 
The law in Utah is clear, consistent and conclusive: "[Statutes are not applied 
retroactively unless retroactive application is expressly provided for by the legislature." Brown 
& Root Industrial Service v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 947 P.2d 671,675 (Utah 1997).7 
This rule has been codified in Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1996), which states: "No part of these 
revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the SLAPP Act contains no language that the SLAPP Act was 
intended to be applied retroactively. As a consequence, under the above-stated legal 
authorities, the SLAPP Act should not be given retroactive treatment. The only exception to 
this rule is when the legislation provides for purely procedural changes. In such procedural 
circumstances the statute may be given retroactive effect. See Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 
7See also Olsen v. Samuel Mclntvre Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) 
("A long-standing rule of statutory construction is that we do not apply retroactively legislative 
enactments that alter substantive law or affect vested rights unless the legislative has clearly 
expressed that intention"); Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997) ("The intent to have a statute operate 
retroactively may be indicated by explicit statements that the statute should be applied 
retroactively"); see accord State of Utah v. Jacobv. 975 P.2d 939, 942 (Ut. App. 1999) ("A 
statute is presumed to be prospective and will not be applied retroactively in the absence of 
clear legislative intent"); Washington National Insurance Company v. Sherwood Associates, 
795 P.2d 665, 667 (Ut. App. 1990) ("In Utah, a statute generally cannot be given retroactive 
effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute.") 
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1058, 1062 (Utah 1995); Pilcher v. State DepTt of Social Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 
1983). This Court stated that "[t]his is a narrow exception" and that "only procedural changes 
'which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights' may be applied 
retroactively." Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 
1020 (Utah 1995Vquoting Pilcher, supra. 663 P.2d at 455).8 
In contrast, "[a] 'substantive' change, or one that affects substantive rights, may not be 
applied retroactively." Brown & Root Indus. Service v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 
671, 675 (Utah 1997)(citing Ball v. Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Ut. App.1996)). 
"Substantive law is defined as the positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights 
and duties of the parties and which may give rise to a cause of action. . . ." Id.fciting 
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 668 n.5 (Ut. App.1990) 
(emphasis added)).9 
In the present case, the SLAPP Counterclaim is clearly substantive as it is a new cause 
of action created by the SLAPP Act. Therefore, the SLAPP Counterclaim is only potentially 
8See also State of Utah v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939, 942 (Ut. App.1999) ("[A] statute may 
be applied retroactively only if it is procedural in nature and does not enlarge or eliminate 
vested rights"); Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 953 P.2d 
435, 437-38 (Utah 1997) ("[P]ermits retroactive application where a statute changes only 
procedural law by providing a different mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive 
rights without enlarging or eliminating vested rights.") 
9See also Homeside Lending. Inc. v. Miller, 31 P.3d 607,615 (Ut. App. 2001) ("[W]hen 
statutory amendments are substantial and substantive and not merely procedural, then 
retroactive application is not appropriate. If the 'vested rights' given by a statute have been 
enlarged, then the amendment cannot be considered procedural.") 
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available to Tobias/Feld if the SLAPP Act can be retroactively applied. However, Tobias/Feld 
are attempting to state a claim under the newly created SLAPP Act which became law in April 
2001 to facts occurring in 1996, 1997 and 1998. As discussed in more detail herein, such 
efforts are not judicially permitted, and accordingly, ADC was entitled to summary judgment 
in its favor over the SLAPP Counterclaim as determined by the trial court. 
The SLAPP Counterclaim brought by Tobias/Feld is also an attempt to assert a claim 
based on the second part of the SLAPP Act. The SLAPP Counterclaim even cites to the 
specific provisions in the SLAPP Act that creates this new cause of action as the basis for the 
claim itself. See Counterclaim at ffl[196 and 197; R. 1030; see also Utah Code Ann. §78-58-
105 (2001). As discussed above, creating a new statutory counterclaim with new statutory 
remedies is the very definition of creating new substantive rights between the parties. As such, 
accompanying the creation of these new rights is the absolute preclusion of retroactive 
application.10 That is the law. And the law makes fundamental sense. All notions of fairness 
and justice would be violated if the legislature is allowed to retroactively make past conduct 
actionable. Yet, that is exactly what Tobias/Feld are attempting to do in the present case by 
way of their SLAPP Counterclaim. 
There is no dispute that Tobias/Feld actively opposed the RiverPark Project. This 
opposition began concurrently with the filing by ADC of the ADC Application to both change 
the Master Plan of South Jordan City, as well as make zoning changes to the subject property 
10See generally J. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. 
L. 81 (1997). 
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comprising the RiverPark Project. Tobias/Feld's opposition continued throughout the 
pendency of the ADC Application. Once the RiverPark Project was approved in April 1998, 
the only outstanding issue was ADC's present suit against Tobias/Feld for tortious interference 
with ADC's contractual rights with the Williams. 
No subsequent events or facts have ever been even alleged by Tobias/Feld after April 
1998. This is because none exist. After the RiverPark Project was completely approved by 
South Jordan City in April 1998, Tobias/Feld cannot claim that their "free exercise of rights 
granted under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution" were inhibited, as required under 
theSLAPP Act. See Utah Code Ann. §78-58-105(l)(b) (2001). Certainly after ADC sold the 
RiverPark Project in January 2000 to third-parties, Tobias/Feld cannot claim that their "free 
exercise of rights granted under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution" were inhibited, 
as required under the SLAPP Act. See id. Importantly, both of these critical events occurred 
years before even the enactment of the SLAPP Act. 
Attached hereto as Appendix "B" is a detailed factual chronology, including a time-line 
chart that dramatically illustrates this reality. As alleged in Tobias/Feld's counterclaim 
(approximately fifty-three (53) pages in length with hundreds of exhibits) all of the actions that 
Tobias/Feld took in opposition to the development of the William's Property occurred between 
October 7, 1996 (when ADC first filed for a zoning change) and March 6, 1998 (when ADC 
filed its Complaint in this action.) Tobias/Feld even brag that the filing of this suit by ADC 
did not stop their efforts to oppose the RiverPark Project. See Counterclaim at [^160; R. 
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1023.11 
The SLAPP Act providing for a SLAPP Counterclaim went into effect over three (3) 
years after any of the above-delineated relevant facts occurred. Even if ADC's purpose were 
to chill public participation, which ADC vehemently contends was not the case, all of the 
"chilling" would have taken place over three (3) years prior to the enactment of the SLAPP 
Act. Tobias/Feld cannot now take advantage of a statute that was enacted in 2001 to remedy 
any alleged damage that occurred between 1996 and 1998. The SLAPP Act enacted in 2001 
cannot be applied retroactively to create these kinds of substantive rights or claims. 
Accordingly, the dismissal of the SLAPP Counterclaim should, as a matter of law, be sustained 
by this Court. 
2. Bill of attainder and other constitutional concerns. 
Applying the foregoing interpretation of the SLAPP Act to the present case resulted in 
the trial court's dismissal of Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaims as a matter of law. The 
SLAPP Act was enacted over three years after the Complaint was filed in this action. 
Significant legal precedence supports the effective preclusion of the retroactive application of 
the SLAPP Act to the present case. 
Interestingly, a fair reading of Tobias/Feld's Opposition Memorandum to ADC's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment over their SLAPP Counterclaim, as reaffirmed in their 
1
 Tobias/Feld states in paragraph 160 of the SLAPP Counterclaim that 
"[notwithstanding Anderson Development's SLAPP suit, Mrs. Tobias and Mrs. Feld 
continued to participate in the process of government and attended the next Planning & Zoning 
Commission hearing on March 11,1998." SeeR. 1023. 
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Appellants' Brief before this Court, leads to the conclusion that Tobias/Feld themselves 
effectively concede ADC's argument that the SLAPP Act cannot have retroactive application 
in this case. Instead, Tobias/Feld argue that the SLAPP Act need only apply prospectively 
from its enactment in April 2001 because ADC "continued" pursuing its valid claims by filing 
a certificate for readiness of trial. By so doing, Tobias/Feld argue that ADC violated the 
"continuing" provisions of the recently enacted SLAPP Act. Tobias/Feld now are apparently 
in the posture of making a Fee Claim and a Damage Claim for attorneys fees and damages 
arising from the time that ADC filed its certificate of readiness for trial. This argument was 
rejected by the trial court. 
Tobias/Feld apparently believe that the SLAPP Act was specifically designed and even 
enacted by the Utah legislature to provide them with a possible claim against ADC and other 
protection from ADC in this very case that had been pending at that time for more than three 
years. See Affidavits of former State Senator Mont Evans12 and State Senator D. Chris 
12Former State Senator Mont Evan states in his affidavit that "Mrs. Tobias and I 
discussed introducing legislation in the Utah state senate to remedy the injustice of the strategic 
lawsuit against public participation ("SLAPP suit") filed by Anderson Development against 
her and Mrs. Feld." See Affidavit of Mont Evans attached to Tobias/Feld's Memorandum in 
Opposition to ADC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment over Tobias/Feld's SLAPP 
Counterclaim (the "SLAPP Opposition Memorandum") as Exhibit 10 at TJ4; R. 2356. Mr. 
Evans emphatically notes, "I drafted and sponsored Senate Bill 0027 specifically for the 
purpose of providing Mrs. Tobias and Mrs. Feld with an expeditious procedural remedy for 
Anderson Development's SLAPP Suit against them Id. at ^7; R. 2357. While Mr. Evans 
statements contains evidentiary impermissible legal conclusions without foundation (e.g., that 
ADC's suit was a SLAPP suit), he does provide us with ample evidence that he specifically 
intended to interfere with pending litigation and create a bill of attainder. ADC objected to this 
affidavit to the extent that it is without foundation and states impermissible legal conclusions. 
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Buttars.13 Such actions, if they are actually true, would be an illegal use of the legislative 
powers and the SLAPP Act would be deemed a prohibited bill of attainder. Parenthetically, 
while this further legal problem associated with the SLAPP Counterclaim was raised by ADC 
at the trial court level, the trial court did not need to apply this additional basis to dismiss the 
SLAPP Counterclaim. Yet, at the appeals level every basis proffered to the trial court, even 
if not relied upon by the trial court in rendering its opinion can be used as a basis for affirming 
by the appeals court. See Dipomav.McPhie, 2001 UT 61, P 18,29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb 
13State Senator D. Chris Buttars similarly provides testimony that, while laced with 
obviously self-serving statements for Tobias/Feld, are equally impermissible legal conclusions 
without foundation. However, he does show that he too wanted to create a bill uniquely 
beneficial to Tobias/Feld and specifically hurtful to ADC. Senator Buttars notes: "I knew Mrs. 
Tobias and Mrs. Feld and knew that they had been sued by Anderson Development, LC 
("Anderson Development") for $1.2 million in retaliation for their opposition to certain Master 
Plan and zoning changes in South Jordan City. See Affidavit of D. Chris Buttars attached to 
the SLAPP Opposition Memorandum as Exhibit 15 at [^4.; R. 2457. It is interesting and 
troubling that this State Senator did absolutely no independent verification as to the basis for 
Tobias' claim that the suit was without merit. In fact, all that Senator Buttars did was to read 
an obviously biased and overtly slanted article that Tobias gave him from the SALT LAKE CITY 
WEEKLY published in April 1998 even before this Court had ruled against Tobias/Feld's 
Motion to Dismiss. State Senator Buttars should be asking the question now, "Why didn't 
Tobias inform me that this suit had survived all attempts to have it dismissed summarily?" 
Such misinformation or omission of information speaks both to Senator Buttar's lack of 
adequate attention to this matter AND Tobias' lack of both candor and ethics. It is in this 
inaccurate light that Senator Buttars continues, "It was my intent that HB0112 would apply to 
the retaliatory lawsuit pending against my constituents, Janalee Tobias and Mrs. Feld. Id. at 
TJ7; R. 2458. Such admissions are troubling indicators that he too wanted to create legislation 
tailored to interfere with pending litigation and create a bill of attainder. In his case, he 
actually got what he wanted. Unfortunately for Tobias/Feld, they had over-sold their belief 
that the ADC case was a SLAPP suit and, therefore, Senator Buttars (like Mr. Evans) required 
that such a determination would be a condition precedent to a claim under the SLAPP Act. 
ADC also objected to this affidavit to the extent that it is without foundation and states 
impermissible legal conclusions. 
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v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222,225-26 n.2,461 P.2d 290,293 n.2 (1969); 
see also Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (applying Limb); 5 C.J.S. Appeal 
& Error §714 (1993). 
The Utah constitutional restrictions against Bills of Attainder in Art. I, §9, prohibit 
legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past 
conduct. See, e. g.. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-462, 14 L. Ed. 2d 484, 85 S. 
Ct. 1707 (1965). The United States Supreme Court has defined bills of attainder as "legislative 
acts . . . that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group 
in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. . . ." United States v. 
Lovett 328 U.S. 303,315,66 S. Ct. 1073,90 L. Ed. 1252 0946); see accord Selective Service 
System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846-47, 104 S. Ct. 3348, 
82 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1984), quoting Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 468 
(1977); see also State v. Washburn, 34 Conn. App. 557, 562, 642 A.2d 70, cert, denied, 230 
Conn. 912,645 A.2d 1017(1994). Further, the Court has broadly defined what may constitute 
punishment for bill of attainder jurisprudence, stating that "the deprivation of any rights, civil 
or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment [depending on] the circumstances 
attending and the causes of the deprivation " Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277,320,18 
L. Ed. 356 (1866). The specificity element of the definition of "bill of attainder" is met by a 
statute singling out an individual, whether the individual is called by name or described in 
terms of past conduct which, because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of 
particular persons. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control 
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Board, 367 U.S. 1, 81 S. Ct. 1357, 1405, 6 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1961). 
In the present case, Tobias/Feld argue that the SLAPP Act was enacted specifically 
referencing Anderson Development's suit against Mrs. Tobias and Mrs. Feld. See SLAPP 
Opposition Memorandum at p. 64; R. 2089. Tobias/Feld go even further stating that "[t]he 
intent of the bill [the SLAPP Act] . . . was intended to apply to lawsuits, such as Anderson 
Development suit against Mrs. Tobias and Mrs. Feld, that were pending at the time the bill was 
passed." Id. Based on these representations, Tobias/Feld's efforts of getting assurances that 
the SLAPP Act would apply to their case, only subject to their showing that the claims brought 
by ADC were in fact nothing more than a SLAPP case, have resulted in the unconstitutional 
application of the Act as an illegal Bill of Attainder. 
As further presented to the trial court by ADC, there are other serious potential 
constitutional violations if the trial court had allowed the SLAPP Act to be applied in this case 
as requested by Tobias/Feld.14 Indeed, applicable Utah law requires this Court to interpret and 
14In addition to the Bill of Attainder and the problematic issues connected to this 
constitutional protection, should the SLAPP Act be accepted for what Mr. Evans, Senator 
Buttars and Tobias/Feld allege, there are several other constitutional principles that similarly 
come into question, including the following: 
1. Law Impairing the Obligation of Contracts. Art. I, § 18 of the Utah Constitution 
states: "No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." The SLAPP Act, 
as Tobias/Feld seek to apply it, does impair the obligation of contacts and is illegal. In this 
case, the trial court has previously ruled, before enactment of the SLAPP Act, that ADC has 
a valid and cognizable claim for intentional interference with existing and prospective 
contractual relations. The obligation of contracts is clear. ADC had a contract with Williams 
and had the right to seek enforcement of that contract without interference by Tobias/Feld. 
Tobias/Feld also shared an obligation in those contracts to not interfere with ADC's contract. 
(continued...) 
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apply the SLAPP Act in a constitutional manner. See, e.g.. State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 397 
(...continued) 
The trial court has previously recognized this tort in this case and has stated that ADC has 
presented a valid and cognizable cause of action. The Court should not allow the SLAPP Act 
to apply to this case as its application would impair the obligation of contracts. 
2. Open Courts. Art. I, §18 of the Utah Constitution states: "All Courts shall be 
open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." The application of the 
SLAPP Act to ADC's pending civil case as proposed by Tobias/Feld should be deemed as 
unconstitutional. Applying the SLAPP Act, as proposed by Tobias/Feld, effectively bars ADC 
from prosecuting its valid cause of action which was pending before a tribunal of this State. 
According to the affidavits proffered by Tobias/Feld in their Opposition Memorandum, the 
SLAPP Act was specifically passed to interfere with ADC's right to seek redress before a 
tribunal of this state. If allowed by this Court, the application of the SLAPP Act to this 
pending case will interfere with ADC's ability to obtain a remedy by due course of law and 
will act as an effective bar to ADCs prosecution of its valid civil cause of action. 
3. Separation of Powers. Art. V, §1 and other sections of the Utah Constitution 
define separation of powers. In this case, ADC had availed itself its constitutional right to seek 
redress before the Judicial Branch of government. Thereafter, Tobias/Feld also availed 
themselves of the protections of law before the Judicial Branch by filing a Motion to Dismiss. 
When the motion was dismissed, Tobias/Feld went before the Legislative Branch of 
government and asked that branch to specifically intervene and to "change the rules" associated 
with how the ADC case against them was proceeding before another branch of government, 
the Judiciary. According to the affidavits propounded by Tobias/Feld, the Legislative Branch 
of government attempted to change the rules and allow for the imposition new law into the 
case, effectively giving Tobias/Feld new causes of action. 
4. Other Important Constitutional Provisions. Other relevant constitutional 
provisions include Art I, §27 (Fundamental Principles): "Frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government"; Art. I, §24 (Uniform Operation of Laws): "All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation."; Art. I, §7 (Due Process): "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law."); and Art. I, §1 (Inherent and Inalienable rights): 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives an liberties, 
to acquire, possess and protect property; . . .petition for redress of grievances . . . ." 
-30-
(Utah 1989) (Courts have a "duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate 
legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities."); State 
v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982)("We construe statutes, if possible, to avoid the risk of 
running afoul of constitutional prohibitions55). 
3. Tobias/Feld's Motion to Dismiss is the substantive equivalent to a 
Motion for Judgment on the pleadings, as contemplated under 
Sections 103 and 104 of the SLAPP Act 
Section 103(l)(b) of the SLAPP Act provides that the party challenging the complaint 
should file a motion under URCP 12(c) - a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Such a 
motion is akin to the general Motion to Dismiss that is typically brought under Rule 12(b)(6). 
See, e.g., Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); St. Benedict Dev. Co. v. St 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). In fact, the standard for review of both of these 
motions is effectively the same. See, e.g.. Young v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206,331 P.2d 1099, 
1100(1958) (The standard of review for a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under URCP 
12(c) is to have all the facts of the complaint given to the party to whom the motion is against 
with all inferences fairly arising therefrom); Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 
1055,1058(Utah 1991) (The standard ofreview for a Motion to Dismiss under URCP 12(b)(6) 
is to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all 
reasonable inferences in his favor). Accordingly, the scrutiny given under either of these 
motions would be the same. 
In the present case, on or about April 28,1998, Tobias/Feld filed a Motion to Dismiss 
claiming that ADC had "failed to state a claim for interference with existing contractual 
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relations, failed to state a claim for interference with prospective economic relations . . . [and 
that the Complaint was brought] to harass and retaliate against people who have exercised their 
rights" (the "Motion to Dismiss"). See R. 32. After the Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed 
by both parties, on or about December 8, 1998, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss. 
In so denying the Motion, the trial court specifically found that "[t]he Plaintiff [ADC] has 
stated a cause of action in its complaint of intentional interference with existing economic 
relations or prospective economic relations" (the "Motion to Dismiss Ruling"). See R. 68. 
The Motion to Dismiss Ruling effectively and fully extinguished any possible claim that 
Tobias/Feld might have hoped to achieve under the SLAPP Act. This reality is even further 
substantiated when one acknowledges that under Section 104(l)(b) the moving party is 
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the primary reason for the filing of the 
complaint was to interfere with the first amendment rights of the defendant. This standard is 
even higher than the traditional level of preponderance of the evidence used for such motions. 
The original Motion to Dismiss ruling denying the dismissal of ADC's case in 1998 was 
later reaffirmed in 2002 when the trial court denied Tobias/Feld's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in this action. This reaffirmation was the result of Tobias/Feld filing on or about 
November 9, 2001 a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming again that ADC had failed to 
state a cause of action against them for interference with either existing contractual relations 
or prospective economic relations. See R. 337-339. After this motion was fully briefed by the 
parties the trial court, on or about May 21, 2002, denied Tobias/Feld's Motion for Summary 
Judgment finding that material factual disputes existed. See R. 927-929. Therefore, 
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Tobias/Feld twice failed to meet an even lower standard than that required under the SLAPP 
Act to qualify for relief. 
E. Courts in Other Jurisdictions Have Similarly Interpreted and Applied 
SLAPP Acts, 
1. A finding that the context of the claims is not solely within the 
governmental process is sufficient alone to dismiss a SLAPP 
counterclaim. 
While the foregoing cases illustrate that the claims brought must have a substantial basis 
in fact or law for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law is sufficient to dismiss 
a SLAPP counterclaim, these cases also demonstrate that unless the claim arises specifically 
from the exercise within the governmental process a dismissal of the SLAPP counterclaim is 
also appropriate. This basis was further explained by the Supreme Court of Maine in Millett 
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS 240 (Maine 1999) where the court 
held that in order to avoid finding the SLAPP Act unconstitutional, the party seeking dismissal 
must "make a threshold showing that the claims against it are based on petitioning activities 
alone and have no substantive basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities." 
(Emphasis added). This same analysis was also used by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
in Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Product Corp.. 427 Mass. 156, 691 N.E. 2d 935, 943 (Mass. 
1998), wherein the court similarly found that the SLAPP Act was not intended to authorize 
dismissal of legitimate, cognizable claims based on something other than petitioning activities 
and that if the statute was to be so construed, then it would violate a plaintiffs own 
constitutional right to petition a court for redress of their grievances. 
-33-
This same analysis is also fatal to Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaims. It is 
indisputable that the claims asserted by ADC against Tobias/Feld do not involve the 
governmental process. For example, the ADC's claim of contractual interference does not 
arise from something Tobias/Feld said or did during a South Jordan City public meeting or 
filed as part of the opposition to the Commercial Development with South Jordan City. In 
contrast, the claims asserted by ADC against Tobias/Feld are specifically and narrowly focused 
at their activities in regards to a private sales transaction between ADC and the Williams 
family. As such, the SLAPP Act simply does not apply. Further, as articulated by the New 
York, Maine and Massachusetts' Supreme Courts, to apply the SLAPP Act in such a way 
would be unconstitutional as it would effectively violate ADC's constitutional right to petition 
a court for redress of its grievances. For this reasoning alone, Tobias/Feld's SLAPP 
Counterclaims were appropriately dismissed. 
2. A finding that the claims have a substantial basis in fact or law is 
sufficient alone to dismiss a SLAPP counterclaim. 
As previously discussed, the Utah SLAPP Act was modeled after the New York SLAPP 
Act. The New York SLAPP Act was enacted in 1992. There have been several cases that 
have been brought under this act giving the New York courts the opportunity to examine both 
the procedural and constitutional implications of the act. For example, in Niagra Mohawk 
Power Corp. v. Testone, 272 A.D. 2d 910, 708 N.Y.S. 2d 527 (4th Dept. 2000), the appellate 
court determined that the trial court had improperly allowed the filing of a counterclaim under 
the SLAPP Act because "the plaintiffs action was supported by substantial arguments for 
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extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." In Niagra Mohawk, the plaintiff had 
brought an action against the defendants for attempted civil extortion as a result of the 
defendants' alleged attempt to have the plaintiff pay money to defendants in return for 
defendants not disclosing certain information to the Public Service Commission. The claim 
for attempted civil extortion was dismissed on the grounds that the New York law did not 
recognize the tort of attempted extortion. At the same time, the defendants sought permission 
to file a counterclaim under the New York's SLAPP Act, which the trial court allowed. Both 
parties appealed the trial court's rulings. The Supreme Court of New York affirmed the trial 
court's dismissal of the attempted civil extortion claim. 
However, and most interestingly, the Court also reversed the trial court's allowance of 
the SLAPP counterclaim on two applicable theories: 
• That the basis for the unsuccessful claim of attempted extortion was "based in part on 
his [defendant's] statements to the Public Service Commission, it is not 'materially 
related' to such participation"; and 
• That "plaintiffs action, although now dismissed, was 'supported by a substantial 
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.'" 
Id. at 912. Consequently, even though the plaintiff failed in its claim against the defendant, 
the claim was not the basis for a SLAPP claim because it was not materially related to public 
participation and was supported by a "substantial argument for the modification or reversal of 
existing law." 
Similarly, in Clemente v. Impastato, 290 App. Div. 2d 864, 736 N.Y.S. 2d 281, app 
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den., 2002 NY LEXIS 1536 (N.Y. 2002), plaintiff had brought a defamation action against 
defendant for comments that defendant had included in a letter sent to the Department of 
Environmental Conservation. Defendant counterclaimed under the New York SLAPP Act 
alleging that the defamation action was a SLAPP suit. At trial, after plaintiff concluded his 
proof, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs action. Ultimately, the court 
also dismissed defendant's SLAPP counterclaim. Defendant appealed. On appeal, the New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed. Again the Court reasoning is also instructive. 
• First, the court found that "Plaintiffs defamation action centered on defendant's 
statements contained in her letter to DEC, which accused plaintiff of criminal conduct 
directed against defendant and a DEC employee. Such allegations of plaintiff s criminal 
acts were not within the scope of DEC's oversight of plaintiffs permits to operate a 
gravel mine and are, therefore, not "materially related" to defendant's opposition to 
plaintiffs application to DEC for renewal and expansion of those permits as required 
by Civil Rights Law § 76-a (1) (a) [the SLAPP Act]; and 
• Second, the court "conclude[d] that plaintiffs defamation action, although now 
dismissed, was commenced with a substantial basis in fact and law." 
Id. at 282. Again, even though the plaintiff failed to prove its claim, the claim was nonetheless 
not a SLAPP claim because of not being materially related to public participation and there 
being a substantial basis of fact and law in bringing it in the first place. 
Like these cases in New York, Tobias/Feld have twice failed to qualify for relief under 
Utah's SLAPP Act, as the trial court has twice found that, at the very minimum, that the causes 
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of action asserted by ADC have a substantial basis in fact and law. Accordingly, dismissal of 
their SLAPP Counterclaims was the only appropriate result under the circumstances. 
Tobias/Feld's sole claim under the SLAPP Act appears to be a misplaced notion that because 
ADC "continued" to pursue its valid claims against Tobias/Feld that the SLAPP Act provides 
relief. Yet, the profound truth is that the reason that ADC continued its claims against 
Tobias/Feld in this action is because the trial court twice told it that it legally could. 
Furthermore, the SLAPP Act itself states that "[n]othing in this section [Section 105] 
shall affect or preclude the right of any party to any recovery otherwise authorized by law." 
UCA §78-58-105(2) (2001). This express language is in complete harmony with the courts 
in other jurisdictions who have ruled on this matter. As discussed above, these courts have 
found that to apply the SLAPP Act constitutionally, it cannot be used as a vehicle to affect or 
preclude a party's right to bring a valid claim against another. Such permission cannot form 
a basis for relief under the SLAPP Act. Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaim was therefore, 
properly dismissed. 
Ill, TOBIAS/FELD'S CLAIMS BASED UPON EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FOR THE 
FILING OF A LAWSUIT AGAINST THEM WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED, AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Emotional Distress Damages Are Not Available for Filing a Lawsuit. 
Tobias/Feld allege that ADC has caused emotional distress based upon the filing and 
pursuit of this action. See Counterclaim. However, Tobias/Feld's claims for emotional distress 
are not appropriate under applicable law. Claims for emotional distress may not be based on 
the filing of lawsuits. This issue was directly addressed by this Court in Bennett v. Jones, 
-37-
Waldo. Holbrook & McDonough, 203 UT 9,70 P.3d 17,470 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah 2003), 
wherein this Court succinctly stated that 
"[a]n allegation of improper filing of a lawsuit or use of the legal process against 
an individual is not redressable by a cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress . . .even if we were to assume that the . . . conduct. . . were 
sufficiently outrageous, [the plaintiffs] claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is barred by the judicial proceedings privilege." 
This holding is in accord with virtually every jurisdiction that has reached this issue. 
For example, the Court of Appeals for the State of California has held that there can be no 
emotional distress claim arising from a lawsuit because such claims are privileged. See Cantu 
vs. Resolution Trust Co.. 4 Cal. App. 4th 857, 888-889 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1992) ("Where . . 
. a party acts in good faith to pursue its own legal rights, such conduct is privileged, even if 
emotional distress will result). 
Similarly, in Early Detection Center, PC v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 403 N.W.2d 830, 
833 (Mich. App. 1986), the Court of Appeals for the State of Michigan held that 
[t]he conduct, although it would otherwise be extreme and outrageous, may be 
privileged under the circumstances. The actor is never liable, for example, 
where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible 
way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause 
emotional distress. 
Id.(citing to Restatement 2d (Torts) 46, comment g) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the court in Early Detection Center, PC, supra, stated that u[w]e believe 
that the last comment quoted above closely describes the situation presented here. Plaintiffs 
allege that the outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants was the filing of a 
"groundless" suit. However, this amounts to nothing more than an assertion of legal rights in 
-38-
a permissible way." Id. 
The case at hand could not be more analogous. The plaintiffs in Early Detection Center, 
PC filed suit partly based upon a claim of emotional distress based upon a previously filed 
lawsuit. They claimed emotional distress for the filing of what they termed a groundless 
lawsuit. The court found that even if the suit was groundless, that action is not enough to rise 
to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. See id. In fact, the court stated that "by 
resorting to a court of law for the resolution of its dispute with plaintiffs, defendant followed 
what a civilized society would consider the most appropriate form of conduct." Id. 
These cases are in complete accord with the Restatement of Torts which sets forth a 
clear rule that while one is attempting to enforce his legal rights in a permissible way there is 
no liability for emotional distress. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted this Restatement rule 
that where a party is enforcing one's legal rights that action can never be considered to extreme 
and outrageous behavior necessary to support a claim of emotional distress.15 
15See, e.g., Bendalin v. Valley National Bank, 540 P.2d 194, 196 (Az. Div. I 1975) 
(actor not liable when trying to enforce legal rights); Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 360 
N.E.2d 765, 768-69 (111. 1976) (creditor must be given some latitude to pursue reasonable 
methods of collecting debts even though such methods may result in some inconvenience, 
embarrassment or annoyance to the debtor); Early Detection Center v. New York Life, Inc.,403 
N.W.2d 830, 833-34 (Mich. 1986) (allegation that the outrageous conduct on the part of the 
defendants was the filing of a "groundless" suit.. .amounts to nothing more than an assertion 
of legal rights in a permissible way); Lachenmaier v. First Bank Systems, Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 
619-20 (Mt. 1990) (bank not liable for emotional distress where it merely exercised a legal 
right to foreclose on the mortgage and notes); Straus v. Kirby Court Corp., 909 S.W.2d 105, 
109-10 (Tex. App. - Houston 1995) (legal action taken to enforce a lease does not rise to the 
level of outrageous conduct necessary for emotional distress); Jackson v. Peoples Federal 
Credit Union, 604 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Wis. 1979) (collection tactics not permissible but did not 
(continued...) 
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ADC has alleged from the outset that its claims are based upon an interference with 
exiting contractual relations. The trial court has twice agreed that ADC's allegations comprise 
a legitimate claim for such torts. By seeking to enforce its rights, ADC does not, and cannot, 
subject itself to an emotional distress claim. Accordingly, the Tobias/Feld claim in the 
Counterclaim, as a matter of law, was properly dismissed by the trial court. R. 3887. 
B. Taking Tobias/Feld's Allegations as True, ADC's Conduct Does Not Rise 
To The Level Required To Sustain Claims for Emotional Distress. 
As discussed above, Tobias/Feld cannot plead a claim, as a matter of law, for emotional 
distress based on the mere filing of the lawsuit. On this basis alone, the counterclaim for 
emotional distress was dismissed. However, the counterclaim for emotional distress further 
failed because Tobias/Feld have not even alleged that ADC engaged in outrageous conduct 
sufficient to cause emotional distress or acted in reckless disregard of the probability of causing 
emotional distress as a result of the conduct. The law is clear that "it is for the court to 
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded 
as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery." Gygi v. Storch, 503 P.2d 449,450 (Utah 
1972)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment h) (emphasis added). 
This Court has articulated the well-established criteria for an emotional distress claim 
in Samms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961): 
(...continued) 
rise to the level of clearly excessive); Mummery v. Pold, 770 P.2d 241, 243 (Wyo. 1989) 
(where party to a lawsuit purchases a judgment from a separate suit solely to levy on judgment 
and harass other party to current suit, not enough to maintain cause of action for emotional 
distress). 
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[A]n action for severe emotional distress, though not accompanied by bodily 
impact or physical injury, where the defendant intentionally engaged in some 
conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, 
or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; 
and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and 
intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. 
See accord White v. Blackburn. 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah App.1990) ("[I]n an action for 
severe emotional distress, the court has held that the plaintiff must show the offensive behavior 
to have been perpetrated (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any 
reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a 
nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality."). 
This Court has repeatedly held that merely unreasonable or offensive conduct does not 
qualify as outrageous conduct. Outrageous conduct exceeds all bounds of what is usually 
tolerated in a civilized community and that the conduct was so "outrageous and intolerable that 
it offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Retherford v. 
AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 949, 970-72 (Utah 1992). 
Taking all of Tobias/Feld's claims as true, as alleged in the Counterclaim, one is left 
with the following factual picture: 
ADC was aware that Tobias/Feld were attempting to stop the development of 
the Williams Property. 
ADC warned Tobias/Feld that if they interfered with a contractual relationship 
they would take legal action. 
• ADC took legal action believing that Tobias/Feld wrongfully interfered with 
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its contractual relationship over the Williams Property 
See generally R. 988-1040. 
Certainly, the threatening of a lawsuit or the subsequent filing of a lawsuit does not rise 
to the level of extreme or outrageous conduct. If such were the case, the courts would be 
flooded with suits claiming emotional distress damages for merely being named a party to the 
suit. 
Under Utah law it is proper to dismiss an emotional distress claim, as a matter of law, 
if the conduct alleged is not sufficiently outrageous. Ankers vs. Rodman, 995 F. Supp.1329, 
1336 (D. Utah 1997); Boisiolv vs. Morton Thiokol Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 801-802 (D. Utah 
1988). Both Ankers and Boisiolv are instructive in how extreme the alleged behavior must be 
in order to qualify as outrageous. In Ankers, a professional basketball player, Dennis Rodman, 
pinched a spectator's backside and made crude remarks to her in the middle of a nationally 
televised game. In Boisjoly, the defendant fired and attempted to blacklist and destroy the 
career of an engineer who revealed errors and irregularities in the company's solid rocket 
engines after the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. In both cases the emotional distress claims 
were dismissed because the conduct complained of was not sufficiently outrageous. See Ankers 
atl337;Boisjolvat802. 
In the case at hand, Tobias/Feld's only allegations set forth in the Counterclaim is that 
ADC threatened to sue and subsequently sued them. Subsequently, the trial court twice denied 
Tobias/Feld's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgement. Under the 
circumstances of this case, those allegations cannot, as a matter of law, amount to the necessary 
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outrageous conduct that is required in Utah in order to support a claim for emotional distress. 
Accordingly, the Tobias/Feld Counterclaim for such emotion distress damages was dismissed 
by the trial court. R. 3887. 
IV. TOBIAS/FELD'S CLAIMS BASED FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS WERE 
PROPERLY DISMISSED, AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Tobias/Feld Failed to Understand the Scope of Their Dismissed Wrongful 
Use of Civil Proceeding Counterclaim. 
On January 27,2003, the trial court, in ruling on ADC's Motion to Dismiss, dismissed 
Tobias/Feld's counterclaim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. R. 3887. Tobias/Feld did 
not appeal this dismissal. Despite this dismissal, Tobias/Feld continue to defend its sole 
remaining counterclaim for abuse of process as if it was the same cause of action as the 
dismissed wrongful use of civil proceeding. ADC could only surmise that Tobias/Feld failed 
to understand the scope and differences between these two torts. However, the trial court did 
understand the differences as it granted ADC's Motion for Summary Judgment over 
Tobias/Feld's abuse of process counterclaim. 
In 1999, this Court in Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841 (Utah), provided clear direction as 
to the scope of the civil tort of wrongful use of civil proceeding. In this regard, this Court 
acknowledged that "[t]his court has only infrequently treated the tort of wrongful use of civil 
proceedings." Id. at 844. The Gilbert court concluded that "[t]o preserve analytical clarity 
with respect to the species of tort permitting suit for misuse of judicial proceedings, we apply 
the Restatement's formulation of wrongful use of civil proceedings." Id. at 846. In this 
regard, the Gilbert court, in citing to the Restatement, held: 
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The Restatement denominates wrongful use of civil proceedings as the civil 
counterpart to malicious prosecution. It consists in instituting or maintaining 
civil proceedings for an improper purpose and without a justifiable basis. The 
Restatement describes the pertinent criteria for wrongful use of civil proceeding 
as follows: 
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or procurement of 
civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful 
civil proceedings if (a) he [or she] acts without probable cause, and primarily for 
a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in 
which the proceedings are based, and (b) except when they are ex parte, the 
proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are 
brought. 
Id. at 845 (citing to Restatement (Second) of Torts §674) (emphasis added).16 
In the present case, the trial court properly determined that because the underlying 
claims brought by ADC against Tobias/Feld for intentional interference with its existing 
contractual rights with the Williams (the First REPC) and for intentional interference with its 
prospective economic relations with the Williams (the Second REPC) have yet to be resolved 
in favor of Tobias/Feld, Tobias/Feld's claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings was 
premature, and therefore, must be dismissed. 
1
 interestingly, the Gilbert opinion was issued after Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 
896 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court did not adopt the reasoning of 
the Keller court in Gilbert. In contrast, the Gilbert court cited to the Keller opinion as 
illustrative as to the divergent rulings that had been issued in this area of the law. For example, 
in this regard the Gilbert court noted, "[h]owever, even the more recent cases do not always 
employ the same nomenclature [for wrongful use of civil proceeding and abuse of process 
claims]. Keller, for instance, appears to treat civil and criminal proceedings under a common 
rubric of'malicious prosecution.'" Gilbert v. Ince, supra, 981 P.2d at 845, n.7. 
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B. Tobias/Feld Failed to Understand the Scope of Their Counterclaim for 
Abuse of Process. 
An abuse of process claim centers on the process, rather than the proceedings. See 
generally C. Pate, Clarifying the Elements of Malicious Use of Process and Abuse of Process 
Claims, 57 MD. L. REV. 1039 (1998). Therefore, typical examples of abuse of process 
naturally include: 
Excessive execution on a judgment; attachment on property other than that 
involved in the litigation or in an excessive amount; oppressive conduct in 
connection with the arrest of a person or the seizure of property . . .; extortion 
of excessive sums of money . . . . 
Farmers Gin Co. v. Ward. 73 N.M. 405, 407-08, 389 P.2d 9, 11 (1964). 
The following graph depicts the difference between the torts of wrongful use of civil 
procedure and abuse of process: 
Initiation of 
Proceedings 
WRONGFUL USE OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 
Continutation of Proceedings 
- > 
•File suit • Lis Pendens -Subpoenas • Depositions Triai 
ABUSE OF PROCESS 
As this graph depicts, the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings centers on the 
proceedings in general, either at the initiation stage or at any point when the continuation 
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becomes wrongful. On the other hand, the tort of abuse of process centers on specific process 
or events during the litigation that lack probable cause and are used for an improper purpose. 
While related, these two torts deal with fundamentally different issues. 
1. Utah Law Distinguishes Claims for Abuse of Criminal Process and 
Claims for Abuse of Civil Process. 
Under Utah law, there is an important further distinction between abuse of process 
claims brought within the civil context and those that are brought under the criminal context. 
Unfortunately, in the present case that distinction has also been either innocently confused or 
obviously obfuscated by Tobias/Feld. Understanding the distinctions between the application 
of this tort in these two contexts is critical. The following chart delineates these differences: 
Criminal Abuse of Process Claim Civil Abuse of Process Claim 
Does not require the prior proceeding to 
have terminated in favor of the person 
against whom they were brought. See 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah App. 
1989) 
Requires that the prior proceeding to have 
terminated in favor of the person against 
whom they were brought. See Arnica 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah App. 1989) 
The basis for an action for abuse in the 
criminal context requires a showing that 
the suit was "a perversion of the process to 
accomplish some improper purpose, such 
as compelling its victim to do something 
which he would not otherwise be legally 
obligated to do." Crease v. Pleasant Grove 
City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 519 P.2d 888, 890 
(1974). 
The basis for an action for abuse of process 
in the civil context requires a showing that 
a process was 
(1) "brought without probable cause, 
(2) "for the purpose of harassment or 
annoyance; and 
(3) "it is usually said to require malice." 
Baird v. Intermountain Sch. Fed. Credit 
Union. 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976); 
Winters v. Schulman. 977 P.2d 1218, 1225 
(Utah App. 1999). 
Unfortunately, Tobias/Feld have utterly failed to account for these distinctions. Rather, 
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Tobias/Feld have exclusively relied upon own misunderstanding of the reasoning and holding 
of this Court in Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, supra. See Tobias/Feld Opposition 
Memorandum at p. 17. Yet, as noted above, the Crease opinion was directed to the application 
of this tort in the criminal context only. As this Court specifically noted that all other claims 
previously brought in the Crease case "have been eliminated except against Councilman 
Klemm on the issue of abuse of criminal process." Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, supra, 519 
P.2d at 888 (emphasis added). As a result, the reasoning found in Crease is inapplicable to the 
present case. 
The trial court properly looked to those distinct Utah cases brought within the civil 
context in Utah to understand the proper application of the tort of abuse of process. For 
example, Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah App. 1999), involved a claim brought for 
abuse of process arising in the civil context of a claim for wrongful lien. In Winters, Winters 
and his wife divorced in California in 1989. In 1990, Winters bought a home in Sandy, Utah. 
Subsequently, Winter's ex-wife hired a lawyer to seek enforcement of their divorce decree. 
The lawyer, Schulman, filed a lis pendens on Winter's Sandy home as part of her enforcement 
efforts. Winters filed suit claiming that the lis pendens constituted a wrongful lien, and that 
such alleged baseless filing constituted an abuse of process within the divorce proceedings. 
Ultimately, the trial court ruled that the lis pendens was not a wrongful lien and, therefore, 
Winters could not state a viable cause of action for abuse of process. In this regard the 
Winters court held: 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a civil cause of action for abuse of 
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process where it is shown that a suit was brought without probable cause, for the 
purpose of harassment or annoyance, and it is usually said to require malice. 
Further an abuse of process [in the civil context] requires that the prior 
proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they were 
brought. 
Id. at 1225.17 
It is within this context, applying these elements that Tobias/Feld's abuse of process 
counterclaim was examined by the trial court and must be examined by this Court. 
2. A Claim for Abuse of Civil Process Requires that the Prior 
Proceedings Terminate in Favor of the Person against Whom They 
were Brought 
In Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 950-55 (Utah App. 
1989), Schettler filed counterclaims against Arnica Mutual for both criminal and civil abuse 
of process arising from Arnica Mutual's procurement of a criminal case against Schettler for 
insurance fraud and Arnica Mutual's initiation of a case against him for civil fraud and related 
claims. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the civil abuse of process claim, 
holding: 
In his pleadings, Schettler attempts to allege both an abuse of the criminal and 
civil process. The latter [the abuse of civil process] is premature since it 
requires that the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against 
whom they were brought. 
Id. at 960; see accord Baird v. Intermountain School Fed. Credit Union, 555 P. 2d 877, 878 
17Winters v. Schulman, supra, was also issued after Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 
896 F. Supp. 1562 (Utah 1995) was issued by the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah. Like the Utah Supreme Court in Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841 (Utah 1999), the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Winters similarly decided not to adopt or follow the holdings in Keller. 
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(Utah 1976); see also MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS ABUSE OF PROCESS MUJI 10.20 
(1993) ("[A]n abuse of process action requires that the proceedings have terminated in favor 
of the person against whom they were brought."); see also Winters, supra ("[A]n abuse of 
process [in the civil context] requires that the prior proceedings have terminated in favor of the 
person against whom they were brought.") 
Consequently, the timing for bringing an abuse of process claim is the same as a claim 
for wrongful use of civil proceedings. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah 
1999) (a condition precedent to bringing a claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding is that 
the underlying action terminated in favor of the person against whom that underlying case is 
brought); see accord Restatement (Second) of Torts at §674(b). There is no dispute that the 
underlying claims of ADC against Tobias/Feld have not yet been adjudicated in favor of 
Tobias/Feld. As a result, Tobias/Feld's claim for abuse of civil process against ADC is 
premature and therefore properly dismissed by the trial court. See R. 4379. 
3. A Claim for Abuse of Civil Process Requires a Lack of Probable 
Cause in Bringing the Alleged Abusive Process. 
Central to establishing a claim for abuse of civil process is showing that the process was 
"brought without probable cause." Winters v. Schulman, supra, 977 P.2d at 1225; see accord 
Baird v. Intermountain School Fed. Credit Union. 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976). Yet, as 
discussed below, none of the basis pleaded and/or argued by Tobias/Feld as their basis for a 
claim of abuse of process against ADC is sufficient as a matter of law. 
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a. Tobias/Feld's claim that ADC's initiation and continuation of 
the present action forms the factual basis for their abuse of 
process claim against ADC is insufficient as a matter of law. 
Tobias/Feld have argued that ADC's initiation and then continuation of the present 
action form a valid basis for their abuse of process counterclaim. However, as discussed 
above, allegations as to the initiation and/or the continuation of that action falls expressly 
within the rubrics of the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings, not under the tort of abuse 
of civil proceedings. See Gilbert v. Ince, supra, 981 P.2d 845. The trial court had already 
dismissed Tobias/Feld's counterclaim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. 
b. Tobias' claim that ADC's taking of her deposition forms a 
factual basis for a claim of abuse of civil process against ADC 
is insufficient as a matter of law. 
The sole remaining factual basis for their claim of abuse of civil process is Tobias' 
allegations that ADC wrongfully took her deposition on October 30, 2003 (the "Tobias 
Deposition").18 This claim fails for several reasons. ADC surely had probable cause for 
taking a deposition of a named party. See Winters v. Schulman, supra, 977 P.2d at 1225 (The 
process being alleged as abusive must of been "brought without probable cause."); see also 
URCP 30(a)(1) ("A party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by 
deposition upon oral examination . . . ."). ADC had "probable cause" for the taking of this 
deposition and, as such, Tobias was unable to satisfy the first element of this tort. 
18It should be noted that only Ms. Tobias has this claim against ADC. No claim has 
ever been even asserted that a claim for abuse of process exists for ADC's taking of Ms. Feld's 
deposition. 
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Furthermore, the taking of her deposition was for discovery purposes in the pending 
action and not for the purpose of harassment or annoyance for multiple reasons. Ms. Tobias 
was represented by counsel throughout her deposition. The questions posed and the relevance 
of them was the result of Tobias' own actions. This deposition was taken BEFORE the trial 
court dismissed her counterclaim for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress. 
By bringing counterclaims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, Tobias 
brought her emotional state into issue. ADC, therefore, in its defense had the responsibility 
to fully explore any sources of emotional distress. 
The law is clear that "a defendant is entitled to discover whether there have been other 
stressors relating to plaintiffs mental and physical health during the relevant time period which 
may have contributed to the claimed emotional distress." Gatewoodv. Stone Container Corp., 
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21076, T(13 (D. Iowa 1996). For example, in Gladfelter v. Wal-Mart 
Stores. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, f3(D. Neb. 1995), the plaintiff opposed a scheduled 
deposition of his former girlfriend on the grounds that it would only be used to embarrass him. 
However, the court found that "[p]laintiff has affirmatively placed his emotional well being 
in issue. Plaintiffs own expert witness opines that a significant cause of plaintiff s emotional 
distress was the deterioration of plaintiff s relationship with the proposed deponent, Jeanette 
Carol. On these grounds, the court agrees with defendant that the deposition of Ms. Carol 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as permitted by 
Rule 26(b)(1)." The court realized that there were other possible causes for the alleged 
emotional distress and allowed discovery of those potential causes as the plaintiff had placed 
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emotional health into issue. 
Many of the same dynamics and needs as determined in the Gladfelter v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, supra, case were also evident in the present action. Ms. Tobias attempted to mis-
characterize herself as an innocent and simple housewife being attacked by ADC who caused 
her emotional distress. Such an attempt was also demonstrated in her prior pleadings wherein 
she and Ms. Feld are referred to as the "Housewives." See R. 988-1040. Discovery was 
undertaken to determine what Ms. Tobias really was and what kind of emotional distress she 
would likely experience. The truth is, as discovered from Ms. Tobias, is that she is a self 
proclaimed political and social activist. She has been involved in literally dozens of causes,19 
and has been actively involved in many political campaigns and personal election efforts.20 
19ADC was able to discover that Ms. Tobias organized the following groups for various 
causes in addition to her formation with Ms. Feld of Save Our South Jordan River Valley, Inc., 
dba SOS and Save Open Spaces: 
1. Ladies at Home (See Tobias Deposition at p. 34, In. 11); 
2. Hot Pink Mamas (See Tobias Deposition at p. 37, In. 11); 
3. Women Against Gun Control (See Tobias Deposition at p. 92, Ins. 7-13); 
4. Three Neighborhood Watch Groups (See Tobias Deposition at p. 115, Ins. 7-8); 
5. People Against More Taxes (See Tobias Deposition at p. 118, Ins. 10-16); 
6. Citizens for Smart Transportation (See Tobias Deposition at p. 122, Ins. 19-22); 
and 
7. Citizens for Term Limits (See Tobias Deposition at p. 130, Ins. 10-11). 
SeeR. 3093. 
20ADC was able to discover that Ms. Tobias also was involved in the following political 
campaigns: 
1. Genevieve Atwood's campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives (See 
Tobias Deposition at p. 42, Ins. 20-23); 
2. Merrill Cook's campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives (See Tobias 
(continued...) 
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Her causes are varied, from open space issues to pro-gun rights. It is within this context and 
level of confrontation and controversy of her own making that ADC was required to examine 
Tobias' claim that this case was "the source" of all her emotional distress. One must 
understand her world which is aptly summarized by the bumper-sticker on her minivan - "So 
Many Causes, So Little Time." See R. 3092. 
It was of further interest that during the pendency of this action, Ms. Tobias was very 
(...continued) 
Deposition at p. 43, Ins. 18-20); 
3. Jim Decker's campaign for State House of Representatives (See Tobias 
Deposition at p. 46, Ins. 22-25); 
4. Ken Olafson's campaign for Mayor of West Valley City (See Tobias Deposition 
at p. 50, Ins. 18-22); 
5. Dan Bresnahan's campaign for State House of Representatives (See Tobias 
Deposition at p. 53, Ins. 13-18); 
6. Sue Lockman's campaign for State House of Representatives (See Tobias 
Deposition at p. 56, Ins. 1-3); 
7. Merrill Cook's campaign for Utah Governor (See Tobias Deposition at p. 61, 
Ins. 2-5); 
8. Brent Foutz's campaign for South Jordan City Council (See Tobias Deposition 
at p. 82, Ins. 22-24); and 
9. Merrill Cook's re-election campaign for U.S.House of Representatives (See 
Tobias Deposition at p. 86, Ins. 1-2). 
See R. 3093-3094. 
ADC was also able to discover that Ms. Tobias ran for the following political offices 
(she lost in each of these elections): 
1. In 1998 for the State House of Representatives (See Tobias Deposition at p. 62, 
Ins. 12-19); and 
2. In 1999 for South Jordan City Council (See Tobias Deposition at p. 72, Ins. 10-
12). 
SeeR. 3094-3095. 
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active with Women Against Gun Control, to which she is president. See R. 3094-3095. 
During the same period of time that Ms. Tobias claimed that she suffered emotional distress 
due to the filing of the present action, she attended various news conferences, sent e-mail 
alerts, organized rallies, traveled to Washington, D.C. to attend a "Second Amendment Sister" 
rally wherein she spoke and marched in protest, organized a rally at the Utah State Capitol, and 
organized another rally on Mother's Day. 
Following these activities and still during the very same time that she was claiming 
emotional distress damages against ADC, Ms. Tobias' group was listed among "hate groups" 
by the national Simon Wiesenthal Center, a prominent Los Angeles organization whose focus 
is ending anti-Semitism and bigotry around the world. After apparent further confrontation, 
the Simon Wiesethal Center took Women Against Gun Control off its "hate" list. (See 
generally Tobias Deposition at pp. 104-114; R. id.). 
In July 2002, at a panel discussion at the Hinckley Institute of Politics Controversial 
Legal Issues Class, entitled "2nd Amendment: Should private persons be allowed to carry guns 
on campus?" Ms. Tobias was a panel member, along with Fred Esplin, U of U Spokesperson, 
Dave Jones, former state legislator, and John Flynn, U of U Law Professor. In her introductory 
statement, Ms. Tobias recounts: 
"As you can see, it was 3 anti-gun men against 1 pro-gun woman(me). In my 
opening remarks (after each of them had been given 10 minutes to speak before 
me), I said that in a match of wits against wits, that they needed to send more 
men to debate against me, but in a match against physical strength, I admitted 
to being the weaker sex against even one man at a time—and that's why I carry 
a gun." 
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As a result of her remarks and offensive, confrontational approach, Fred Esplin walked 
out of the room and reported that he refused to participate in the debate with Ms. Tobias. See 
R. 3095-3096. It is the emotional distress and attendant damages of this "housewife" that 
needed to be understood in this case. The questions asked during her deposition were for 
purposes of understanding her background, her life, her lifestyle and her activities - all of 
which are relevant to any consideration of her claims for emotional distress.21 
Further, as part of ADC's examination into the "world" that Ms. Tobias had created for 
herself was to examine both her familial and other inter-personal relationships. Unfortunately, 
this included co-defendant Brent Foutz. The facts were undisputed that Mr.Foutz worked 
closely and as an ally with Ms. Tobias in her efforts to interfere with the Williams' sale of 
properly to ADC. Brent Foutz had developed an unhealthy attraction to Ms. Tobias during that 
time and this was causing her emotional distress. This relationship was considered by Jane 
21
 Such aggressive and often abusive conduct was most recently noted in articles 
published by the SALT LAKE TRIBUNE dated June 12,2003 and the DESERET MORNING NEWS 
dated June 13, 2003. Both of these articles describe a South Jordan Planning Commission 
meeting on June 11,2003, wherein defendants Tobias and Foutz were cited as disrupting. THE 
DESERET MORNING NEWS reported that Tobias, "lobbed the first salvo at Tuesday's meeting 
by calling commission chairman Bob Stubbs "arrogant." Stubbs told the reporter that Tobias 
"was 'hassling' others at the meeting and that she wrote on the back of a comment card given 
to the commission, 'We're back' . . . Stubbs said Foutz and Tobias wanted to speak to every 
item on the commission's agenda and to use the meeting as a forum to air their 'dirty laundry.'" 
See DESERET MORNING NEW, S. Jordan in upoarover'name calling, (June 13,2003) at Section 
B, p. 3. The Salt Lake Tribune reported further that Bob Stubbs stated that "Tobias was 
ignorant and exhibited 'immature and out-of-order behavior'" that even included '"yell[ing] 
at us from the audience' when they no longer had the floor." Mr. Stubbs noted that in his 
entire tenure as the commission chair this was the first time that he had to call "in a South 
Jordan police officer to maintain order." See THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, South Jordan Repeals 
Ordinance, (June 12, 2003) at Section B, p. 4. 
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Foutz as one of the central factors that lead to failure of her 20+ year marriage with defendant 
Brent Foutz.22 Understanding Ms. Tobias' reaction to this relationship was important and 
relevant because it illustrated another possible source of emotional stress and further evidenced 
Ms. Tobias' capacity to manage emotionally difficult situations of her own creation. 
While obviously resistant to explain or acknowledge, Ms. Tobias confirmed during her 
deposition that she knew of the many troubling indicators or information about Mr. Foutz's 
attraction to her. See Tobias Deposition at pp. 147-48-Ins. 24-11; p. 151,lns.7-18;pp. 161-62, 
Ins. 13-17; pp. 166-69; R. 4006-4007. In response to questioning as to whether such conduct 
was hurting Mr. Foutz, Ms. Tobias responded: 
Ms. Tobias: No, they were hurting me. 
Question: So you didn't really care if they were hurting his [Brent Foutz's] family; 
is that what you're saying? 
Ms. Tobias: My concern was my husband and his honor. 
See Tobias Deposition at p. 168-69, Ins. 25-3 (emphasis added); see also Tobias Deposition 
at p. 171,1ns. 18-19, p. 173, Ins. 6-13; pp. 173-74, Ins. 3-1; R. 4007. 
While the testimony proffered during Ms. Tobias' deposition was at times personal, as 
the foregoing demonstrates, its was highly relevant to the emotional distress counterclaims she 
filed. Ms. Tobias' claims that this litigation was the primary if not the sole source of her 
emotional struggles, in light of this testimony, is disingenuous. Through discovery, ADC 
22See generally Affidavit of Jane Foutz attached as Exhibit "A" to ADC' s Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Tobias/Feld's common law counterclaims, including the 
claims for emotional distress, specifically at ^13-20. See R. 4021-4035. 
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confirmed that Ms. Tobias thrust herself into the vortex of multiple disputes. She appears to 
thrive on publicity and seeks opportunity to call attention to herself (a search on the Internet 
of her name found numerous hits, containing dozens of news articles that she is quoted in and 
press releases she is credited with). She was the recipient of romatic expressions from a co-
defendant. Ms. Tobias5 "naive housewife" claim was nothing but an ill-conceived facade. It 
is within that context that her actions against ADC for emotional distress needed to be 
determined. 
As a result, ADC's taking of Tobias' deposition was both necessary and appropriate in 
the present case. While being represented throughout her deposition by counsel, Tobias cannot 
now claim that the taking of said deposition was for the purpose of "harassment or annoyance." 
ADC was preparing its defense to Tobias' counterclaims by taking her deposition. Tobias may 
take some misconceived offense at the questions asked, but she cannot legitimately claim that 
ADC was abusing the process by so taking her deposition.23 
C. Tobias/Feld's Abuse of Process Claims Fail Even Under the Misplaced 
Standards That Toblis/Feld Articulated. 
Even under Tobias/Feld's view of the law, Tobias/Feld must show that the legal 
process pursued was used "primarily to accomplish a purpose for which [the legal process] 
was not designed . . .." Restatement 2d of Torts § 682. In other words, under Tobias/Feld's 
23PROSSER ON TORTS aptly noted in these circumstances that indeed, "there is no liability 
where the defendant [or plaintiff] has done nothing more than carry out the process to its 
authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS §121, at 898 (5th ed. 1984). 
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own position, "the gist of the tort is not commencing an action or causing process to issue 
without justification, but misusing, or misapplying the process justified in itself for an end 
other than that which it was designed to accomplish." Keller v. Ray, Ouinney & Nebeker, 896 
F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (D.Utah). 
ADC has repeatedly proven that its purpose in bringing the action against Tobias/Feld 
was legitimate at law, and ADC has at all times directed the litigation within the properly 
defined parameters of its cause of action. To date, Tobias/Feld have attempted to assert their 
abuse of process claim by presenting to the trial court facts which were immaterial, irrelevant, 
and which fall well outside the necessary scope of maintaining their counterclaim. 
Tobias/Feld asserted that the trial court could not grant ADC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment because the question of whether ADC used the judicial system for an improper 
purpose was a question of intent which must be determined by a jury. See Tobias/Feld 
Memorandum in Opposition to ADC's Motion to Dismiss at p. 18; R. 3608. However, 
Tobias/Feld once again fail to understand the law as it pertains to an abuse of process claim, 
even as cited by them. 
Under Tobias/Feld's rubrics, an abuse of process claim does not hinge on the intent of 
the parties. While it is true that a "proper issuance of process may become tainted by its 
subsequent use, [a] regular use of process with bad intentions is not a malicious abuse of that 
process." McKay Machine Company v. Bosway Tube and Steel Corp., 180 N.W.2d 96, 97 
(Mich.App. 1970). Intent may be relevant to a claim for malicious prosecution, but in an abuse 
of process claim "the purpose for which the process is used, once it is issued, is the only 
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thing of importance." Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. C. 
Utah 1995)(Emphasis the court's). In this case, the only purpose for which ADC has used the 
legal process was to discover that Tobias/Feld intentionally interfered with ADC's contractual 
and economic relations and the facts upon which Tobias/Feld based their claims - this "is the 
only thing of importance " Id. 
The key element to Tobias/Feld's abuse of process claim requires that Tobias/Feld show 
that ADC has perverted the legal process underlying a claim for intentional interference with 
contractual and economic relations. Tobias/Feld cite to Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, supra 
to support their position24 that the primary element for proving an abuse of process claim is as 
follows: 
the essence of [abuse of process] is a perversion of the process to accomplish 
some other purpose, such as compelling its victim to do something which he 
would not otherwise be legally obligated to do. On the other hand if it is used 
for its proper and intended purpose, the mere fact that it has some other 
collateral effect does not constitute abuse of process. 
30 Utah 2d 451, 519 P. 2d 888, 890 (Utah 1974). This language was further explained by the 
Federal District Court for Utah when it commented to the standard set forth in the Crease 
opinion: 
In addition, whether there was an abuse of process is to be determined as an 
issue independent from the rightfulness or wrongfulness of the prior steps in the 
proceedings. Although abuse of process is not well-defined in Utah caselaw, 
other jurisdictions have examined it more closely. In those jurisdictions it is 
24As previously discussed, the Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, supra case involves the 
application of an abuse of process claim within the criminal context, rather than the civil 
context as found in the present case. 
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generally agreed that if the action is confined to its regular and legitimate 
function in relation to the cause of action stated in the complaint there is no 
abuse. Even if the plaintiff had an ulterior motive in bringing the action or 
if he knowingly brought suit upon an unfounded claim. Moreover, while the 
ulterior motive may be inferred from the wrongful use of the process, the 
wrongful use may not be inferred from the motive. A cause of action for abuse 
of process may arise through an act by a defendant 'outside of the regular and 
legitimate use of the process resulting in an interference with either the person 
or property of the plaintiff. Such as an excessive execution on a judgment or 
attaching property in an excessive amount. 
Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeken 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (D. Utah) (emphasis added); see 
accord Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, supra, 519 P.2d at 890; Institute for Professional Dev. 
v.Regis College, 536 F. Supp. 632,635 (D.Colo. 1982)(quoting Am. Jur. 2d, Abuse of Process 
§ 13 (1962). 
Once again, ADC is compelled to reiterate that the action brought by ADC for 
intentional interference with economic relations, is a legitimate and recognized claim for relief 
under Utah law the trial court has recognized this on at least two occasions.25 To maintain its 
claim against Tobias/Feld, under Tobias/Feld's own analysis, ADC is required to prove: (1) 
that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic 
relations (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing in injury to the 
plaintiff.26 The legal process affixed to the tort was designed to protect existing contractual 
25See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 
199Inciting Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isomu 657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah 1982)). 
26These are the three elements, or three-pronged test, established by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Leigh Furniture for proving or maintaining a cause of action for intentional 
interference with contractual and economic relations. See, Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 302. 
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relationships and prospective relationships of economic advantage not yet reduced to a formal 
contract. Id. Moreover, the process is designed to provide redress where contracts have been 
interfered with wrongfully. 
Having again established what the legal process to maintain a claim for interference 
with contractual and economic relations is, the proper analysis for determining whether ADC 
abused the process must of legal necessary focus on whether the process has been used to 
accomplish some other purpose or whether Tobias/Feld are being compelled to do something 
which they would not otherwise be legally obligated to do. The material facts do not support 
Tobias/Feld's assertions under this analysis. 
Tobias/Feld claim that ADC committed an abuse of process by filing the lawsuit to 
punish them and silence them. See R. 3591. However, in pursuing its litigation, ADC is 
simply seeking redress for the wrongful actions of Tobias/Feld, regardless of whether they 
view it as "punishment." 
1. Whether ADC Filed or Continued This Litigation for an Improper 
Purpose is Not Material to an Abuse of Process Analysis. 
Tobias/Feld assert that whether ADC initiated or maintained its litigation against 
Tobias/Feld5 s for their intentional interference with contractual and economic relations was 
done with an improper purpose is a question of fact for a jury to decide. Again, Utah law 
defines what is necessary to prove an abuse of process claim. Regardless of whether this 
litigation was filed with an improper purpose (and ADC vigorously defends the position that 
it was not), Tobias/Feld must provide the court with some factual evidence showing that ADC 
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has used the process associated with its claim for intentional interference with contractual and 
economic relations or in defense of the Counterclaim as it existed in a manner which is outside 
the processes' regular and legitimate functions. See Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 
F.Supp. 1563,1571 (D. Utah), citing. Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 519 P.2d 888,890 (Utah 
1974); Institute for Professional Dev. v. Regis College, 536 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D.Colo. 
1982)(quoting, Am. Jur. 2d, Abuse of Process § 13 (1962). This, Tobias/Feld have failed to 
do. 
Tobias/Feld utterly failed to show to the trial court that ADC has used, or is using, its 
claim against them to accomplish anything other than to seek redress and remedy for the actual 
damages that Tobias/Feld caused to ADC's contractual relations with the Williams. The 
"Statement of Disputed Facts" presented by Tobias/Feld only show that there exists no 
evidence which would tend to prove their abuse of process claim. The facts they raise in 
regards to ADC's actions in this case are focused on the timing of letters, timing of the lawsuit 
filing, timing of service, delays in prosecuting the case, etc. None of these facts show that 
ADC abused the legal process or acted outside the process' regular and legitimate function. 
2. There Are No Material Facts Which Show that ADC Abused the 
Judicial Process. 
Regardless of whether ADC was unhappy by the political actions of Tobias/Feld in 
regards to the pending master plan or zoning change of the Riverpark Project at South Jordan 
City, ADC's cause of action against Tobias/Feld has at all times focused and remained on their 
interference with contractual relations, not their right to be active in the political process. 
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As the foregoing illustrates, even under Tobias/Feld's own legal understanding 
Tobias/Feld failed to establish why summary judgment wasn't appropriate over their abuse of 
process claim. As a consequence, the trial court properly granted summary judgment over the 
same. 
V. ANY AND ALL CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND FOR 
ATTORNEYS9 FEES AND COSTS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Tobias/Feld characterize their punitive damages claim as part of their SLAPP 
counterclaim, however the SLAPP Act does not provide for punitive damages. Therefore, 
Tobias/Feld plead under Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (l)(a) which permits punitive damages only 
if 
compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of 
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that 
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the 
rights of others. 
As discussed above, ADC's claims have been the subject of two dispositive motions 
by Tobias/Feld, both claiming that ADC's claims were without merit and cannot be 
maintained. These motions have been denied by the trial court. Accordingly, punitive 
damages are not available in the present case. Additionally, the law is clear that any claim for 
punitive damages can only be supported if the underlying claims of Tobias and Feld are 
successful and result in an award of compensatory or general damages. Without such a 
showing, punitive damages are simply not available. 
Finally, Tobias/Feld seek attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
-63-
56(1953, as amended). However, the law in Utah requires that "[a] court may award attorney 
fees under section 78-27-56 and/or costs under rale 54(d) only to a prevailing party." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1953, as amended); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d); see accord 
Robinson v. State. 20 P.3d 396 (Utah 2000); Faust v. KAI Techs.. Inc.. 15 P.3d 1266 (Utah 
2000). Additionally, to be a prevailing party, a party 'must obtain at least some relief on the 
merits' of the party's claim or claims. See Crank v. Utah Judicial Council. 20 P.3d 307 (Utah 
2001). Tobias/Feld's claims for attorneys' fees and costs are only derivatives of their 
underlying claims and can only be awarded if Tobias/Feld are able to succeed on the merits of 
those claims. No independent cause of action for such damages exist. 
The Counterclaim is explicit that the only action complained of by Tobias/Feld was the 
threat and subsequent filing of a lawsuit that ADC maintains, and which the trial court twice 
affirmed, as having been properly pled under Utah law. Tobias/Feld's independent claim for 
punitive damages was therefore properly dismissed. 
VI. AS THE TRIAL COURT HAS FOUND, TWICE: A CLAIM FOR 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONS AND PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS DOES NOT 
REQUIRE A BREACH BUT ONLY AN IMPAIRMENT. 
The issue as to whether a breach is required to state a claim for intentional interference 
with existing contractual relations as been previously raised and resolved by the trial court, 
twice. 
• First, this issue was raised when Rocky Anderson was counsel for Tobias/Feld. He 
filed a Motion to Dismiss just after the case was filed. In this motion, Mr. Anderson 
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argued that the law required a breach. See R. 27-28. Unfortunately, the law that Mr. 
Anderson cited to had been expressly rejected by this Court. See R. 41-42. 
Accordingly, on or about December 14, 1998, the trial court denied Tobias/FekTs 
Motion to Dismiss ruling that a[t]he Plaintiff [ADC] has stated a cause of action in its 
complaint of intentional interference with existing economic relations or prospective 
economic relations." See R. 68. 
• Secondly, on or about November 9, 2001, Tobias/Feld filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment claiming again that ADC had failed to state a cause of action against them for 
interference with either existing contractual relations because there was no breach. See 
R. 345-346. On or about May 21, 2002, the trial court again denied such an attempt 
noting that material issues of disputed fact existed thereby precluding the granting of 
summary judgment. See R. 927-928. 
Despite such express prior rulings by the trial court, Tobias/Feld have yet again argued 
that because there was no actual breach of the First REPC and that the Second REPC was 
closed, that no actionable interference occurred. A brief recount as to the evolution of this tort 
in Utah evidences just how misplaced Tobias/Feld are in repeatedly asserting that position. 
A. Utah Law Rejected Early Case Law That Indicated A Breach is an Element 
of Intentional Interference with Existing Contractual Relations. 
The notion that a breach was a required element under the tort of intentional 
interference with existing contractual relations finds its root in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts as interpreted by this Court in Bunnell v. Bilk 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962). However, the 
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approaches proffered by both the Restatement (Second) and the Bunnell court, as relied upon 
by Tobias/Feld, have been expressly rejected by this Court in Leigh Furniture and Carpet 
Company v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), and its progeny. 
In Leigh Furniture, this Court considered the different maturations of the tort of 
intentional interference with economic relations. This included the Restatement (Second) 
definition of the tort of intentional interference with economic relations. The Restatement 
(Second) approach to this tort involves the interplay and interrelation of seven factors. Id. at 
303. Ultimately, the Leigh Furniture Court rejected this approach altogether. Id. at 304. 
Likewise, the Leigh Furniture Court rejected the "prima facie-tort" approach adopted 
by the Restatement (First) of Torts. In rejecting this approach, the Court noted that several 
prior Utah opinions wrongfully "assumed" that this approach would be adopted. This included 
the Bunnell opinion. See id. at 303; see also Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc, 
360 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1961). 
As such, Tobias/Feld's reliance on the Restatement (Second) and the "prima facie-tort" 
approaches are both misguided and unsupported by current Utah law. Accordingly, the 
analysis employed by Tobias/Feld yet again is not helpful in adjudicating this cause of action 
for intentional interference with economic relations. 
B. The Proper Standard to Establish the Tort of Intentional Interference with 
Economic Relations in Utah Is Set Forth in Leigh Furniture to Which ADC 
Has Sufficiently Established Each Element Against Tobias/Feld. 
In Utah, the tort of intentional interference with economic relations protects "both 
existing contractual relationships and prospective relationships of economic advantage not yet 
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reduced to a formal contract." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 
194,200 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added) (citing Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 
293, 302 (Utah 1982)). Three requirements exist for such a claim: 
1. "that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or 
potential economic relations"; 
2. "for an improper purpose or by improper means"; 
3. "causing injury to the plaintiff." 
St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 200 (emphasis added) (citing Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304). 
Under the express rulings of this Court both torts of intentional interference with either 
existing or prospective economic relations are governed by the same test. In contrast, 
Tobias/Feld claims that a different test should be used for each claim. Yet, this argument is 
based on the application of legal theories expressly rejected by the Utah courts. 
Furthermore, under the test adopted by the Utah courts, no actual breach of contract 
is required under either tort, but only the impairment of performance. As succinctly stated 
in St. Benedict's: "[T]here is no allegation in the complaint that any existing [contract] was 
breached or that the performance under any [contract] was in any way impaired by defendants' 
actions." St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 201 (emphasis added). Under this analysis, the St. 
Benedict's court determined that either a "breach" or an "impairment" would be sufficient to 
state a claim for intentional interference with economic relations. Thus, while a breach 
definitely meets the standard, so does an impairment. Tobias/Feld's argument to the contrary 
must, therefore, be rejected again by this Court. 
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C. ADC has Stated Sufficient Material Facts in Support of its Claim that the 
First REPC and Second REPC were Both Impaired by the Wrongful and 
Intentional Conduct of Tobias/Feld. 
Unfortunately, Tobias/Feld have missed again the central issue underlying ADC's 
causes of action for intentional interference with existing contractual relations and prospective 
economic relations. Tobias/Feld wants this Court to look only at what the Williams did or 
didn't do in regards to the First REPC and Second REPC. Yet, such a perspective misses the 
mark. This case is not about how Tobias/Feld damaged the Williams, but how Tobias/Feld 
damaged ADC.27 This case is about how Tobias/Feld impaired ADC's ability or capacity or 
willingness to perform under the First REPC and Second REPC. It is that wrongful impact that 
ADC seeks relief against Tobias/Feld. As the facts repletely demonstrate, Tobias/Feld actively 
and intentionally worked to impair ADC's contractual relations with the Williams under the 
First REPC and intentionally worked to impair ADC's prospective economic relations with the 
Williams that resulted in the Second REPC. Such intentional and wrongful conduct is 
actionable. 
As previously discussed, this Court in St. Benedict's. 811 P.2d at 201 held that the torts 
of intentional interference with existing contractual relations and prospective economic 
relations only required an "impairment" of the underlying existing contract or prospective 
economic relations. The term "impairment" is defined as a process or event to make worse or 
27Ironically, one could argue that Tobias/Feld's wrongful actions in damaging ADC in 
the end actually benefitted the Williams, as the Williams were wrongfully induced to charge 
ADC more for the Williams Property to which ADC ultimately paid. 
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to diminish in some material respect. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1974) at p. 
574. 
Under Black's Law Dictionary, the term "impairment" in relation to contracts is defined 
as follows: 
A law which impairs the obligation of a contract is one which renders the 
contract itself less valuable or less enforceable, whether by changing its terms 
and stipulations, its legal qualities and conditions, or by regulating the remedy 
for its enforcement. . . . The word impair' means, according to the standard 
writers in our language, simply 'to diminish; to injure; to make worse,' etc. 
See Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Ed. (1968) at 885. 
As discussed below, the facts clearly demonstrate how Tobias/Feld impaired ADC's 
ability and willingness to close under the First REPC (the claim for interference with existing 
contractual relations) and impaired or made less valuable to ADC the terms under which it 
bought the Williams Property under the Second REPC (the claim for intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations). This case requires Tobias/Feld to be accountable for 
their actions. Once they chose to "do everything in their power to stop the project" (as told to 
David Millheim by Tobias/Feld) they crossed the lines of ethics and legal public participation 
and intentionally damaged ADC. Such wrongful conduct is actionable. 
1. Tobias/Feld Wrongfully Interfered With the First REPC By 
Impairing ADC's Ability, Capacity or Willingness to Purchase the 
Williams Property under the Terms of the First REPC 
Tobias/Feld's wrongful and intentional actions were directed to "impair" or "diminish" 
the value of the First REPC to ADC by attempting to induce the Williams to breach the First 
REPC with ADC, as well s by preventing the requisite zoning changes to occur over the 
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Williams Property until the First REPC had expired. The evidence is overwhelming that these 
objectives were specifically and intentionally acted upon by Tobias/Feld. The following 
summary of facts establish this reality: 
1. Once the First REPC was executed ADC begin the process necessary to get the 
Williams Property rezoned or otherwise entitled to meet the terms of the First REPC with 
South Jordan City. See Appendix "A" at ffi[8, 9. 
2. At all times, ADC acted in conformity to the express requirements of applicable 
law in their efforts to get the Williams Property. In fact, the time allotted under the First REPC 
to get the necessary zoning completed was both reasonable and sufficient. See Appendix "A" 
atffl|47,48, 58,64. 
3. Tobias/Feld's first efforts to "impair" the First REPC were trying to convince 
the Williams to breach the First REPC by refusing to sell to ADC. See Appendix "A" at ^ fijl 1, 
16, 17, 51(o). 
4. Tobias/Feld believed that ADC would only close on the First REPC if the 
requisite zoning changes were completed. So, Tobias/Feld contacted key decision-makers at 
South Jordan City for the purpose of convincing them to improperly delay rezoning on the 
Williams Property until after June 30,1997, when the First REPC expired. See Appendix "A" 
atin[12,64. 
5. To convince these key South Jordan City decision-makers, Tobias/Feld 
misrepresented themselves as a credible and legitimate charitable environmental entity that had 
the ability and connections to purchase the Williams Property and preserve it as open spaces — 
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as a park or science center. These misrepresentations included claims that Tobias/Feld were 
interested in preserving open spaces in the Jordan River Valley, that it was a tax-exempt entity 
and that it had raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for the protection of open spaces. See 
Appendix "A" atlfflll, 25, 29, 51(p), 51(q), 53, 54, 67, 73. 
6. Tobias/Feld represented to these key decision-makers that Tobias/Feld had either 
rased sufficient fimds or had friendly buyers who were willing to purchase the Williams 
Property for more than what ADC was offering to pay and then leave the property as open 
space. See Appendix "A" at fflfll, 28, 51(b), 51(j), 51(q), 53, 54, 67, 73. 
7. Key decision-makers at South Jordan City were deceived by Tobias/Feld and as 
a result agreed to delay the rezoning of the Williams Property until after June 30, 1997 in 
accord with Tobias/Feld's request. See Appendix "A" at ffl[12, 23, 30, 53, 54, 66. 
8. Based critically on Tobias/Feld's wrongful and intentional actions, as discussed 
above, ADC was unable to get the Williams Property rezoned to be part of the RiverPark 
Business Park on or before June 30, 1997, when the First REPC expired. See Appendix "A" 
atffl|13,31,66, 73. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, Tobias/Feld intentionally and wrongfully interfered with 
ADC's contractual relationship (the First REPC) with the Williams impairing, or diminishing 
or reducing the value of the First REPC by improperly delaying the rezoning of the Williams 
Property. Such wrongful conduct is actionable under Utah law. It is for such wrongful 
conduct that ADC seeks recovery. 
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2. Tobias/Feld Wrongfully Interfered With the Second REPC By 
Impairing the Terms of the Second REPC Compared to the Terms 
of the First REPC. 
Coupled with their misrepresentations to key decision-makers at South Jordan City to 
induce a delay in rezoning the Williams Property until after the First REPC had expired, 
Tobias/Feld engaged in a concerted effort to convince these city officials and the Williams that 
they represented a viable financial alternative to ADC. They did this through multiple 
misrepresentations. As Boyd Williams told South Jordan City: 
So you can benefit from our experience, I will tell you what happened when we 
let our original contract expire with Anderson Development to entertain an offer 
from Open Lands Trust people (as prompted by the SOS group.) They made 
promises and offers that were not fulfilled. They skewed the facts to take unfair, 
advantage of our situation, and, to our dismay, we found that they were not 
credible and, in fact, misleading and untruthful. We will not work with these 
people and feel that they have mislead many who support their possible cause 
and involvement in this project. 
See Appendix "A" at t l06. 
The following summary of facts establish this reality: 
1. Tobias/Feld's wrongful actions included, but were not limited to, repeatedly 
representing to South Jordan City officials, the Williams and others that they had located 
willing and able buyers for the Williams Property for more than ADC was willing to pay under 
the First REPC, bringing potential buyers to the Williams while the First REPC was still in 
place, when they knew that such was utterly untrue. See Appendix "A" at ^ 5 1 (b), 51 (q), 67, 
91,95,99,100,103, 104,112,116. 
2. Tobias/Feld's misrepresentations pertaining to South Jordan City officials, the 
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Williams and others was further compounded by misrepresenting themselves as a credible and 
legitimate charitable environmental entity that had the ability and connections to facilitate these 
kinds of transactions. These misrepresentations included claims that Tobias/Feld and their 
organization were interested in preserving open spaces in the Jordan River Valley, that they 
were a tax-exempt entity, and that they had raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for the 
protection of open spaces. See Appendix "A" at ffi[25, 51(q), 53, 54, 67, 74, 91, 92, 98, 102, 
111,115. 
3. The true facts are that Tobias/Feld's sole concern was stopping ADC's 
development. Tobias/Feld and SOS were not a tax exempt entity, had never raised any 
substantial money, and had failed to comply with numerous provisions of Utah law, including, 
but not limited to, the Utah Charitable Solicitation Act, Utah Code Ann. § § 13-22-1, et seq. and 
the Election Code. Utah Code Ann. §§20A-11-701, et. seq. and were not even registered in 
Utah under the name of as SOS. See Appendix "A" at ffl|55-57. 
4. The foregoing wrongful actions by Tobias/Feld caused the Williams to consider 
that they should be getting more for the Williams Property than what was contracted for under 
the First REPC. See Appendix "A" at ffl[27, 104. 
5. ADC was required to pay at nearly $700,000 more for the Williams Properly to 
the Williams and suffered consequential and incidental damages in excess of $300,000.00. See 
Appendix "A" at ffi[34(a)-(g), 35. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, Tobias/Feld intentionally and wrongfully interfered with 
ADC's prospective economic relations with the Williams. Tobias/Feld acted as a shill in the 
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market for the Williams Property, creating a fabricated competitive market through 
misrepresentations. The result damaged ADC by requiring it to pay more for the Williams 
Property under the Second REPC. Such wrongful conduct is actionable under Utah law. It is 
such wrongful conduct that ADC seeks recovery. 
D. Tobias/Feld Are the Proximate Cause of the Impairment of the Contract 
Between the Williams and ADC. 
Tobias and Feld's actions are the proximate and legal cause of the injury suffered by 
ADC. Proximate cause is "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by 
an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not 
have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury." Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356-57 (Utah 1996) 
(citing Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). 
Here, but for the interference by Tobias and Feld with the Williams contract directly, 
and the improper induced delays of South Jordan City that were a result of Tobias and FekTs 
misrepresentations to city officials and others, ADC would not have suffered injury. Tobias 
and Feld now are attempting to distance themselves from the actions that were taken by the city 
on its request and based upon their representations. See Affidavits of David Millheim and 
Thomas Christensen at Appendix "A" at ffl|45-78. 
Finally, however, this Court has stated that "[qjuestions relating to negligence and 
proximate cause are generally for the fact-trier, court or jury, to determine." Rees v. 
Albertson's. 587 P.2d 130, (Utah 1978). 
-74-
Tobias/Feld were not only interested in denying ADC's zoning application on the 
Williams Property, but would use any means available to harm ADC. They deliberately sought 
improper and then delay of city actions in the hopes that once the Williams option expired 
ADC would not economically be able to purchase the Williams property in the First REPC. 
E. ADC Was a Real Party in Interest to the Contract; ADC Was Assigned All 
Rights to the Litigation by Lakeview Farms and Janice Phelps Andersen. 
Tobias and Feld contend that ADC cannot assert its claims because it was not the 
ultimate purchaser of the Williams property. This argument fails to recognize the facts as they 
have been presented in this action, including the following: 
• ADC was the contracting party with the Williams. See Appendix "A" at ^5. 
• ADC, Janice Phelps Andersen and LakeView Farms, LLC operated under a 
contractual relationship whereby ADC would secure the property and Janice 
Phelps Andersen and LakeView Farms, LLC would finance the project. See 
Appendix "A" at HH36-39, 118-122. 
• ADC was assigned any and all potential rights to this litigation by LakeView 
Farms, LLC and Janice Phelps Andersen. See Appendix "A" at 1fl[40, 123. 
• ADC was a party to the contract when the impairment occurred. See Appendix 
"A" at If5. 
• ADC was assigned any and all rights to this litigation and is the real party in 
interest in this litigation. See Appendix "A" at 1ffl4l(c), 44, 123(c), 126. 
As a result, Tobias/Feld's arguments are simply misplaced and not based on the factual 
realities of this matter. 
F. The Actions of South Jordan City Were Based upon the Misrepresentations 
of Tobias/Feld, as Has Been Alleged AH Along. 
While the allegations that Tobias and Feld wrongfully petitioned and ultimately 
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convinced South Jordan City to delay action have been made at every pertinent stage of this 
litigation, Tobias and Fled now attempt to claim that these are new facts that were not raised 
earlier. This position is not supported by the record. See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint ^[31; 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint and for 
the Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, throughout; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment, for an Order Granting Leave to Amend Their Pleadings to Plead a 
Counterclaim, for an Order Granting a Jury Trial and For an Order Continuing the Trial, 
throughout. 
ADC has maintained that this action is not aimed at chilling legitimate economic 
speech. However, ADC has also alleged from the outset that a portion of the statements made 
and actions taken by Tobias and Feld's action ceased to be legitimate protected speech and 
became unprotected and economically harmful misrepresentations to South Jordan City 
officials. Tobias and Feld's claims that this argument is new is simply untrue. For example, 
when defending against Tobias and Feld's previous Motion for Summary Judgment against 
ADC, ADC alleged that" SOS furthered their wrongful conduct by contacting key decision-
makers at the City of South Jordan for the purpose of convincing them to delay rezoning the 
Williams Property until after June 30, 1999." See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment, for an Order Granting Leave to Amend Their Pleadings to Plead a 
Counterclaim, for an Order Granting a Jury Trial and For an Order Continuing the Trial at p. 
-76-
33; R. 527. 
G. The Misrepresentations Made by Tobias and Feld Are Not Privileged. 
Tobias and Feld argue that their misrepresentations to South Jordan City officials are 
somehow protected under the First Amendment right to petition in a variety of actions, 
including actions for tortious interference with business relationships. To support this position 
Tobias and Feld cite Havoco of America. Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1983)28. 
However, the Seventh Circuit Court in Havoco stated that "a private citizen's acts pursuant to 
his right to petition a legislative body, be it local or otherwise, are conditionally privileged. . 
. ." Id. at 648 (emphasis added)29. Furthermore, the court cited the Illinois Supreme Court 
28Tobias and Feld also cite a number of other cases for the proposition that their actions 
were immune, however, each of these cases recognize the "sham" exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. In Westfield Partner's, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp 523, 526 (N.D. 111. 
1990), the court recognized that "there is an exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity, the 
"sham" exception. This exception applies when it can be shown that an ostensible campaign 
to petition the government is actually a cover for nothing more than an attempt to harass" Id. 
at Note 10. (citing California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 
(1972)). In Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W.Va. 1981), the court stated that "[cjonduct which 
prevents a party from participating in the policy-making functions of the executive, legislative, 
or judicial branches of government is not petitioning activity protected by the right to petition 
the government, and such conduct may give rise to a cause of action for damages." Id. at 29. 
In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531(9th Cir. 1991), the court held 
that "Noerr-Pennington protection is not absolute. The Noerr court recognized an exception 
where a publicity campaign, 'ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action . . 
. is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor.'" Id. at 535 (citing Eastern R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1960). There is no First 
Amendment or Noerr Pennington doctrine protected for one who uses the political process to 
harm others. 
29Similarly, Utah law allows for a conditional privilege. The Utah Constitution states 
(continued...) 
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where it held that "[t]here must be a desire to harm, which is independent of and unrelated to 
a desire to protect the acting party's rights and which is not reasonably related to the defense 
of a recognized property or social interest." Id. at 649. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit went 
on examine the Noerr-Pennington doctrine30 stating that "activity within the ambit of the right 
(...continued) 
that "All men have the inalienable right... to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right." Utah Constitution. Article 1, Section 1 (emphasis 
added). 
30The United States Supreme Court developed the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in the 
context of antitrust litigation in order to protect the legitimate exercise of the constitutional 
right to petition the government after retributive civil claims were brought by parties harmed 
by petitioning activity. See Professional Real Estate Investors. Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Industries. Inc.. 508 U.S. 49 (1993)(citing Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight. Inc.. 365 U.S. 127 (1961)). The courts have adopted the United States Supreme 
Court's position that petitioning activity that amounts to 'a mere sham' are not immune under 
Noerr-Pennington. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. Inc.. 365 
U.S. 127,144 (1961). Consequently, sham petitioning activities that 'are not genuinely aimed 
at procuring favorable government action' but constitute inappropriate uses of governmental 
process, are not protected under the doctrine. Pound Hill Corp. Inc. v. Perl. 668 A.2d 1260, 
1263 (R.I. 1996). Under this doctrine, "[t]hose who petition government for redress are 
generally immune from antitrust liability." Professional Real Estate Investors. Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Industries. Inc.. 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993). "However, under the sham exception to the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, there is no immunity if the effort to influence or obtain government 
action is in fact only an attempt to interfere with the business relationships of a competitor." 
Id. The "sham" exception to Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use the 
governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive 
weapon. A classic example is the filing of frivolous objections to the license application of a 
competitor, with no expectation of achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose 
expense and delay. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited. 404 U.S. 508 
(1972). A "sham" situation involves a defendant whose activities are "not genuinely aimed 
at procuring favorable government action" at all. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head. 
Inc.. 486 U.S. 492. 500(1988). 
Tobias and Feld are attempting to explain away their tortious interference with 
contractual relations by arguing that they were merely engaging in the political process. The 
(continued...) 
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to petition the government for redress of grievances is privileged under the First Amendment, 
unless the alleged petitioning activity "is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing 
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of [another]." Id. 
at 649 (emphasis added)(citing Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
CONCLUSION 
A. The Trial Court Properly Granted ADC's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Over Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaim. 
This action was filed over five years ago. ADC has survived multiple attempts by 
Tobias/Feld to have it dismissed or judgment entered against ADC over it. The trial court has 
ruled and affirmed that ADC, at the very least, has stated viable causes of action against 
Tobias/Feld for their wrongful interference with both its then existing and prospective 
economic relations. The SLAPP Act should not apply to this case at all. It does not contain 
any language for retroactive application and Tobias/Feld's efforts to create a claim against 
ADC in this pending action by way of the SLAPP Act, if sanctioned, results in serious and 
multiple constitutional consequences. 
(...continued) 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not protect defendants who have engaged in illegal behavior. 
In Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 900 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir.1990), the United States 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine "does not 
provide immunity where legitimate lobbying efforts are accompanied by illegal or fraudulent 
actions." Id. at 1440; See also Westborough Mall Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 693 
F.2d 733, 746 (8th Cir.1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983). From the outset, ADC has 
alleged that Tobias and Feld went beyond simple political activism. They began to interfere 
with contractual relationships that ADC had with a seller, the Williams. There can be no 
constitutional protection for this type of behavior. 
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However, applying the SLAPP Act by its very terms and procedures to this case 
required the dismissal of Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaims, as a matter of law. The SLAPP 
Act requires a finding that the action was commenced or continued without a substantial basis 
in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law. This Tobias/Feld have also failed to do. The 
statutory scheme under which the SLAPP Act exists requires a finding by clear and convincing 
evidence that the primary reason for the filing of the complaint was to interfere with the first 
amendment right of the defendant. This Tobias/Feld have failed to do. ADC's claims do not 
arise within the governmental process, but rather arise from a private sales transaction to which 
Tobias/Feld have interfered. These failures and deficiencies were fatal to Tobias/Feld's 
SLAPP Counterclaims. 
Based on the foregoing, ADC respectfully requests that the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment in ADC's favor over Tobias/Feld's SLAPP Counterclaim be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted ADC's Motion to Dismiss Over 
Tobias/Feld's Abuse of Process Counterclaim. 
The Utah courts have established that the tort of abuse of civil process is predicated on 
having the underlying action terminate in favor of the person or party asserting the claim for 
abuse of civil process. This is the same requirement as the Utah courts have applied to its 
counterpart tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings. It is undisputed that the present litigation 
has not yet terminated. As a result, Tobias/Feld's counterclaims for abuse of civil process, and 
wrongful use of civil proceeding were premature and therefore properly dismissed. 
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Furthermore, the only factual basis for this tort is Ms. Tobias' claim that ADC abused 
the civil process when it took her deposition. Yet, applicable law indisputably required the 
trial court to find that ADC had sufficient probable cause, as well as the actual right, to take 
Ms. Tobias' deposition and discover the basis and circumstances surrounding her emotional 
state. Therefore taking her deposition cannot form the basis for an abuse of civil process claim. 
Finally, while ADC's taking of her deposition was uncomfortable for all parties, Ms. Tobias 
was represented by counsel during the deposition and the information sought was relevant to 
the defense by ADC to the then existing counterclaims, as well as was relevant to ADC's 
prosecution of its claims. 
The undisputed facts establish that this litigation has proceeded according to the rules. 
Tobias/Feld initiated legal challenges to the sufficiency of the allegations of ADC's 
Complaint. These challenges have been unsuccessful. Discovery has proceeded under the 
auspice of both the trial court and each party's legal counsel. Dispositive motions have been 
heard and ruled upon which have narrowed the matters to be tried. Litigation brings with it 
inherent stress and anxiety, but it also provides a mechanism to resolve complicated and hotly 
disputed matters. In the present case, the process has been followed by ADC. No abuse 
existed. 
Based on the foregoing, ADC respectfully requests that the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment in ADC's favor over Tobias/Feld's abuse of process Counterclaim be 
affirmed. 
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C. The Trial Court Properly Granted ADC's Motion to Dismiss Over 
Tobias/Feld's Emotional Distress, Punitive Damage and Attorney's Fees 
Counterclaims. 
The counterclaim asserted by TobiasYFeld for emotional distress and punitive damages 
were properly dismissed by the trial court. On careful review of each of these counterclaims 
asserted, it is evident that Tobias\Feld have failed to meet crucial elements. Intentional and 
negligent emotional distress claims cannot be based upon the filing of a complaint. There is 
no recognized independent tort for punitive damages or attorney's fees. 
Based on the foregoing, ADC respectfully requests that the trial court's dismissing of 
Tobias/Feld's emotional distress, punitive damage and attorney's fees counterclaims be 
affirmed. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Denied Tobias/Feld's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Over ADC's Claims for Intentional Interference with Existing 
Contractual Relations and Prospective Economic Relations Claims. 
Tobias/Feld abandoned the role of concerned citizens and chose the role of lawless 
activists. Tobias' statement to the then South Jordan City manager that she would "do 
anything in her power to stop the development," is telling. Defendant Foutz's bragging to the 
press that Tobias, Feld and he has cost ADC "millions of dollars," is dramatic proof that they 
were willing to engage in unlawful means to damage ADC. 
This case is not about a developer attempting to punish concerned citizens for voicing 
their honest objections to a development. This case is about lawless extremists who actively 
and intentionally, over the course of months wrongfully interfered with ADC's contractual 
rights to purchase the Williams Property - a critical part of the RiverPark Business Park. This 
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interference impaired ADC's contractual right by wrongfully delaying the requisite zoning 
changes over the Williams Property until the First REPC had expired. And at the same time, 
acting as a shill in the market for the Williams Property, Tobias/Feld created the mis-
impression, through false representations, that Tobias/Feld or others were willing and able to 
purchase the Williams Property for more than what ADC had offered, evidenced by the Second 
REPC. These intentional and wrongful actions resulted in the First REPC expiring before the 
Williams Property was rezoned (even though every other parcel in the RiverPark Business Park 
had been rezoned before that time) and the Williams demanding that ADC pay more for the 
Williams Property under the Second REPC based critically on assurances and representations 
by Tobias/ Feld that they had the money raised or others willing and able to buy the Williams 
Property at a higher price. 
This lawless approach to opposing the RiverPark Business Park is actionable under 
Utah law by asserting the torts of intentional interference with existing contractual or 
prospective economic relations. Both actual, consequential and punitive damages are 
available. Tobias/Feld 's wrongful conduct caused ADC to sustain significant actual, 
incidental and consequential damages. 
Tobias/Feld's Motion for Summary Judgment was properly denied by the trial court and 
should be affirmed here. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATEMENT OF CASE - ADC's Casein-Chief 
The following facts provide additional substantiation and materiality to the overview 
of the factual context of the section entitled, "STATEMENT OF CASE" This appendix 
includes the following sections: 
I. FACTS FROM ADC: 
• Gerald Anderson - the Manager and Member of ADC 3 
II. FACTS FROM SOUTH JORDAN CITY. 
• David Millheim - the former City Manager of South Jordan City 20 
• Thomas Christensen - a former member of the South Jordan 
City Council 29 
III. FACTS FROM THE WILLIAMS FAMILY. 
• Boyd Williams - the owner of the Williams Property 34 
• Dorothy Williams - the owner of the Williams Property 42 
• Cheri Johnson - the adult daughter of Boyd and Dorothy Williams 44 
IV. FACTS FROM LAKE VIE W FARMS: 
Douglas Andersen - the Manager and a Member of LakeView Farms . . 46 
Please note that these facts are taken from various affidavits submitted to the trial 
court in by ADC in opposition to Tobias/Feld's Second Motion for Summary Judgment over 
ADC's case-in-chief. See R. 3742-3884. Thereafter, Tobias/Feld filed corresponding 
motions to strike these affidavits and the trial court denied the vast majority of Tobias/Feld's 
requests in this regard. See R. 4039-4128. For example, Tobias/Feld sought to strike 25 of 
the 32 paragraphs submitted by David Millheim, the City Manager for South Jordan City 
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during much of the relevant time.1 This included striking paragraph eight that contained 16 
subparagraphs delineating Tobias/Feld's actions of misrepresentation to South Jordan City. 
See R. 4088-4103. Ultimately, the trial court granted Tobias/Feld's request striking 
paragraphs 9 and 15, on foundational grounds. See R. 4376-4380. ADC is fully confident 
that at trial the matters discussed in these two paragraphs will be admissible, as any 
foundational objections can be remedied. Accordingly, the full content of these affidavits 
are presented herein, with appropriate notation as to any adverse ruling by the trial court. 
As presented below, ADC has compiled significant, credible and admissible testimony 
and documentary evidence to support ADC's allegations that Tobias/Feld intentionally 
interfered with or impaired ADC's then existing contractual relations and prospective 
economic relations with the Williams over the purchase of the Williams Property. 
Tobias/Feld also made the following requests to strike portion of the affidavits 
submitted by ADC: 
Affiants 
Gerald Anderson (Affidavit 1) (Manager/Member of ADC) 
Gerald Anderson (Affidavit 2) (Manager/Member of ADC) 
David Millheim (former South Jordan City Manager) 
Thomas Christensen (former South Jordan City Councilman) 
Boyd Williams (Co-owner of the Williams Property) 
Dorothy Williams (Co-owner of the Williams Property) 
Cheri Williams (daughter to Boyd and Dorothy Williams) 
Douglas Andersen (Manager/Member of Lakeview Farms) 
No. Requested 
5 of 21 
21 of 44 
25 of 32 
10 of 20 
19 of 30 
4 of 6 
3 of 6 
Oof 10 
No. Struck 
3 
13 
2 
0 
3 
1 
1 
0 
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I. FACTS FROM ADC: Gerald Anderson - the Manager and Member of ADC. 
Gerald Anderson (" Anderson") provides a chronological recount of the operative facts 
in this action. His testimony provides a workable factual framework to understand the 
contours of this case, including the following: 
• Testimony about Tobias/Feld's actions with South Jordan City in seeking to 
delay the rezoning of the Williams Property until the First REPC expired is directly supported 
by the testimony of David Millheim, the then City Manager of South Jordan City, and 
Thomas Christensen, a then member of the South Jordan City Council. The affidavits 
submitted by these two men provide ample foundation to Anderson's testimony in this 
regard. 
• Testimony about Tobias/Feld's actions as a shill in the market thereby 
wrongfully driving the price up on the Williams Property is fully supported by the unified 
testimonies of Boyd Williams, Dorothy Williams and their adult daughter, Cheri Johnson. 
The affidavits submitted by these three people provide ample foundation to Anderson's 
testimony in this regard. 
• Testimony pertaining to the contractual financial arrangement that ADC had 
with Lake View Farms and Janice Andersen in the financing of the purchase of the Williams 
Property. These material facts are fully supported by the testimony of Douglas Andersen, 
the manager and member of LakeView Farms, LLC and the husband of Janice Andersen. 
The affidavit submitted by this person provides ample foundation and support to Anderson's 
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testimony in this regard. In sum, Anderson provides this Court with a cohesive and 
understandable description of this case and illuminates the reality as to the strength of 
plaintiff ADC's case against Tobias/Feld for intentional interference with existing 
contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective economic relations. 
1. Gerald Anderson ("Anderson") is the manager and a member of ADC, a 
locally owned and operated real property development company. Since its formation, 
Anderson has acted as the manager of ADC. See Affidavit of Gerald Anderson attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" at Tfl (the "Anderson Affidavit"); R. 3643. 
2. For many years ADC worked at developing real property located in the 
southern portion of the Salt Lake Valley including South Jordan, Utah. See Anderson 
Affidavit at T|2;R. 3643. 
3. In 1996, ADC determined to develop an office project located west of the 
Jordan River and south of 106th South Street which has been and currently is referred to as 
the RiverPark Project. See Anderson Affidavit at ^[3; R. 3643. 
4. A key part of the RiverPark office development included the purchasing or 
optioning certain real property owned by various parties, including the Williams family. See 
Anderson Affidavit at f4; R. 3643. 
5. On or about October 23, 1996, ADC and the Williams entered into an option 
agreement, in the form of a Real Estate Purchase Contract for the purchase of the Williams 
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Property that would comprise the southern portion of the then proposed RiverPark Business 
Park (the "First REPC" ). See Anderson Affidavit at ^5; R. 3643. 
6. Pursuant to the terms of the First REPC, the Williams agreed to sell the 
Williams Property to ADC for $35,000 per acre and ADC was willing to buy the Williams 
Property for this price once the property had obtained zoning that would allow for the 
RiverPark Business Park (See the First REPC attached as Exhibit "A" to the Anderson 
Affidavit). See Anderson Affidavit at f 6; R. 3643. 
7. The First REPC further provided that ADC would do the work to get the 
Williams Property master planned and zoned and they would do so on or before June 30, 
1997. Id. See Anderson Affidavit at f7; R. 3644. 
8. Once the First REPC was executed, ADC began the process necessary to get 
the Williams Property rezoned or otherwise entitled to meet the terms of the Williams Option 
Agreement by filing an application for master plan and zone change with South Jordan City. 
See Anderson Affidavit at f 8; R. 3644. 
9. Once the application for master plan and zoning the Williams Property was 
filed with South Jordan City, Anderson was informed by many people in the community that 
defendants, JanaLee S. Tobias and Judy Feld ("Tobias and Feld"), began to oppose the 
development of the RiverPark Business Park. See Anderson Affidavit at [^9. [Trial court 
struck this paragraph on the basis that it lacked adequate foundation. ADC believes that any 
-5-
such failure will be cured at trial and this information will be heard by the jury.]; R. 3744, 
4376-4380. 
10. After the zoning application was filed with South Jordan City and once it began 
to be processed, Tobias and Feld began to oppose the RiverPark Business Park through 
various activities including engaging in what Anderson believed to be a concerted, 
intentional and wrongful attempt to interfere with the ADC contract to purchase and develop 
the Williams Property, as well as other properties constituting the RiverPark Project. See 
Anderson Affidavit at ^10. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it lacked 
adequate foundation. ADC believes that any such failure will be cured at trial and this 
information will be heard by the jury.]; R. 3744, 4376-4380. 
11. In early December 1996, Anderson was informed that Tobias and Feld engaged 
in a pattern of repeatedly speaking with the Williams and other land owners asking them not 
to honor their contracts to sell their properties to ADC; and inviting landowners, including 
the Williams to meetings specifically designed to induce the land owners from honoring their 
contracts to sell property to ADC; specifically offering to buy the very land that ADC had 
under contract of purchase for the RiverPark project. See Anderson Affidavit at %l1. [Trial 
court struck this paragraph on the basis that it was hearsay. ADC believes that any such 
testimony will be admissible at trial based on the state of mind exception to the hearsay 
rule.]; R. 3744-3745, 4376-4380. 
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12. Anderson was present at South Jordan City council meetings where Tobias and 
Feld asked South Jordan City officials to delay a timely decision on the zoning application 
so that options on properties would expire and that Tobias and Feld would have more time 
to raise even more money to purchase the Williams Property and other lands comprising the 
RiverPark project. See Anderson Affidavit at Tfl2; R. 3745. 
13. Anderson felt that the efforts by Tobias and Feld were against the law and, 
accordingly, Anderson signed and sent a letter dated December 13, 1996 (see attached 
Exhibit "B" to the Anderson Affidavit) to Tobias and Feld. Anderson also sent a copy of that 
letter to others including two South Jordan City officials, Dave Millheim, South Jordan City 
Manager, and Mike Mazuran, South Jordan City Attorney, putting the City on notice of his 
grave concerns regarding efforts to interfere with ADC's contractual rights to purchase the 
Williams Property, as well as his concerns with efforts to violate ADC's due process rights 
to a timely and fair decision by South Jordan officials on the pending application to master 
plan and zone property. See Anderson Affidavit at ^[13; R. 3745. 
14. Anderson's purpose in sending this letter was to insist that Tobias and Feld 
cease interfering with ADC's rights including its right to due process at South Jordan City, 
as well as its rights to purchase properties pursuant to the legally binding contracts for 
purchase of the land involved in the RiverPark Project including the Williams Property. See 
Anderson Affidavit at fl4; R. 3745. 
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15. After Anderson sent the December 13, 1996 letter, Anderson had a 
conversation with Tobias and Feld. This conversation occurred late in the evening after a 
city meeting regarding the RiverPark project at the Denny's Restaurant in South Jordan in 
the later part of December 1996. In that meeting, Tobias informed him that she had received 
his December 13, 1996 letter and had conferred with her husband, Steve Tobias, regarding 
its contents. Tobias stated that she had also discussed the contents of the December 13,1996 
letter with Feld. Feld acknowledged that she and Tobias had extensively discussed those 
matters. Both Tobias and Feld admitted to Anderson that the statements made in the 
December 13, 1996 letter were, in fact, true. See Anderson Affidavit at *[jl5; R. 3746. 
16. In that same meeting, Tobias and Feld both admitted that they had encouraged 
Boyd Williams and Dorothy Williams and other land owners not to honor their legally 
binding contracts to sell property to ADC. Tobias and Feld also specifically admitted that 
they had asked city officials to delay a decision on the pending ADC zoning application until 
after the option contracts for purchase of the Williams Property and other properties had 
expired. See Anderson Affidavit at [^16; R. 3746. 
17. After that evening conversation with Tobias and Feld, Anderson was shocked 
to learn from Boyd and Dorothy Williams and their family members that Tobias and Feld had 
made further contacts with Boyd and Dorothy Williams encouraging them to dishonor the 
contract with ADC for the purchase of the Williams Property. In fact, Ms. Tobias and Ms. 
Feld brought prospective purchasers to the Williams home, including Wendy Fisher of the 
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organization, Utah Open Lands, who had looked at the Williams property and had offered 
more money to Williams and who had encouraged Williams not to honor their contract with 
ADC. These events occurred while the First REPC was still in place. See Anderson 
Affidavit at [^17. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it was hearsay. ADC 
believes that any such testimony will be admissible at trial based on the state of mind 
exception to the hearsay rule.]; R. 3746-3747; 4376-4380. 
18. Furthermore, on at least two different occasions, Anderson was told by Boyd 
Williams that the husband of Tobias, Steve Tobias, had approached Boyd Williams and made 
offers to purchase the Williams Property for his own real estate development project. See 
Anderson Affidavit at ^ [18. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it was hearsay. 
ADC believes that any such testimony will be admissible at trial based on the state of mind 
exception to the hearsay rule.]; R. 3747; 4376-4380. 
19. In early January 1997, Mr. Williams informed Anderson that South Jordan City 
officials contacted him and encouraged him to meet with Wendy Fisher of Utah Open Lands. 
Anderson was also told by the city officials that he should ask Mr. Williams if he would be 
interested in donating his property to the city as opposed to selling it. See Anderson 
Affidavit at TJ19. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it was hearsay. ADC 
believes that any such testimony will be admissible at trial based on the state of mind 
exception to the hearsay rule.]; R. 3747; 4376-4380. 
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20. Later, Anderson learned that Ms. Fisher and Utah Open Lands as well as Jim 
Davis of the Trust for Public Land had entered into a contract wherein these organizations 
would act as an agent of South Jordan City for purposes of arranging property acquisition for 
parks, recreation and open space preservation - especially involving lands along the Jordan 
River within South Jordan City limits. See Anderson Affidavit at ^ [20. [Trial court struck this 
paragraph on the basis that it was hearsay. ADC believes that any such testimony will be 
admissible at trial based on the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.]; R. 3747; 4376-
4380. 
21. Sometime in January 1997, Anderson became aware of the fact that South 
Jordan City officials had made a proposal for purchase and development of the Williams 
Property. This proposal involved allowing the private citizens's groups, Tobias and Feld, the 
opportunity to have time to come up with money to purchase the Williams Property for a 
science center. In return, South Jordan City officials proposed that they would consider 
master planning and rezoning the other properties in the RiverPark project. See Anderson 
Affidavit at TJ21. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it was hearsay. ADC 
believes that any such testimony is not hearsay at all and such necessary foundational 
requirements will be made at trial so that such testimony will be admissible.]; R. 3747-3748; 
4376-4380. 
22. ADC had option contracts that expired by January 31, 1997 on some of the 
other properties. Accordingly, Anderson sent a letter dated January 27, 1997 to Dave 
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Millheim, South Jordan City Manager, objecting to this treatment. (See letter dated January 
27,1997 marked as Exhibit "C" and attached to the Anderson Affidavit). On page 2 of that 
letter, Anderson stated: "The City has proposed that the Williams ground not be 
remasterplanned to accommodate some vocal private citizens who desire to build a science 
center. This reduces the size of the project by 30 acres..." The statements Anderson made 
in this letter were never rebutted at any time by any city officials. See Anderson Affidavit 
at1J22;R.3748. 
23. Later, on January 28, 1997, Anderson sent another letter to Mr. Millheim 
complaining about the City's proposal to allow the private citizen's group (Tobias and Feld) 
the opportunity to have time to come up with money to purchase the Williams Property for 
a "science center." (See letter dated January 28, 1997 marked as Exhibit "D" and attached 
to the Anderson Affidavit). See Anderson Affidavit at ^[23; R. 3748. 
24. About this time, City officials requested that Anderson provide copies of all 
option contracts associated with the properties involved in the RiverPark project. The city 
officials indicated that they wanted to be sure that ADC had indeed the purchase rights to 
purchase the properties. Anderson provided copies of the option contracts. One of these 
contracts, of course, was the first option contract for the Williams Property which had an 
option deadline of June 30, 1997. See Anderson Affidavit at |^24; R. 3748. 
25. Tobias and Feld' misrepresentations pertaining to Williams was further 
compounded by Tobias and Feld misrepresenting themselves as a credible and legitimate 
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charitable environmental entity that had the ability and connections to facilitate these kinds 
of transactions. Anderson feels that many in South Jordan relied on the misrepresentations 
made by Tobias and Feld in delaying the zoning on the Williams Property. These 
misrepresentations included claims that Tobias and Feld were interested in preserving open 
spaces in the Jordan River Valley generally, that it was a tax-exempt entity, and that it had 
raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for the protection of open spaces. See Anderson 
Affidavit at Tf25. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it was conclusory. ADC 
believes that any such necessary foundational and opinion requirements will be made at trial 
so that such testimony will be admissible.]; R. 3749, 4376-4380. 
26. However, Anderson believed that the true facts are that Tobias and Feld' sole 
concern was injuring ADC and its RiverPark development. See Anderson Affidavit at [^26. 
[Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it was conclusory. ADC believes that any 
such necessary foundational and opinion requirements will be made at trial so that such 
testimony will be admissible.]; R. 3749, 4376-4380. 
27. The foregoing wrongful actions by Tobias and Feld caused Williams to 
consider that they should be getting more for the Williams Property than what was contracted 
for under the First REPC. See Anderson Affidavit at ^ [27. [Trial court struck this paragraph 
on the basis that it was conclusory. ADC believes that any such necessary foundational and 
opinion requirements will be made at trial so that such testimony will be admissible.]; R. 
3749,4376-4380. 
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28. Tobias and Feld furthered their wrongful conduct by contacting key decision-
makers at the City of South Jordan for the purpose of convincing them to delay rezoning the 
Williams Property until after June 30, 1997. These efforts were successful. See Anderson 
Affidavit at TJ28 ; R. 3749, 4376-4380. 
29. Anderson believed that Tobias and Feld represented to these key decision-
makers that they had either raised sufficient funds or had friendly buyers who were willing 
to purchase the Williams Property for more than what ADC was offering to pay and then 
leave and preserve it as open spaces. See Anderson Affidavit at TJ29. [Trial court struck 
this paragraph on the basis that it was hearsay. ADC believes that any such testimony is not 
hearsay at all and such necessary foundational requirements will be made at trial so that such 
testimony will be admissible.]; R. 3749, 4376-4380. 
30. Key decision-makers at the City of South Jordan delayed the rezoning of the 
Williams Property until after June 30,1997. The South Jordan City Council master planned 
and rezoned all properties, except for the Williams property, on April 28, 1997. See 
Anderson Affidavit at f30; R. 3749-3750. 
31. When ADC failed to get the Williams Property rezoned to be part of the 
RiverPark Business Park on or before June 30, 1997, the Williams Option Agreement 
expired. See Anderson Affidavit at ]f31; R. 3750. 
32. On July 15,1997, Anderson attended a meeting with representatives of South 
Jordan City, various wildlife and environmental preservation groups. This meeting occurred 
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at the Towers Office Complex at 400 West 106th South, in South Jordan, Utah. Anderson 
was invited to the meeting to discuss a matter that was calendared late on the agenda 
involving wetlands issues on properties on the east side of the Jordan River. The meeting 
was conducted by Keith Snarr, the South Jordan City Economic Development Director. 
During the meeting, the parties began to strategize about how the Williams Property could 
be purchased. Statements were made that South Jordan City officials were not going to 
rezone the Williams Property and that it would be preserved for open space and other 
environmental uses in accordance with Tobias and Feld's requests. It was clear to Anderson 
that the matter had been extensively discussed beforehand and that it had been an agenda 
item in previous meetings before June 30, 1997. When the parties realized that Anderson 
was present and listening to the conversation, they abruptly stopped their strategy session and 
moved on to the next agenda item. See Anderson Affidavit at }^32; R. 3750. 
33. On November 23, 1997, ADC entered into a new Real Estate Purchase 
Contract with the Williams for the William's Property (the "Second REPC"). The Second 
REPC was less advantageous to ADC than the First REPC. See Anderson Affidavit at TJ33; 
R. 3750. 
34. The Second REPC was much more costly to ADC. A calculation and summary 
of these costs includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
a. Purchase price. The First REPC price was $35,000 per acre. The 
Williams Property per a Bush and Gugell survey contained 23.5684 acres or a total purchase 
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price of $824,894.00. The Second REPC provided for a guaranteed purchase price of 
$1,000,000. The difference in cost is $175,106.00. See R. 3751. 
b. Water shares. The First REPC gave ADC the option of purchasing 10 
shares of water in the Beckstead Canal company for $1,000 per share. The Second REPC 
provided that the shares of water were to be priced at $3,000 which more closely paralleled 
the fair market value of the water shares. ADC never exercised the option and lost out on 
a profit of $2,000 per water share multiplied by 10 shares for damages of $20,000. See R. 
3751. 
c. Restrictions on the height of buildings. The Second REPC, unlike the 
First REPC, contained the additional restriction that buildings constructed on the Williams 
Property could be no more than 3 stories in height. ADC estimates the value of this 
restriction to be approximately $175,000. See R. 3751. 
e. Bridge over Beckstead Canal. The Second REPC requires ADC to 
construct a bridge over the Beckstead Canal to provide access to Williams Property. The 
First REPC did not have this obligation. ADC estimates the value of this restriction to be 
approximately $ 50,000. See R. 3752. 
d. Oversized utilities sufficient to service the Williams Property. The 
Second REPC requires ADC to construct at ADC's "sole expense electric utility lines, 
natural gas utility lines, telephone cables, water lines, sanitary sewer lines and storm drain 
lines sufficient for intended development of the West Property." The First REPC did not 
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have these obligations. ADC estimates the value of this restriction to be approximately 
$50,000. See R. 3752. 
e. 10* Right of Way along Midas Creek. The Second REPC requires that 
Williams be given a 10? right of way along Midas Creek. The First REPC did not include this 
obligation. ADC estimates the value of this restriction to be approximately $12,000. See R. 
37512 
f. Significant Limitations on the Use of the Williams Property. The 
Second REPC requires that the Williams Property have significant passive park use 
restrictions prohibiting use of "sports activity fields such as baseball, soccer, sport facilities, 
public concerns or nighttime activities. Further, pursuant to the Second REPC, "any lighting 
shall be shielded to avoid off-site intrusion." The First REPC did not have these obligations. 
ADC estimates the value of this restriction to be approximately $200,000. See R. 3752. 
g. Cornerstone survey, engineering and attorney's fees. The Second REPC 
required ADC to provide a survey for the Williams. The First REPC did not have this 
obligation. This cost $3,000. Additionally, the contract required ADC to pay $750 for 
engineering of Williams property, and $5,000 for Williams attorneys fees. See Anderson 
Affidavit at ffi[34(a) through (g). See R. 3752. 
3 5. With the inclusion of interest charges of approximately $312,484.77 plus total 
estimated general damages of $690,856 leaves a final estimated damages to ADC as a result 
of the material differences between the First and Second REPCs is $1,003,340.70. Further, 
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ADC has sought punitive damages and costs and attorneys' fees according the facts of the 
case and law of Utah. In this case, ADC believes that punitive damages could exceed the 
sum of $3 million. See Anderson Affidavit at [^3 5; R. 3753. 
36. In late 1997, Anderson contacted Doug Andersen, Manager of LakeView 
Farms, L.L.C. ("LakeView"), and Janice Phelps Andersen ("Janice") and asked if they would 
be interested in jointly funding the purchase of the Williams Property. Janice and LakeView 
accepted Anderson Development's offer. See Anderson Affidavit at ^36; R. 3753. 
37. This relationship was always "arm's length" yet the parties had confidence in 
one another and they entered into other oral contracts with one another. See Anderson 
Affidavit at 137; R. 3753. 
38. Janice and LakeView agreed to fund the Williams Property but a condition to 
this funding would be that the Williams Property needed to be positively master planned and 
rezoned by South Jordan City. See Anderson Affidavit at f38; R. 3753. 
3 9. The contractual relationship between LakeView, Janice and ADC was formed 
involving some of the following features: 
a. ADC already obtained the Second REPC on the Williams Property. The 
purchase portion of the Second REPC would be assigned to LakeView Farms and Janice 
when the Williams Property was to be purchased. See R. 3753. 
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b. ADC would take all measures and expend all reasonable costs to obtain 
acceptable South Jordan City master planning and zoning approval of the Williams Property. 
SeeR. 3754. 
c. Lake View and Janice would fund the purchase of the Williams Property. 
The Williams Property would remain titled in the names of Lake View and Janice in light of 
the fact that Section 1031 Like Kind Exchange monies were being used See R. 3754. 
d. Once purchased, ADC would take all measures and expend all 
reasonable costs to obtain: a development agreement with South Jordan City covering the 
Williams Property and other properties in the RiverPark Office Project, successful creation 
by South Jordan City of a special improvement district to fund some of the needed 
infrastructure in the RiverPark Project, a favorable vote involving a land trade involving 
some of the Williams Property. This land trade involved obtaining approvals from the State 
of Utah as well as South Jordan City. See R. 3754. 
e. Once purchased, ADC would also market the Williams Property along 
with other properties within the RiverPark office project and would find a final purchaser 
who would close on the Williams Property. The final terms of the sale had to be approved 
and agreeable to ADC, LakeView and Janice. See R. 3754. 
f. At closing on the final sale of the property to an end user, LakeView, 
Janice and ADC would construct the closing transaction to preserve favorable tax and 
financial treatment for LakeView, Janice, and ADC. See R. 3754. 
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g. At closing, ADC, Janice and Lakeview would recoup their basis and 
expenses and divide profits in an equitable manner. See Anderson Affidavit at ^[39(a) 
through (g); R. 3755. 
40. Additionally, during the initial discussions between Lake View, Janice and 
Anderson, they discussed a dispute between ADC and JanaLee Tobias and Judy Feld. 
Anderson told them about his concerns with Janalee Tobias and Judy Feld. Anderson was 
concerned because the cost of the second option contract was significantly higher and that 
the profits from the sale of the Williams Property would be significantly diminished. 
Anderson told them that he would probably be filing suit against Tobias and Feld for their 
efforts to interfere with ADC's first and second REPC. See Anderson Affidavit at ^ |40 ; R. 
3755. 
41. At that time, LakeView and Janice agreed: 
a. That any decision whether to file suit would be that of ADC, 
b. ADC would be fully responsible to pay for all costs and attorney fees 
in filing suit, if it chose to file suit. See R. 3755. 
c. That ADC would retain any rights to pursue claims against Tobias and 
Feld. LakeView and Janice would assign all rights to ADC to pursue all claims against 
Tobias and Feld. See Anderson Affidavit at ffiJ41(a) through (c); R. 3755. 
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42. In March 1998, Anderson informed Lake View and Janice that ADC had filed 
suit against Tobias/Feld for intentional interference with existing and prospective contractual 
relations. See Anderson Affidavit at [^42; R. 3755. 
43. Pursuant to the contractual relationship with ADC the parties all closed on the 
Williams Property on April 17, 1998. See Anderson Affidavit at f B ; R. 3755. 
44. Additionally, when the Williams Property was ultimately sold to High Uinta 
Investment Properties, LC, the litigation between Anderson Development and Janalee Tobias 
and Judy Feld was expressly reserved by ADC. (See the Purchase Agreement between ADC 
and High Uinta Investment Properties attached as Exhibit "E" to the Anderson Affidavit). 
See Anderson Affidavit at ^44; R. 3755-56. 
II. FACTS FROM SOUTH JORDAN CITY. 
A. David Millheim - the former City Manager of South Jordan City. 
45. David Millheim ("Millheim") was the City Manager for South Jordan City 
from March 1995 through August 1998. See Affidavit David Millheim attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B" at 1J2 (the "Millheim Affidavit"); R. 3803. 
46. During the time that Millheim was the City Manager he had the responsibility 
to oversee all staff and implement city council direction. Further, he was intimately involved 
with all City Council actions. Millheim was present at City Council meetings and met with 
members of the City Council regularly. Millheim also became intimately involved with large 
development projects to be undertaken in the city where City involvement was required such 
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as rezoning or the obtaining of permission to develop. See Millheim Affidavit at f3; R. 
3803. 
47. In the Fall of 1996 Millheim became aware that Anderson Development LC 
("ADC") desired to do develop a parcel of land for commercial development in the Jordan 
River bottoms on the west side of the Jordan River at approximately 10600 South and 
southward. ADC made an application to South Jordan City on October 7, 1996, to change 
the city's master plan to allow for commercial and office building development, restaurants 
and a community park in the area to be developed. Attached as Exhibit "A" to the Millheim 
Affidavit is a copy of the request. This request became a project that Millheim undertook 
to oversee on behalf of the City and to which he became intimately involved. See Millheim 
Affidavit at ^|4;R. 3803. 
48. The application for the change to the master plan immediately caused a 
significant stir in the community with some very vocal opposition to the proposed change. 
See Millheim Affidavit at TJ5; R. 3803. 
49. On or about October 31, 1996, Millheim received copies of the contract that 
Anderson Development had with the Williams that had deadlines for the obtaining of City 
approval of the masterplan and zoning changes. On November 4, 1996, Millheim received 
a letter from ADC (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Millheim Affidavit) 
stressing to him the importance meeting the deadlines. See Millheim Affidavit at f6; R. 
3803-3804. 
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50. Early in the process of ADC's effort to get the Master Plan changed by the city 
Millheim became aware of Janalee Tobias' ("Tobias") and Judy Feld's ("Feld") extreme 
opposition to the project. Very early on they expressed opposition to the project and became 
involved in an effort to stop the project. Because of their extreme opposition to the ADC 
project Tobias and Feld were placed on a committee comprised of Millheim, Tobias, Feld, 
Richard Warne (a city councilman) and Kent Money (a city councilman) to help work 
through the project and come to some compromises on the project. Because of that 
committee assignment and because of his position as city manager Millheim had numerous 
conversations and meetings with Tobias and Feld about the project and Anderson 
Development's efforts to have the project approved by an amendment to the master plan so 
that a commercial development could be built. Millheim also saw Tobias and Feld as they 
appeared before the City Commission. Tobias and Feld would call Millheim and meet with 
him separately and in the committee meetings. Tobias and Feld would call Millheim for 
information and an understanding of the process involved at the Planning Commission and 
City Council Meetings about this project. Millheim always provided the information they 
requested. Tobias and Feld always expressed that they did not want to have the project go 
through in any way. They were not willing to compromise on the project in any way. See 
Millheim Affidavit at f7; R. 3804. 
51. Early on (early 1997 to mid-1997) Millheim had many conversations with 
Tobias and Feld at the council meetings, committee meetings, over the telephone and in 
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person outside of the committee and council meetings. Some of the conversations were with 
Tobias alone and some were with Feld alone but most of the time the conversations were 
with both Tobias and Feld. What follows is a rendition of those conversations that Millheim 
had. Since there were so many conversations Millheim cannot at this time designate 
precisely when those conversations were held other than to say that they were conducted in 
early 1997 to mid-1997; R. 3804-3805. Those conversations and events included: 
a. As early as November 20,1996, Feld indicated to the City Planning and 
Zoning Commission that she would fight the ADC project every inch of the way. See 
Minutes of Planning and Zoning Commission dated November 20, 1996 (relevant pages) 
attached as Exhibit "C" to the Millheim Affidavit; R. 3805. 
b. On or about November 26, 1996, Tobias and Feld sent to Millheim a 
letter asking him to delay the action of the city council on the ADC application. They 
indicated that they had pledged support for the purchase of the property and asked for 
additional time to "gain financial support." See copy of letter from Tobias and Feld to Dave 
Millheim dated November 26, 1997, attached as Exhibit "D" to the Millheim Affidavit; R. 
3805. 
c. Tobias and Feld asked Millheim specifically what they could do to "kill" 
(their word) the Anderson Development project. Millheim told them that Anderson 
Development already had the property under contract. Millheim's first response to them was 
that they probably could not kill the project since it was already under contract. See R. 3 805. 
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d. Tobias and Feld asked for copies of all the applicable city ordinances. 
Millheim gave them copies of the relevant ordinances. See R. 3805. 
e. When asked what they could do Millheim told Tobias and Feld to write 
their concerns and share them with the council members. See R. 3805. 
f. Tobias and Feld always wanted to entirely prevent the project. See R. 
3806. 
g. Tobias and Feld, apparently believing that Millheim had the power to 
do so, asked him in my capacity as city manager to "kill" (their word choice again) the 
Anderson Development project. Millheim told them that he was a staff person in the city and 
that was not his role but the role of the city council if the city council chose to do so. See R. 
3806. 
h. Millheim told them if they thought they could buy the ground they 
should do so. See R. 3805. 
i. Tobias and Feld asked Millheim about the contract that Anderson 
Development had to buy the properly from the Williams and all the other parcels that 
Anderson Development was attempting to purchase. They asked the nature of the project, 
boundaries, relationship to homes and other questions. They asked Millheim when the 
Anderson Development Williams contract expired. Millheim does not recall telling them 
when the Anderson Development Williams contract would expire by its terms. See R. 3806. 
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j . Tobias and Feld asked Millheim if he would delay the city's approval 
of the Anderson Development project to make it so that the Anderson Development contract 
with the Williams would have expired. See R. 3806. 
k. Tobias and Feld asked Millheim what the city could do to slow down 
the Anderson Development project and "kill" it. See R. 3806. 
1. Tobias and Feld told Millheim, with great vehemence, that they would 
"do everything in their power to stop the project." See R. 3806. 
m. Tobias and Feld told Millheim that they would pack the council room 
with people to oppose the project. See R. 3806. 
n. Tobias and Feld told Millheim that they would sue the city if the project 
looked like it was going to go through. Millheim responded by asking: "Sue for what?" 
They said: "Whatever we can come up with." See R. 3807. 
o. Tobias told Millheim on one occasion that she had told Boyd 
(understood to be"Williams") to "not sell his property." See R. 3807. 
p. Tobias and Feld told Millheim that they had "several hundreds of 
thousands of dollars" available to purchase the Williams Property. See R. 3807. 
q. Tobias and Feld first told Millheim that they had people or groups that 
would buy the Williams Properly. Millheim asked: "Who?" Tobias and Feld told him that 
they had "wealthy people and citizens groups" that they were forming. Tobias and Feld 
continued to tell Millheim that they needed time to make it work (that they or someone else 
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would buy the Williams Property). Tobias told Millheim that she had talked to the 
governor's office, Congressman Cooks's Office and open space preservation groups (Trust 
for Public Lands; Utah Open Spaces) that were supposedly supporting the preservation of 
the property for open space and had money (or access to money) to buy the Williams 
Properly. Tobias and Feld told Millheim and council members that they had money or had 
others who had money to purchase the Williams Property. See Millheim Affidavit at [^8; R. 
3807. 
52. During this time (early 1997 to mid-1997) Tobias and Feld talked to numerous 
members of the South Jordan City Council. Millheim expected that they were telling the city 
council members the same information that they were telling him because during that period 
of time council members were telling him that they had been talking to Tobias and Feld and 
the council members were reiterating many of the same things that Tobias and Feld had been 
telling Millheim. See Millheim Affidavit at f 9. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the 
basis that it lacked foundation. ADC believes that at trial sufficient foundation can be 
proffered so that such testimony will be admissible.]; R. 3807-3808, 4376-4380. 
53. Because Tobias and Feld were representing that they had money to buy the 
Williams Property the city delayed the approval of the project. Council members expressed 
to Millheim that they wanted to allow time for Tobias and Feld to do what they said they had 
the capacity to do. The city council members, as Millheim heard them express themselves, 
choose to allow Tobias and Feld to make good on their representations that they had money 
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and people to buy the Williams Property. The representations made by Tobias and Feld that 
they had money or buyers for the Williams Property was made frequently and caused the 
council to delay approving the project. That delay extended beyond the contact date of June 
30, 1997. See Millheim Affidavit at [^10; R. 3808. 
54. Because of the representations that Tobias and Feld made that there was money 
at their disposal to purchase the Williams Property and convey the property to the City or 
retain the property in open space and that the persons having that money were The Trust for 
Public Lands and Utah Open Spaces the city in April 1997, invited representatives of the 
Trust for Public Lands and Utah Open Lands to present to the city council what they would 
be willing to do. A proposed Memorandum of Understanding was drafted that would put the 
city in a relationship with The Trust for Public Lands and the Utah Open Lands for the 
purchase of the property. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed in May and June 
1997 and covered the West side of the Jordan River parkway. See copy of Memorandum of 
Understanding attached as Exhibit "E" to the Millheim Affidavit. See Millheim Affidavit 
at1fll;R.3808. 
5 5. Eventually it turned out that Tobias and Feld did not come forward with money 
or other people with money to buy the project. Tobias and Feld frequently said that they had 
arranged for The Trust for Public Lands to buy the project. Ultimately, a council meeting 
was held that Millheim attended and Wendy Fisher from Utah Open Lands was invited to 
attend and express the interest of Utah Open Lands had in the purchase of the project. 
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Wendy Fisher, stated that Utah Open Lands did not have the funds to purchase the project. 
Wendy Fisher further stated that Utah Open Lands wanted to help preserve the area as open 
space but had no money or anything to contribute to do so other than a desire to help 
facilitate such an action. At that time the city was very much aware that the city could not 
just "take" the Williams Property, through eminent domain or any other zoning restrictions 
due to counsel. See Millheim Affidavit at [^12; R. 3809. 
56. At a subsequent meeting (about two weeks after the council meeting noted 
above) with Tobias and Feld at which Millheim was present, Kent Money (a city council 
member) asked Tobias and Feld if they had any money to purchase the project. That time 
was the first time that Tobias and Feld admitted that they did not have the money. At all 
times prior to that time Tobias and Feld told Millheim and others that they had either 
sufficient money to buy the Williams Property or had others who would buy the Williams 
Property. See Millheim Affidavit at ^[13; R. 3809. 
57. No other buyers ever materialized for the Williams Property other than 
Anderson Development. See Millheim Affidavit at T|14; R. 3809. 
58. Anderson Development first sought the approval of the South Jordan City 
Council in October 1996 to approve a change to the zoning over the Williams Property. 
Typically, a period of time from October through the end of June the next year is plenty of 
time to get a zoning change through the South Jordan City Council. Millheim believes that 
the efforts of Tobias and Feld to represent that they had buyers for the Williams Property 
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when they in fact did not delayed the approval of the zoning change sought by Anderson 
Development by as much as one (1) year. Millheim felt that Tobias and Feld failed to be 
candid with him and with the South Jordan City Council and the South Jordan City 
government when they represented to the city that they either had the money or had people 
or organizations to buy the Williams Property when they did not. See Millheim Affidavit at 
f 15. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it lacked foundation and parts were 
hearsay. ADC believes that at trial sufficient foundation can be proffered so that such 
testimony will be admissible and that any hearsay aspects (what city council persons thought) 
will be testified by Thomas Christensen, a then South Jordan City Councilman.]; R. 3808-
3809,4376-4380. 
B. Thomas Christensen - a former member of the South Jordan City 
Council. 
59. Thomas Christensen was a former member of the South Jordan City Council. 
He served as an elected member of the South Jordan City Council for 8 years from January 
1992 to January 2000. See Affidavit of Thomas Christensen attached hereto as Exhibit "C" 
(the "Christensen Affidavit") at ^[1. All of the information stated in the Christensen 
Affidavit is based upon his own personal knowledge from memory, personal conversations, 
and review of official documents. See Christensen Affidavit at %l; R. 3839. 
60. In the fall of 1996, Anderson Development, LC (hereinafter "Anderson") filed 
a master plan and zoning application with South Jordan City to master plan and rezone 
various properties in the river bottoms areas located generally south of 106th South, north of 
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112th South (Midas Creek), east of the Jordan River and east of the Beckstead Canal. This 
project was referred to as the RiverPark project. See Christensen Affidavit at f2; R. 3839. 
61. The portion of the RiverPark Property located furthest to the south was owned 
by Boyd and Dorothy Williams (hereinafter "the Williams"). See Christensen Affidavit at 
1J3;R.3839. 
62. After the initial master plan and zoning applications were filed and began to 
be processed in the City, Jana Lee Tobias, Judy Feld (and later Brent Foutz) gathered a group 
of South Jordan City residents in opposition to the RiverPark office project. See Christensen 
Affidavit at | 5 ; R. 3840. 
63. Christensen understood that a key element of the RiverPark office development 
included certain real property owned by the Williams. At the time Anderson filed its master 
plan and zoning application the Williams property was zoned A-5 (Agricultural Use). See 
Christensen Affidavit at %5; R. 3840. 
64. After Anderson filed its applications, South Jordan City officials became aware 
of the fact that the Anderson option to purchase the Williams Property would expire on June 
30, 1997. City officials knew that a key condition to Anderson's purchase of the Williams 
Property was obtaining a positive city council vote on its pending master plan and zoning 
application. See Christensen Affidavit at <ft6; R. 3840. 
65. In December 1996, Christensen was informed that Anderson had sent a letter 
to Tobias/Feld objecting to efforts by Tobias/Feld to interfere with Anderson's contractual 
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relations with the Williams and others. (See letter dated December 13, 1996 marked as 
"Exhibit A" and attached to the Christensen Affidavit). See Christensen Affidavit at f 7; R. 
3840. 
66. In public and private communications with City officials, Tobias/Feld 
encouraged city officials to delay consideration of the master plan and zone changes on the 
Williams Property until the Anderson option to purchase had expired. See Christensen 
Affidavit at H8;R. 3840. 
67. In public and private communications with City officials, Tobias/Feld stated 
that they had raised large sums of money and had friendly buyers who were willing to 
purchase the Williams properly a for a science center or a park and donate it to the City for 
use as a city park, for open space or for some other recreational amenity. See Christensen 
Affidavit at Tf9; R. 3840. 
68. Tobias/Feld was particularly closely associated with another member of the 
South Jordan City Council named Richard Warne. Councilman Richard Warne had an 
assignment of responsibility to oversee city parks and chaired a citizens park committee. See 
Christensen Affidavit at f 10; R. 3840. 
69. Members of the City Council and other city officials were generally in favor 
of the idea of Tobias/Feld purchasing or arranging for the purchase of the Williams Property 
for use as a science center or a city park. See Christensen Affidavit at Tfl 1; R. 3840-3841. 
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70. The City Council postponed action on the Anderson applications in relation to 
the Williams Property in order to give Tobias/Feld a six (6) month time frame to raise the 
money and arrange for the purchase of the Williams property for a public use. See 
Christensen Affidavit at [^12; R. 3841. 
71. In late 1996, SOS introduced Wendy Fisher of Utah Open Lands, who had been 
working with Tobias/Feld to acquire property in the river bottoms, contacted South Jordan 
officials. Later, Jim Davis of the Trust for Public Lands also approached South Jordan 
officials. It was contemplated that Utah Open Lands and the Trust for Public Lands could 
help Tobias/Feld and the City in obtaining the Williams Property for use as a public park and 
open space use. See Christensen Affidavit at ^[13; R. 3841. 
72. In April 1997, the City began negotiating with Utah Open Lands and the Trust 
for Public Lands to work on behalf of the City to obtain lands on the west side of the Jordan 
River, including the Williams Property, for park and open space uses. The executed contract 
with Utah Open Lands and the Trust for Public Lands is attached as "Exhibit B" to the 
Christensen Affidavit). See Christensen Affidavit at |14; R. 3841. 
73. Accordingly, on April 28,1997, the South Jordan City Council master planned 
and rezoned all other properties that were controlled by Anderson within the RiverPark 
Project (Schmidt, Peterson, Forrest, Robbins, Edmunds). The City Council took no action 
on the Williams Property. See Christensen Affidavit at f 15; R. 3841. 
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74. At various times since April 28,1997, members of the City Council would ask 
whether SOS had raised the money or had secured options on the purchase of the Williams 
Property (the First REPC). See Christensen Affidavit at [^16; R. 3841. 
75. In early July 1997, Christensen became aware of the fact that Anderson did not 
purchase the Williams property pursuant to the First REPC. See Christensen Affidavit at 
117;R. 3841. 
76. Thereafter, Tobias/Feld, Utah Open Lands, and the Trust for Public Lands 
could not raise the money or otherwise arrange to obtain the Williams Property for a park, 
open space or for any other recreational use. See Christensen Affidavit at ^18; R. 3841. 
77. Thereafter, Christensen became aware that Anderson Development placed 
under contract the Williams Property for a second time (the Second REPC). Anderson 
requested that the City act on Anderson's previously filed applications for master plan and 
zoning the Williams Property. See Christensen Affidavit at [^19; R. 3841. 
78. In 1998, the City Council voted favorably on the Anderson applications and 
master planned and rezoned the Williams Property. See Christensen Affidavit at [^20; R. 
3841. 
III. FACTS FROM THE WILLIAMS FAMILY. 
A. Boyd Williams - the owner of the Williams Property.2 
2Boyd and Dorothy Williams were the owners of the Williams Property. During the 
course of the First and Second REPC while they engaged in some estate planning whereby 
their property was placed into a trust, they always maintained ownership of the property and 
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Boyd Williams owned the Williams Property with his wife, Dorothy Williams. His 
testimony substantiates, but is not limited to, the following: 
Tobias and Feld activity attempted to persuade him to breach the First REPC. 
Tobias and Feld represented to him that they had raised hundreds of thousands 
of dollars to purchase his property. 
Tobias and Feld sought to delay the rezoning of his property until the First 
REPC had expired. 
• Tobias and Feld brought people to his property both while the First REPC was 
in place and after it had expired whom they represented were interested and able to 
purchase the property. 
• That he entered into the Second REPC with ADC for a higher amount directly 
because of the representations of Tobias and Feld. 
• That he now believes that Tobias and Feld had materially misrepresented, 
stating, in pertinent part, "[t]hey made promises and offers that were not fulfilled. They 
skewed the facts to take unfair advantage of our situation, and, to our dismay, we found that 
they were not credible and, in fact, misleading and untruthful. We will not work with these 
people and feel that they have mislead many who support their possible cause and 
involvement in this project." 
were authorized signatories to these inter-vivos trusts. Tobias/Feld's arguments that the 
Williams were not the owners is factually misplaced. 
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The following is specific testimony proffered by Boyd Williams: 
79. On or about October 23,1996, Anderson Development Company, LC ("ADC") 
and my wife and I entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("First REPC") for the 
purchase of a portion of our property that would comprise the southern portion of the then 
proposed RiverPark Business Park. See Affidavit of Boyd Williams attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D" at %L (the "B. Williams Affidavit"); R. 3857. 
80. Pursuant to the terms of the First REPC, we agreed to sell a portion of our 
property to ADC for $3 5,000 per acre and ADC was willing to buy our property for this price 
once the property had obtained zoning that would allow for the RiverPark Business Park. 
See B. Williams Affidavit at f3; R. 3857. 
81. I was interested in selling a portion of my property to a commercial developer. 
I had been approached many times in the past about selling my land to residential developers, 
but I did not want to sell to a residential developer who would simply put a subdivision in 
next to the land that I would continue to live on. See B. Williams Affidavit at [^4; R. 3857. 
82. It was my plan to sell only a portion of my property and preserve the remainder 
for my wife and me. When we met with Gerald Anderson of ADC we liked his plan and 
were willing to sell the property for that type of development. See B. Williams Affidavit at 
^|5;R.3857. 
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83. The First REPC further provided that ADC would do the work to get our 
property master planned and zoned and they would do so on or before June 30, 1997. See 
B. Williams Affidavit at ^6; R. 3857. 
84. In early December 1996,1 was invited to attend a meeting at Tom Peterson's 
house in South Jordan, Utah. Janalee Tobias and Judy Feld ("Janalee and Judy") were 
present at that meeting, both myself and my wife attended that meeting. See B. Williams 
Affidavit at f7; R. 3858. 
85. Janalee and Judy were present at the meeting, as well as another neighboring 
property owner, Kay Edmunds. I was aware that Kay Edmunds had also signed a REPC with 
ADC. At the end of the meeting I told Janalee that we should all work together to make the 
project work for the whole community, including ADC. She curtly replied that she was 
against the ADC development and that it was "all or nothing." See B. Williams Affidavit at 
T|8;R. 3858. 
86. I was invited to the meeting and told that Janalee and Judy had arranged for 
Wendy Fisher, from Utah Open Lands, to be present at the meeting. Upon arriving at the 
meeting I was informed that Wendy Fisher was not going to be present. See B. Williams 
Affidavit at ]f9;R. 3858. 
87. Throughout the meeting, Janalee and Judy repeatedly encouraged me not to 
perform on the First REPC that I had entered into with ADC. Janalee and Judy also 
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encouraged Kay Edmunds and me to not sell to ADC and to get out of our contracts. See B. 
Williams Affidavit at TflO; R. 3858. 
88. Janalee and Judy stated that if I would get out of the contract with ADC they 
could find other buyers for the property. Janalee and Judy continued to encourage us to break 
our contract throughout this time. See B. Williams Affidavit at Tfl 1; R. 3858. 
89. During the period that the First REPC was in existence, I was informed many 
times that Janalee and/or Judy had been contacting my daughter, Cheri Johnson, to get her 
to encourage us to break the contract with ADC. See B. Williams Affidavit at Tfl2. [Trial 
court struck this paragraph on the basis that it was hearsay. ADC believes that at trial such 
testimony will be admissible through the testimony of Cheri Williams.]; R. 3859,4376-4380. 
90. I thought that it was odd that Janalee was opposed to the development of my 
property because on at least two different occasions, her husband, Steve Tobias, approached 
me and made offers to purchase our property for his own real estate development project. 
See B. Williams Affidavit at f 13; R. 3859. 
91. Janalee and Judy represented to me that they had formed a non-profit 
organization and had raised hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy my property. See B. 
Williams Affidavit at fl4; R. 3859. 
92. I thought that they had raised the money because they had convinced South 
Jordan City to go in with them in buying the property. See B. Williams Affidavit at [^15; R. 
3859. 
-37-
93. In January 1997, while the property was under contract, Gerald Anderson came 
to my home and asked me if I would be interested in donating my property for a science 
center. He told me that he had been told by the South Jordan City to find out if we would be 
interested in donating my property for a science center. I informed him that I was only 
interested in selling my property, as it was part of my retirement. See B. Williams Affidavit 
at1Jl6;R.3859. 
94. Sometime in January 1997, South Jordan City officials made a proposal for 
purchase and development of our property. This proposal involved allowing Tobias and Feld 
to come up with all the money to purchase our property for a science center. See B. Williams 
Affidavit at T[17;R. 3859. 
95. Janalee Tobias contacted me repeatedly during the period of the First REPC 
and stated that she had multiple potential buyers for my property and that I should not sell 
to ADC. See B. Williams Affidavit at ^18; R. 3860. 
96. Prior to the expiration of the First REPC, Janalee and Judy brought people to 
my property in order to induce me to break my contract with ADC and allow others to 
purchase the property. See B. Williams Affidavit at ]fl9; R. 3860. 
97. I had received offers from other residential developers but was not interested 
in selling to a residential developer. See B. Williams Affidavit at ^|20; R. 3860. 
98. Janalee and Judy, in many South Jordan City meetings I attended, encouraged 
South Jordan City to deny any application or, at the least, delay the application until the 
-38-
expiration of the First REPC. They also stated that they had raised hundreds of thousands 
of dollars through their non-profit group and were working to buy the property. See B. 
Williams Affidavit at Tf21; R. 3860. 
99. Prior to the expiration of the First REPC, Janalee and Judy brought Wendy 
Fisher to our property to discuss selling the property to them. See B. Williams Affidavit at 
T|22;R. 3860. 
100. In the Summer of 1997,1 received a phone call from Richard Warne, a South 
Jordan City Council Member, he asked if he could come to my home and bring with him Jim 
Davis from the Trust for Public Lands. They arrived at our home and Mr. Warne acted very 
nervous. He asked my wife to close the blinds so he could not be seen in our home. He and 
Jim Davis explained how the Trust for Public Lands could acquire my property and 
encouraged me to sell to the Trust for Public Lands. At the end of the meeting Mr. Warne 
asked that we not tell anyone about their visit to our home. See B. Williams Affidavit at ^ [23; 
R. 3860-3861. 
101. Due to the delays encouraged by Janalee and Judy, ADC failed to get our 
property rezoned to be part of the RiverPark Business Park on or before June 30, 1997, 
consequently, the First REPC expired. See B. Williams Affidavit at ^|24; R. 3861. 
102. After the First REPC expired, Janalee and Judy brought many others to our 
property including people from Utah Open Lands and Salt Lake County. It appeared that 
between the money that Janalee and Judy had raised and the money from other sources that 
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I would be able to sell the property for more money than what was offered under the First 
REPC. SeeB. Williams Affidavit at f25; R. 3861. 
103. During a city council meeting in South Jordan, Janalee Tobias stated that she 
had a written offer and a check from Wendy Fisher to buy our property. However, I never 
saw the offer. See B. Williams Affidavit at ^26; R. 3861. 
104. On November 25, 1997, we entered into a Second REPC with ADC for 
purchase of our property. The cost of this second contract was substantially higher than the 
first contract. This higher price was directly because I figured that if ADC didn't pay this 
higher price that I could get this much from Janalee and Judy or their contacts, as such had 
been expressly assured to me by Janalee. See B. Williams Affidavit at [^27; R. 3861. 
105. On January 2, 1998 I sent a letter to Mayor Dix McMullin asking that the city 
consider the zoning change that I had requested for my property. In that letter I stated, "[a]t 
the City's urgings we have entertained and negotiated with several others to purchase this 
property attempting to preserve it as open space, to no avail. My wife and I are convinced 
that no one can or will pay what Anderson is willing to pay for my property, as proven when 
we let our contract expire and tried to work with the open lands people with no results and 
empty promises." A copy of the January 2, 1998 letter is attached to the B. Williams 
Affidavit as Exhibit "A" See B. Williams Affidavit at Tf28; R. 3861-3862. 
106. Later, on February 2, 1998, My wife and I sent a "memo" to the Mayor, City 
Council and other city officials. In that memo we stated that "[s]o you can benefit from our 
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experience, I will tell you what happened when we let our original contract expire with 
Anderson Development to entertain an offer from Open Lands Trust people (as prompted by 
the SOS group.) They made promises and offers that were not fulfilled. They skewed the 
facts to take unfair advantage of our situation, and, to our dismay, we found that they were 
not credible and, in fact, misleading and untruthful. We will not work with these people and 
feel that they have mislead many who support their possible cause and involvement in this 
project." A copy of the February 2, 1998 letter is attached to the B. Williams Affidavit as 
Exhibit "B." See B. Williams Affidavit at ^29. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the 
basis that it lacked foundation and contained hearsay. ADC believes that at trial sufficient 
foundation can be proffered so that such testimony will be admissible and that it contains no 
hearsay, as the statements are not being proffered for the truth of the statements, but for the 
fact that the statements were made.]; R. 3862, 4376-4380. 
107. In these letters I was referring to the many misrepresentations and half truths 
that were told to us and many in our community by Janalee and Judy. See B. Williams 
Affidavit at |30. [Trial court struck this paragraph on the basis that it lacked foundation and 
contained hearsay. ADC believes that at trial sufficient foundation can be proffered so that 
such testimony will be admissible and that it contains no hearsay, as the statements are not 
being proffered for the truth of the statements, but for the fact that the statements were 
made.]; R. 3862. 
B. Dorothy Williams - the owner of the Williams Property. 
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Dorothy Williams is the wife of Boyd Williams and owned the Williams Property with 
her husband. Her testimony further substantiates the testimony of her husband. In addition, 
she testifies to the fact that at one point Tobias claimed at a public meeting that she had 
actually in-hand an offer and accompanying check from Wendy Fisher, of Utah Open Lands, 
for the Williams Property. She further testifies that she asked Tobias for the offer, but Tobias 
and Feld refused to ever deliver said offer or check to Mrs. Williams or her husband. 
The following are specific testimony proffered by Dorothy Williams: 
108. On or about October 23,1996, Anderson Development Company, LC ("ADC") 
and my wife and I entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("First REPC") for the 
purchase of a portion of our property that would comprise the southern portion of the then 
proposed RiverPark Business Park. See Affidavit of Dorothy Williams attached hereto as 
Exhibit "E" at f2 (the "D. Williams Affidavit"). [Trial court struck this paragraph on the 
basis that there is a typo noting "my wife and I", instead of "my husband and I." This 
correction will be easily made at trial so that such testimony will be admissible.]; R. 3874, 
4376-4380. 
109. Pursuant to the terms of the First REPC, we agreed to sell a portion of our 
property to ADC for $3 5,000 per acre and ADC was willing to buy our property for this price 
once the property had obtained zoning that would allow for the RiverPark Business Park. 
See D. Williams Affidavit at f3; R. 3874. 
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110. From the time that the project was announced Janalee Tobias and Judy Feld 
("Janalee and Judy") began to work against ADC to stop the project. See D. Williams 
Affidavit att4;R. 3874. 
111. Janalee and Judy stated in a South Jordan City council meeting that they had 
formed a non-profit organization and that they had raised hundreds of thousands of dollars 
to buy our property. See D. Williams Affidavit at f 5; R. 3874. 
112. At one meeting in particular, Janalee represented to South Jordan City officials 
that she had a Real Estate Purchase Contract and a check from Utah Open Lands to be given 
to my husband, Boyd Williams and me. I had never heard of such offer, and after the 
meeting I asked Janalee to see the offer and the check. She was pulled aside by Judy and 
they left without explaining where the check and offer on our property was. We never did 
see either the offer or the check. Ultimately I came to believe that Janalee and Judy had 
never obtained such an offer, nor had they raised any money as they represented to us and 
the city. Rather, these misrepresentations were made for the purpose of delaying the 
rezoning of our property to as to delay or prevent ADC from purchasing our property. See 
D. Williams Affidavit at TJ6. [Trial court struck the last two sentenced for lack of personal 
knowledge. ADC believes that at trial sufficient foundation can be proffered so that such 
testimony will be admissible based on the personal knowledge of Mrs. Williams.]; R. 3874-
3875,4376-4380. 
C. Cheri Johnson - the adult daughter of Boyd and Dorothy Williams, 
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Cheri Johnson is the daughter of Boyd and Dorothy Williams. She testifies that she 
was contacted many times by Tobias and/or Feld to encourage her parents to not honor the 
First REPC, as well as made representations about money that they raised to buy the 
Williams Property. 
The following are specific testimony proffered by Cheri Johnson: 
113. On or about October 23,1996, Anderson Development Company, LC ("ADC") 
and my parents entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("First REPC") for the 
purchase of a portion of their property that would comprise the southern portion of the then 
proposed RiverPark Business Park. See Affidavit of Cheri Johnson attached hereto as 
Exhibit "F" at %2 (the "Johnson Affidavit"); R. 3878. 
114. From the time that the project was announced, I became aware that Janalee 
Tobias and Judy Feld ("Janalee and Judy") began to work against ADC to stop the project. 
See Johnson Affidavit at T|3. [Trial court struck the last two sentenced for lack of foundation. 
ADC believes that at trial sufficient foundation can be proffered so that such testimony will 
be admissible based on the personal knowledge of Mrs. Williams.]; R. 3878, 4376-4380. 
115. I was present at a South Jordan City council meeting in Spring 1997, when 
Janalee and Judy stated that they had formed a non-profit organization and that they had 
raised hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy my parent's property. See Johnson Affidavit 
atft ;R.3878. 
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116. Also, I was with my mother at one meeting, Janalee represented to South 
Jordan City officials that she had a Real Estate Purchase Contract and a check from Utah 
Open Lands to be given to my parents as an offer on their property. My mother said that she 
was not aware of any such offer, and after the meeting my mother asked Janalee to see the 
offer and the check. After my mother asked about the offer and check Janalee was pulled 
aside by Judy and they left without explaining where the check and offer on our property 
was. Ultimately I came to believe that there was no offer and that Janalee and Judy had 
never in fact raised the funds as they had represented to the city that they had, but rather had 
made these misrepresentations in an effort to delay the rezoning of my parent's property that 
was necessary for ADC to purchase it.. See Johnson Affidavit at ^|5. [Trial court struck the 
last two sentenced for lack of personal knowledge. ADC believes that at trial sufficient 
foundation can be proffered so that such testimony will be admissible based on the personal 
knowledge of Mrs. Williams.]; R. 3878-3879, 4376-4380. 
IV. FACTS FROM LAKEVIEW FARMS: Douglas Andersen - the Manager and a 
Member of Lake View Farms. 
117. Doug Andersen ("D. Andersen") is the manager and a member of LakeView 
Farms, LLC, a Utah limited liability company. D. Andersen is also married to Janice Phelps 
Andersen. See Affidavit of Douglas Andersen attached hereto as Exhibit "G" at ^ [1 (the "D. 
Andersen Affidavit"); R. 3881-3882. 
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118. In latel997, D. Andersen was contacted by Gerald D. Anderson of ADC who 
invited his wife, Janice Phelps Andersen (hereinafter "Janice"), and Lake View Farms to fund 
a portion of a real estate development known as the RiverPark office project located in South 
Jordan, Utah. This portion of the real estate development was owned by Boyd and Dorothy 
Williams and their property was known as the "Williams Property." Janice and LakeView 
accepted ADC's offer. See D. Andersen Affidavit at | 2 ; R. 3882. 
119. While this was our their contractual relationship, ADC and D. Andersen have 
had positive contractual relationships in other successful real estate ventures. Their 
relationship was always "arm's length" yet they had confidence in one another and always 
had entered into oral contracts with one another. See D. Andersen Affidavit at 1J3; R. 3882. 
120. Janice and LakeView agreed to fund the Williams Property, but a condition to 
this funding would be that the Williams Property needed to be positively master planned and 
rezoned by South Jordan City. See D. Andersen Affidavit at [^4; R. 3882. 
121. The contractual relationship between LakeView, Janice and ADC was formed 
involving some of the following features: 
a. ADC already obtained a second option contract on the Williams 
Property. The purchase portion of the second option contract would be assigned to 
LakeView Farms and Janice. See R. 3882. 
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b. ADC would take all measures and expend all reasonable costs to obtain 
acceptable South Jordan City master planning and zoning approval of the Williams Property. 
SeeR. 3882. 
c. Lake View and Janice would fund the purchase of the Williams Property. 
The Williams Property would remain titled in the names of Lake View and Janice in light of 
the fact that Section 1031 Like Kind Exchange monies were being used. See R. 3882. 
d. Once purchased, ADC would take all measures and expend all 
reasonable costs to obtain: a development agreement with South Jordan City covering the 
Williams Property and other properties in the RiverPark Office Project, successful creation 
by South Jordan City of a special improvement district to fund some of the needed 
infrastructure in the RiverPark Project, a favorable vote involving a land trade involving 
some of the Williams Property. This land trade involved obtaining approvals from the State 
of Utah as well as South Jordan City. See R. 3882-3883. 
e. Once purchased, ADC would also market the Williams Property along 
with other properties within the RiverPark office project and would find a final purchaser 
who would close on the Williams Property. The final terms of the sale had to be approved 
and agreeable to all ADC, LakeView and Janice. See R. 3883. 
f. At closing on the final sale of the property to an end user, LakeView, 
Janice and ADC would construct the closing transaction to preserve favorable tax and 
financial treatment for LakeView, Janice, and ADC. See R. 3883. 
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g. At closing, ADC, Janice and Lakeview would recoup their basis and 
expenses and divide profits in an equitable manner. See D. Andersen Affidavit at f 15(a) 
through (g);R. 3883. 
122. Additionally, during the initial discussions between Lake View, Janice and 
ADC, they discussed a dispute with JanaLee Tobias and Judy Feld. Gerald Anderson told 
D. Andersen and Janice that Tobias and Feld had made efforts to intentionally interfere with 
the First REPC dealing with the Williams Property. Gerald reported that the cost of the 
Second REPC was significantly higher and that the profits from the sale of the Williams 
Property would be significantly diminished. Gerald stated that ADC probably would be 
filing suit against Tobias and Feld for their efforts to interfere with ADC's First and Second 
REPCs. See D. Andersen Affidavit at | 6 : R. 3883. 
123. At that time, Lake View and Janice agreed: 
a. That the decision to file suit would be that of ADC, 
b. ADC would be fully responsible to pay for all costs and attorney fees 
in filing suit, if it chose to file suit. See R. 3883-3884. 
c. That ADC would retain any rights to pursue claims against Tobias and 
Feld. Lake View and Janice would assign all rights to ADC to pursue all claims against 
Tobias and Feld. See D. Andersen Affidavit at H7(a) through (c); R. 3884. 
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124. In March 1998, Gerald informed D. Andersen that ADC had filed suit against 
Tobias and Feld for intentional interference with existing and prospective contractual 
relations. See D. Andersen Affidavit at ^ [8. 
125. Pursuant to our contractual relationship with ADC, Lake View and Janice 
closed on the Williams Property on April 17, 1998. See D. Andersen Affidavit at %9. 
126. When the Williams property was ultimately sold to High Uinta Investment 
Properties, LC, all claims in the litigation between ADC and Tobias and Feld were expressly 
reserved by ADC. See D. Andersen Affidavit at *[[10. 
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APPENDIX "B" 
TO 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
JANALEE TOBIAS and JUDY FELD 
Defendants and Counter CIaimants\Appellants 
vs. 
ANDERSON DEVELOPMENT CO., L.C. 
Plaintiff and Counter DefendantVAppellee 
Consolidated Appeal No. 20030469 
APPENDIX B 
STATEMENT OF CASE - Tobias/Feld's Counterclaims 
The following represents a summary of the voluminous facts contained principally in 
the 53 page counterclaimed filed by Tobias/Feld. This summary of facts was designed to 
give an overview of the time line of critical events associated with this case. For purposes 
of this appeal, this summary of facts was not intended to modify any of the events stated in 
the counterclaim filed by Tobias/Feld. 
PLEASE REFER TO THE CHART ATTACHED HERETO THAT ADC 
PREPARED TO GRAPHIC DEPICT THE FACTUAL CHRONOLOGY 
SUMMARIZED BELOW. THE NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS 
CORRESPOND TO THE NUMBERS ON THE CHART. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS OVER THE RIVERPARK PROJECT 
ENTITLEMENT PROCESS 
l ; 2 
1996 
LlO/96 '11/96 
21; 
24; 
>1997 
H2/96 11191 
38; 39 42 );51 
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58.59; 60 65; 7 
!> 1998 
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77 
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k 
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32 
35 4: 
56; 57 
1,63; 68; 69; 70 
1999 (cont.)~ 
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SALE OF PROJECT 
80 81 
->2000 
k599 r6/99 k7/99 r8/99 L9/99 • 10/99 Al l /99 '12/99 kl/00 
ENACTMENT OF ACT 
-> 2001 
•2 /00 A3/00 •4/00 k5/00 •6 /00 k7/00 rs/oo L9/00 '10/00 Al l /00 '12/00 kl/01 ^2/01 A3/01 F4/01 
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KEY: 
1. Red numbers reflect actions by Tobias/Feld. 
2. Blue numbers reflect actions by ADC. 
3. Green numbers reflect actions by South Jordan City. 
1. On or about October 7,1996, ADC filed an application with South Jordan City 
("SJC") for Master plan and zoning changes over the certain adjoining properties west of the 
Jordan River and south of 106th South Street in South Jordan City, Utah that were owned by 
various landowners including Robert Schmidt, Pat Forrest, Cal Robbins, Thomas K. 
Edmunds and Boyd and Dorothy Williams (the "ADC Application"). See Counterclaim at 
fl6;R.992. 
2. On or about October 28, 1996, ADC entered into a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (the "First REPC") with Boyd G. Williams and Dorothy D. Williams for purchase 
of their property (the "William's Property") for development of the RiverPark Business Park 
(the "RiverPark Project"). See Counterclaim at TJ17; R. 992. 
3. On or about November 6, 1996, SJC provided notice of a public hearing over 
the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at 1J21; R. 993. 
4. On or about November 6, 1996, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer regarding a 
meeting to discuss the notice of the SJC public hearing and to organize an opposition to the 
ADC Application. See Counterclaim at TJ22; R. 994. 
5. On or about November 15, 1996, Tobias/Feld held a meeting at Feld's home 
regarding opposition to the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at ^ [23-25; 30-32; R. 994-
996. 
6. On or about November 16,1996, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer regarding 
opposing the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at ]f33; R. 996. 
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7. On or about November 17, 1996, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer regarding 
meeting to organize opposition to the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at ^34; R. 996. 
8. On or about November 18, 1996, Tobias/Feld held a meeting at Feld's home 
regarding opposing the ADC Application and started to circulate a petition to stop any 
change to SJC's Master Plan requested in the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at 1ft|35-
37; R. 996-997. 
9. On or about November 19, 1996, Tobias/Feld met with SJC councilman 
Richard Warne to discuss the traffic impact of the RiverPark Project. See Counterclaim at 
f38;R. 997. 
10. On or about November 20,1996, a SJC Planning and Zoning Meeting is held 
in which Tobias/Feld voice opposition to the RiverPark Project. A split vote resulted. See 
Counterclaim at 1HJ39-48; R. 997-999. 
11. On or about November 20,1996, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer entitled "SOS 
Alert" against the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at [^49; R. 999. 
12. On or about November 23,1996, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer entitled "Top 
10 reasons to SOS (Save Our South Jordan River Valley)" in opposition to the ADC 
Application. See Counterclaim at Tf50; R. 1000. 
13. In or about November 1996, Tobias called Governor Leavitt regarding 
opposing the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at <|[51; R. 1000. 
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14. On or about November 25, 1996, Tobias received returned call from 
Governor's office regarding her opposition to the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at 
1J52;R. 1000. 
15. On or about November 26,1996, Tobias/Feld sent a letter to S JC requesting a 
three-month delay in their ruling over the ADC Application and to give Tobias/Feld further 
opportunity to make a presentation in opposition to the ADC Application. See Counterclaim 
at 1HI53-56; R. 1000-1001. 
16. On or about December 5,1996, Tobias/Feld held a meeting regarding opposing 
the ADC Application, Wendy Fisher, from Utah Open Lands, is invited, but does not attend. 
See Counterclaim at ffl[58-61; R. 1002-1003. 
17. On or about December 7, 1996, Tobias met with Congressman-elect Merrill 
Cook regarding obtaining federal funds to preserve open space in opposition to the ADC 
Application. See Counterclaim at Tfij62, 63; R. 1003. 
18. In or about December 1996, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer regarding a 
December 9, 1996 meeting to advocate citizen opposition to the RiverPark Project. See 
Counterclaim at ^|64; R. 1003. 
19. On or about December 9,1996, Tobias/Feld held a meeting to discuss strategy 
to oppose the RiverPark Project. See Counterclaim at ^65; R. 1003-1004. 
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20. In or about December 1996, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer through South 
Jordan Elementary School announcing a December 17,1996 public hearing over the ADC 
Application. See Counterclaim at [^66; R. 1004. 
21. On or about December 13,1996, ADC sent a letter to SOS regarding possible 
improper conduct by Tobias/Feld and others. See Counterclaim at ^70; R. 1004. 
22. On or about December 16, 1996, Tobias/Feld sent a letter to SJC requesting 
time for five or six spokespersons to speak at public hearing in opposition to the ADC 
Application. See Counterclaim at ^67; R. 1004. 
23. On or about December 16,1996, Tobias/Feld sent a letter to SJC demanding 
ADC perform certain studies before SJC considers the ADC Application. See Counterclaim 
at f68;R. 1004-1005. 
24. On or about December 17,1996, SJC held a public hearing wherein 
Tobias/Feld presents opposition to ADC Application and ADC presents its Application. See 
Counterclaim atffl[74-79; R. 1006-1007. 
25. On or about December 26,1996, Tobias sent a letter to Governor Leavitt 
regarding opposition to ADC Application. See Counterclaim at [^80; R. 1007. 
26. On or about January 7, 1997, SJC Council Meeting is held wherein Tobias 
presents arguments against ADC Application, including preserving the river bottoms, open 
space and air quality. See Counterclaim at % 81; R. 1007. 
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27. Prior [oJanuan 111 *>w / I obias/Feld distributed a flyer for meeting on January 
17, IW' to discuss dcNelopmeui ol ilie Soium .Ionian Kiser Parkway. See Counterclaim, at 
^|84;R. 1008.. 
28. On or about Januaiy ; ^ .• \)'J9 Tobias/Feld sent a letter to SJC councilmen 
Riciu;,; A am, ,i.t. -,^n .!or^r regarding opposing the ADC Application. See 
Zv. Un vi abuut Jdnucti ; i-tiii" lo discuss sdrateg) 
to oppose the ADC Application. See Counterclaim at ffi{84-87; R* 1°08-
ill t in *»r about January 27, 1997, ADC sent * Viler lo SJC regarding the ADC 
Application. Sec i 'ouiilcci Linn ai l|lv", R loo1!, 
v^ ii ui about Januar "7 |W7 \I)(" suil « Micnm lo S T Handing scope ol 
possible approva 1 >f (he ADC Application. See Counterclaim at ^85-87; R 1008 
r abuit January 28, 1997, SJC Council Meeting is held wherein they 
: lout consideration of tt le William's Property. See 
Counterclaim at ffi[89-92; I- - • 0. 
" On or about February 20,1997, I obias/Feld met with Jodi kcicl - <; 
range planner, and Wendy Fisher to discuss conservation easements as a possible alternative 
In llir AM l App lu l imn See < ' ou i i l e rc l a im al 1|^J. R MHO 
-6-
34. On or about February 21,1997, a meeting was held between Tobias/Feld, SJC 
and ADC to discuss future use of the William's Property. See Counterclaim at ffl|95-97; R. 
1010-1011. 
35. On or about March 6,1997, ADC filed an application with SJC over zoning 
changes to the William's Property (the "William's Application"). See Counterclaim at Tf98; 
R. 1011. 
36. On or about April 1997, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer for a meeting on April 
23,1997 to discuss opposition to the William's Application. See Counterclaim at ffl|99-101; 
R. 1011-1012. 
37. On or about April 23,1997, Tobias/Feld held a meeting to discuss opposition 
to the William's Application. See Counterclaim at TJ102; R. 1012. 
38. On or about April 24, 1997, Tobias/Feld attended a SJC Planning and Zoning 
Meeting over the RiverPark Project wherein the commission voted to approve the Williams 
Application. See Counterclaim at ^103-105; R. 1012-1013. 
39. On or about April 28,1997, SJC Council Meeting is held wherein Tobias/Feld 
presented their opposition to the RiverPark Project. The project was thereafter approved 
without the William's Property being considered. See Counterclaim at ^ [^ [[106-112; R. 1013-
1014. 
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40. On or about June 10,1997, Tobias contacted Congressman Merrill Cook again 
regarding preservation of the South Jordan River Valley River-bottom, including purchasing 
the William's Property. See Counterclaim at j^l 16; R. 1015. 
41. In or about June 1997, Tobias contacted Wendy Fisher again regarding 
purchasing the William's Property. See Counterclaim at ^[118; R. 1015. 
42. On or about June 30, 1997, First REPC expires between ADC and the 
Williams. See Counterclaim at T[l 14; R. 1014. 
43. In or about July 1997, Tobias/Feld gave a video tape on Odgen Nature Center 
to Williams. See Counterclaim at Tfl 19; R. 1015. 
44. In or about August 1997, Tobias/Feld contacted Dan Ross regarding 
purchasing the William's Property. See Counterclaim at f 121; R. 1015-1016. 
45. In or about August 1997, Tobias/Feld contacted Kay Morrill regarding 
purchasing the William's Property. See Counterclaim at ^ 121; R. 1015-1016. 
46. In or about August 1997, Tobias/Feld contacted SJC regarding purchasing the 
William's Property. See Counterclaim at ^121; R. 1015-1016. 
47. In or about August 1997, Tobias/Feld met with County Commissioner Randy 
Horiuchi (two times) regarding purchasing the William's Property. See Counterclaim at 
lfl[123, 124; R. 1016. 
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48. In or about August 1997, Tobias/Feld informed the Williams that they had 
raised $300k from the county to go towards the purchase of the William's Property. See 
Counterclaim at ^[125; R. 1016. 
49. In or about October 1997, Tobias/Feld brought County Commissioner Brent 
Overson to the Williams to tour the property for purposes of preserving or purchasing the 
William's Property. See Counterclaim at f!26; R. 1017. 
50. In or about October 1997, Tobias/Feld learned that SJC had proposed that the 
William's Property be traded for some SJC undeveloped adjoining park property, thereby 
creating an open space (the proposed park) barrier between the RiverPark Project and a 
residential subdivision. Immediately thereafter Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer entitled, "Save 
Our Park" that was in opposition to the land swap between Williams and SJC and a petition 
entitled, "Do Not Move the Park by the Jordan River, Do Not Open Jordan River Drive." See 
Counterclaim at ffl|127-129; R. 1017. 
51. On or about October 23,1997, Tobias/Feld released a news release regarding 
efforts to save the Jordan River-bottom in opposition to the RiverPark Project. See 
Counterclaim at Til30; R. 1017-1018. 
52. On or about November 14,1997, Tobias/Feld sent a letter to CourtlandNelsen, 
State Director of Parks regarding opposition to land trade between the Williams and SJC. 
See Counterclaim at If 131; R. 1018. 
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53. On or about November 6,1997, Tobias/Feld met with Wes Johnson and Terry 
Green of State Park and Recreation Dept. regarding opposition to land trade between the 
Williams and SJC. See Counterclaim at If 132; R. 1018. 
54. On or about November 7,1997, Tobias/Feld forwarded the December 13,1996 
ADC letter to Johnson and Green regarding opposing ADC Application. See Counterclaim 
atTJ133;R. 1018. 
55. In or about November 1997, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer opposing ADC's 
request for extension of time to complete of the RiverPark Project. See Counterclaim at 
K137;R. 1019. 
56. On or about November 25, 1997, SJC Council Meeting wherein ADC's 
requested extension is discussed. Tobias/Feld spoke in opposition to the extension and ADC 
spoke in favor of the same. A decision is postponed until December 16, 1997. See 
Counterclaim at ffl[139-143; R. 1019-1020. 
57. On or about November 25, 1997, ADC entered into 2nd REPC with the 
Williams for the purchase of the William's Property. See Counterclaim at 1J138; R. 1019. 
58. In or about December 1997, Tobias/Feld distributed a flyer regarding the 
scheduled December 16,1997 SJC Council Meeting and Tobias/Feld's opposition to ADC's 
extension request. See Counterclaim at ^ 144; R. 1020. 
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59. On or about December 16, 1997, SJC Council Meeting is held wherein 
Tobias/Feld urged rejection of ADC's extension. ADC requested for the extension. SJC 
granted the ADC extension. See Counterclaim at H1J145, 146; R. 1020-1021. 
60. In or about December 1997, Tobias/Feld decided to prepare a petition, by way 
of a ballot initiative, to overturn the extension granted to ADC by SJC. See Counterclaim 
at 1(147; R. 1021. 
61. In or about January 1998, Tobias/Feld circulated a petition to overturn the 
extension by way of a ballot initiative. See Counterclaim at f 148; R. 1021. 
62. On or about January 20,1998, Tobias/Feld submitted an application to circulate 
a referendum to SJC. See Counterclaim at ^[148; R. 1021. 
63. On or about January 26, 1998, SJC held a special meeting to discuss the 
RiverPark Project. See Counterclaim at Tfl[149, 150; R. 1021. 
64. On or about January 30,1998, Tobias/Feld met with State Senator Mont Evans 
and Governor Leavitt regarding opposing the RiverPark Project. See Counterclaim at Ifl 51; 
R.1022. 
65. On or about February 13,1998, SJC informed Tobias/Feld that the application 
for referendum was rejected by the SJC. See Counterclaim at 1fl[152, 153; R. 1022. 
66. On or about February 19,1998, Tobias/Feld filed a Petition for Extraordinary 
Writ with Utah Supreme Court to require acceptance of application. See Counterclaim at 
1[154;R. 1022. 
-11-
67. In or about February 1998, Tobias/Feld distributed flyer in opposition to 
RiverPark Project. See Counterclaim at ^[155; R. 1022-1023. 
68. On or about March 5, 1998, Tobias/Feld held a meeting with SJC mayor and 
others to oppose the RiverPark Project. See Counterclaim at 1(156; R. 1023. 
69. On or about March 6,1998, ADC served the original summons and complaint 
in this action on Tobias/Feld. See Counterclaim at ^[157; R. 1023. 
70. On or about March 11,1998, notwithstanding the filing this action, Tobias/Feld 
attended SJC Planning and Zoning Meeting to oppose the RiverPark Project. SJC voted to 
approved site plan for the RiverPark Proj ect. See Counterclaim at ^ [ 160-162; R. 1023-1024. 
71. In or about April 7, 1998, Tobias/Feld mailed 7000 referendum and initiative 
petitions to residents of SJC to stop the possible land swap, as well as the entire RiverPark 
Project. See Counterclaim at f 164; R. 1024. 
72. In or about April 1998, Tobias/Feld continued working to gather hundreds of 
signatures for the petition as they waited for the Supreme Court to rule. See Counterclaim 
at ffl[165-167;R. 1024-1025. 
73. On or about April 14, 1998, Tobias/Feld obtained a TRO against the zoning 
of the RiverPark Project pending the outcome of the case at the Supreme Court. See 
Counterclaim at ^168; R. 1025. 
74. On or about April 15, 1998, ADC closed on the 2nd REPC with the Williams 
over the William's Property. See Counterclaim at ^169; R. 1025. 
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75. On or about April 21,199 8, at the preliminary injunction hearing the injunction 
was denied and the TRO was lifted. See Counterclaim at ^[170; R. 1025. 
76. On or about April 21,1998, Tobias/Feld moved to dismiss ADC's Complaint 
on the following two-fold grounds: 1) that ADC had failed to state a claim for tortious 
interference with contract because there had been no breach, and 2) that the lawsuit was a 
misuse of the judicial system and had been filed solely to punish Tobias/Feld for their 
participation in government processes. See Defendants' Motion and Memorandum on file, 
esp. Memorandum Parts I and II for the tortious interference arguments and Part III for 
SLAPP arguments; R. 1025. 
77. On or about April 25, 1998, a SJC Council Meeting is held wherein SJC 
approved the site plan as the final step in the approval of the RiverPark Project. See 
Counterclaim at f 172; R. 1025. 
78. On or about December 8, 1998, the Court denied Tobias/Feld's Motion to 
Dismiss, finding that ADC had in fact stated a claim for tortious interference. See Order 
dated December 8, 1998. 
79. In or about October 1999, High Uinta Investment Properties, LC ("HUIP") 
enters into a Letter of Intent with ADC for the purchase of the RiverPark Development. 
80. In or about November 1999, HUIP purchased portion of RiverPark Project 
from ADC (First Closing). 
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8L In or about January 2000, HUIP purchased remaining portion of RiverPark 
Project from ADC (Second Closing). After this date, ADC had no ownership interest in the 
RiverPark Project. 
82. In or about April 30, 2001, 15 months after the final sale of the RiverPark 
Project by ADC, the Citizen Participation in Government Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-58-
101, et seq.) becomes law. 
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